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AN ESSAY IN HONOR OF HENRY MONAGHAN
Judith Resnik*
Between 2004 and 2009, the United States Supreme Court relied nu-
merous times on habeas corpus to protect the rights of citizens and of aliens
detained after 9/11.  Various claims could be marshaled to bracket the 9/11
decisions—as “war” cases; “Guantánamo” cases; “torture” cases; aberra-
tional responses to documented procedural unfairness; unusual instances of
federal pretrial detention; and either as extraordinary judicial rejections of
challenges to the Court’s authority or as disappointingly narrow procedural
remedies licensing forms of preventive detention.  Further, one could argue
that the specter of terrorism raises normative questions distinct from those
related to confinement for other reasons.
But neither the problems nor the law produced through 9/11 detention
are exotic.  Rather, they are continuous with judicial responses to decisions
by governments trying to maintain peace and security and, hence, incapaci-
tating some individuals feared likely to inflict grave harm.  Officials deal
with uncertainty about which persons are threatening in the contexts of
9/11, of ordinary criminality, and of border regulation.  In response, more
than two million persons are detained in the United States, and some
25,000 segregated in solitary confinement in “supermax” facilities.  Courts
in turn have, over the last several decades, addressed or demurred on claims
about the illegality of both the length and conditions of confinement, and
Congress has repeatedly sought to structure or limit routes that various kinds
of detainees may take to court.
Therefore, the 9/11 decisions are exemplary of what Henry Monaghan
termed the “timeless” questions within the federal courts canon about the role
of courts in this constitutional order.  One sees, repeatedly, the many effects of
“foreign” law on U.S. precepts, as well as the distinctive contributions made
by courts, obliged to function independently, to treat all persons as equally
entitled to dignity, and to work in public.  But the limited role for courts is
also vivid; even as adjudication can frame some parameters of confinement,
the protection of human dignity depends on a diverse set of officials interact-
ing at all levels and in all sectors of government.
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I. JUDGES, CUSTODY, AND THE FEDERAL COURTS CANON
To celebrate Henry Monaghan is to take law seriously.  An area of
law close to his heart (and to those of many others writing in this Sympo-
sium) is the jurisprudence of the federal courts.  As Monaghan explained
in 1970, the field’s “basic problem is, of course, a timeless one:  what is
the proper role of the federal courts in light of the limitations which
inhere in the judicial process, in separation of powers, and in federal-
ism.”1  This Essay, written to honor Monaghan’s work, addresses an as-
pect of that “timeless” problem:  claims brought to the federal courts by
individuals alleging unlawful detention.  This subject has drawn many
commentators in the last nine years as—through the sad and horrifying
sagas of Guantánamo, Abu Ghraib, Bagram, and torture—we have all be-
come involuntary witnesses to vivid examples of the totalizing authority
that can inhere in detention.2
Law sits inside and around these events.  Thus far, habeas corpus has
provided the principal jurisdictional predicate that has enabled individu-
als detained in the wake of 9/11 to appear before judges who were not
directly commissioned by the Department of Defense.  Between 2004 and
2009, the Supreme Court rendered six decisions involving habeas corpus
and the war on terror—Hamdi,3 Hamdan,4 Rasul,5 Padilla,6 Munaf,7 and
Boumediene8—and a seventh, Iqbal, in which the plaintiff sought redress
for mistreatment while in detention.9  In the six habeas cases, a majority
of Justices (on an often deeply divided Court) concluded that 9/11 de-
tainees, including U.S. citizens abroad and aliens under U.S. control,
have rights of access to independent Article III judges.10  Further, several
and of the Federal Courts in Support of the Habeas Petitioners Omar and Munaf, Munaf v.
Geren, 128 S. Ct. 2207 (2008) (Nos. 07-394, 06-1666); Brief of Amici Curiae Norman
Dorsen, Frank Michelman, Burt Neuborne, Judith Resnik, and David Shapiro in Support
of Petitioner [Supreme Court Appellate Jurisdiction], Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557
(2006) (No. 05-184).  In addition, aspects of this discussion relate to a forthcoming book,
co-authored with Dennis E. Curtis and entitled Representing Justice:  From Nascent City-
States to Democratic Courtrooms and Guantánamo Bay (Yale Press forthcoming 2010).
1. Henry P. Monaghan, Book Review, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 1753, 1754 (1970) (reviewing
David P. Currie, Federal Courts, Cases and Materials (1968)).
2. See generally Jane Mayer, The Dark Side:  The Inside Story of How the War on
Terror Turned into a War on American Ideals (2008).
3. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
4. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
5. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
6. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004).
7. Munaf v. Geren, 128 S. Ct. 2207 (2008).
8. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
9. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
10. The Court did not conclude that Article III judges had to make initial decisions
on the merits of the validity of detention.  For example, in Hamdi, the plurality opinion
suggested that detention of citizens during hostilities could be sustained through
administrative decisions made by neutral decisionmakers with subsequent access, in
appropriate circumstances, through habeas corpus to Article III judges. Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536–37 (2004) (plurality opinion).  In the wake of Boumediene,
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of these opinions insist on the limits of executive authority and, in
Hamdan and Boumediene, on the constraints on congressional authority
over federal habeas jurisdiction.  In contrast, in Iqbal, the Court (again
sharply divided) reached a different conclusion, interpreting pleading
and liability rules to make it difficult to obtain judicial redress for injuries
alleged to have stemmed from detention.
The task of my discussion is to understand the analytic relationship
between the recent law and the jurisprudential “canon” of the federal
courts.11   The idea that there is a “canon” (that a particular body of cases
and statutes focused on federal courts represents a jurisprudence of the
federal courts) stems from work in the 1930s by Felix Frankfurter, Harry
Schulman, and Wilbur Katz.12  In 1953, it became entrenched when
Henry Hart and Herbert Wechsler published the first edition of the
casebook, The Federal Courts and the Federal System (Hart and Wechsler).13  As
Henry Monaghan explained in 1974, Hart and Weschler is the “extraordi-
nary” casebook that prods its readers “to think over their heads about the
deepest problems of the legal process.”14
Monaghan made his comments when the second edition of Hart and
Wechsler was published two decades after the book had first appeared.
Monaghan noted that, while the overarching questions of the 1953 edi-
tion had endured,15 the next generation of editors (Paul Bator, Paul
Mishkin, and David Shapiro, who joined Herbert Wechsler) had intro-
district judges have reviewed more than thirty requests for habeas relief.  See infra notes
22–25 and accompanying text.
11. See Judith Resnik & Vicki C. Jackson, The Idea of a Jurisprudence, a Course, and
a Canon:  Introducing Federal Courts Stories, in Federal Courts Stories 1, 1–28 (Vicki
Jackson & Judith Resnik eds., 2009); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Reflections on the Hart
and Wechsler Paradigm, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 953, 961–64 (1994); Judith Resnik, Dependent
Sovereigns:  Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal Courts, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 671, 680–87
(1989); Judith Resnik, Rereading “The Federal Courts”:  Revising the Domain of Federal
Courts Jurisprudence at the End of the Twentieth Century, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 1021, 1022–25
(1994); Akhil Amar, Law Story, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 688, 690 (1989) (reviewing Paul M. Bator,
Daniel J. Meltzer, Paul J. Mishkin & David L. Shapiro, Hart and Wechsler’s the Federal
Courts and the Federal System (3d ed. 1988)).
12. See Cases and Other Authorities on Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure (Felix
Frankfurter & Harry Shulman eds., rev. ed. 1937); Cases and Other Authorities on Federal
Jurisdiction and Procedure (Felix Frankfurter & Wilber G. Katz eds., 1931).  For a detailed
history of Frankfurter’s role in crafting contemporary federal courts jurisprudence, see
generally Mary Brigid McManamon, Felix Frankfurter:  The Architect of “Our Federalism,”
27 Ga. L. Rev. 697 (1993).
13. The first edition, published in 1953, was dedicated by Hart and Wechsler to Felix
Frankfurter, “who first opened our minds to these problems.”  Henry M. Hart Jr. &
Herbert Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System, at ix (1953) [hereinafter
1953 Hart & Wechsler].
14. Henry P. Monaghan, Book Review, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 889, 889 (1974) (Paul M.
Bator, Paul J. Mishkin, David L. Shapiro & Herbert Wechsler, Hart and Wechsler’s The
Federal Courts and the Federal System (1973)) [hereinafter Monaghan, Hart & Wechsler]
(quoting Kingman Brewster, Jr., President of Yale University, in awarding an honorary
degree posthumously to Henry Hart in 1969).
15. Monaghan noted that “familiar landmark cases” had been retained.  Id. at 890.
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duced areas of law that had “no real counterpart” in the first edition.16
“[T]he most dramatic illustration of change” was the chapter on habeas
corpus that was “for all practical purposes . . . wholly new.”17  Moreover,
the pace of change required “further revision” of the just-published 1973
edition because the Supreme Court had worked “important changes in
doctrine” related to habeas corpus.18  As Monaghan reported, between
1953 and 1973, the law of habeas corpus had been transformed, prompt-
ing a major reconceptualization of federal courts’ relationship to
prisoners.
My questions are whether the 9/11 detention law works yet more
“important changes in doctrine” altering the understanding of the Con-
stitution’s role in structuring the predicates for, as well as the length and
conditions of, confinement.  Does the new spate of cases affect law gov-
erning other detainees, held in state or in federal custody, before or after
conviction, rather than in the limbo that we call Guantánamo Bay?19
Does the 9/11 case law illuminate the reach of congressional and execu-
tive control over the jurisdiction of life-tenured judges or the reach of
judicial oversight over government officials whom we now know author-
ized violent treatment of detainees?
One response is to answer these questions in the negative—based on
the view that 9/11 law is peculiar and discrete, dealing with executive,
pretrial detention of alleged terrorists and thus having little to offer a
general theory of separation of powers.  Below, in Part II, I identify six
claims that could be marshaled in support of such jurisprudential con-
tainment—bracketing 9/11 decisions as “war” cases; “Guantánamo”
cases; “torture” cases; aberrational judgments founded on collapses of
procedural fairness; idiosyncratic responses to federal executive pretrial
detention; and as either extraordinary moments of judicial pushback
against challenges to court authority or as disappointingly narrow insis-
tences on procedural remedies that, in practice, have licensed forms of
preventive detention and rejected the imposition of liability for torture
and degrading treatment.  The distinctions among populations of detain-
ees could thus serve to limit the import of 9/11 case law—either because
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.  Monaghan referred to cases, such as Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233
(1973), that imposed limits on post-conviction review.  Monaghan, Hart & Wechsler, supra
note 14, at 890 n.11. R
19. As Monaghan noted, these questions are at the core of the shifting conception of
federal courts jurisprudence, once preoccupied with the “relationship between state and
federal law” and the sometimes “irritating difficulty” of sorting between the two kinds.  Id.
at 891.  In the wake of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), a second focus
emerged, about whether the federal courts had a special role to play in the enforcement
and “vindication” of “federally secured rights.”  Monaghan, Hart & Wechsler, supra note
14, at 894.  Of course, the two aspects intersect, in that challenges to state detention by R
prisoners often entail deciding whether state law operated in tension with a “federally
secured right[ ].”  Id.  The question of an affirmative role for state courts in protecting
detainees is explored infra Part IV.E.
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terror raises unique normative questions justifying different or less pro-
cess or because pretrial detention should entitle those confined by 9/11
to more access to courts than prisoners held after conviction.
My argument, however, set forth in Part III, is that neither the
problems nor the case law represented in 9/11 detention are exotic.
Rather, they are continuous with judicial responses to the central chal-
lenges, faced daily, by governments trying to maintain peace and security
and, hence, incapacitating some individuals feared likely to inflict grave
harm to the social order.  Whether in the context of 9/11 or of more
familiar kinds of criminality and border regulation, officials must deal
with uncertainty about which persons have done or will do harm.  Gov-
ernments regularly desire to obtain information through intense interro-
gations aimed at preventing injuries and at apprehending wrongdoers,
and governments regularly detain various persons.  Courts in turn have,
over the last several decades, ruled many times on the legality of deten-
tion and of confinement conditions.
The underlying encounters producing detention are prompted by
different levels of threat, from minor crimes to transnational terrorism.
The fact of confinement is shared by criminal defendants awaiting trial as
well as those held without the prospect of a trial (as has been the situa-
tion for some 9/11 detainees), certain kinds of migrants, and individuals
deemed dangerous after their sentences have expired.  Further, deten-
tion does not end government needs for investigation and assessment of
individuals held in its jails and prisons.  Even after defendants are con-
victed and incarcerated, custodians must decide prison placements.
Thereafter, officials deal with individuals suspected of violating prison
rules or posing a danger to others.  Thus, in legally diverse settings, custo-
dial regimes must distinguish among and classify detainees to justify why a
particular subset is to be confined in more restrictive conditions than
others, and for longer periods of time.
After 9/11, the Executive asserted its exclusive authority to make all
these decisions for a set of detainees and, through legislation in 2005 and
2006, obtained congressional support for some versions of that proposi-
tion.20  The Supreme Court’s six habeas 9/11 opinions constitute a re-
fusal by life-tenured judges to accede to these assertions of total power.
These decisions read the Constitution to confer a substantive entitlement
20. See Military Commissions Act (MCA) of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600
(codified in scattered sections of 10 and 18 U.S.C.).  For further discussion of the 2006
MCA, see infra notes 118, 134 and accompanying text; see also Detainee Treatment Act R
(DTA) of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 10, 28, and 42 U.S.C.), discussed infra notes 118, 135 and accompanying text. R
On October 28, 2009, the President signed into law the Military Commissions Act of 2009,
which altered several aspects of the 2006 enactment.  See Military Commissions Act (MCA)
of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 1801, 123 Stat. 2190, 2574, discussed infra notes 95–99 and
accompanying text.
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to liberty that cannot be deprived without some process.21  Lower federal
courts then applied the Court’s rulings and, by December of 2009, had
concluded that thirty-one people were held at Guantánamo without suffi-
cient evidentiary support for confinement.22  Before then, the Bush
Administration had ordered many people transferred from Guantánamo;
when President Obama took office, he created a task force that also
found some Guantánamo detainees to be eligible for release.23  Thus, a
population estimated at its height to have included 774 detainees was, by
the fall of 2009, reduced to about 225 people.24  By December of 2009,
21. This reading became clear in the 2008 ruling of Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct.
2229 (2008).  See also Gerald L. Neuman, The Habeas Corpus Suspension Clause After
Boumediene v. Bush, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 536, 551–55, 575–76 (2010).
22. The number of decisions and their impact depends in part on when accountings
are made (and the spelling of the base’s name also varies with authors, some using
Guantánamo and others dropping the accent over the a).  As of December 1, 2009, the
courts had granted habeas relief for thirty-one detainees and denied the writ in eight cases.
Of the thirty-one who prevailed, twenty had been resettled or repatriated to their home
countries.  Of the eleven who had not then obtained relief, the government had sought
appellate review in two cases; the other nine cases involved seven petitioners from Uighurs,
a Kuwaiti, and an Algerian.  See David H. Remes, Legal Dir., Appeal for Justice,
Guantánamo Habeas Grants, Denials, and Appeals, as of 12/01/09 (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).  An analysis of the outcomes somewhat earlier comes from Jonathan
Hafetz & Jonathan Manes, ACLU National Security Project, List of Judgments Related to
Guantánamo Detainees (2009) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Hafetz
& Manes, Guantánamo Detainee Judgments], and from Chisun Lee, An Examination of 38
Gitmo Detainee Lawsuits, ProPublica, Sept. 29, 2009, at http://www.propublica.org/
special/an-examination-of-31-gitmo-detainee-lawsuits-722 (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
23. The Executive Order issued in January 2009 called for the closing of Guantánamo
and mandated that the government undertake a comprehensive review of the detainees.
See Review and Disposition of Individuals Detained at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base
and Closure of Detention Facilities, Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897 (Jan. 22,
2009).  Thereafter, Attorney General Holder announced the creation of a task force to
review individual cases.  See William Glaberson, Pentagon Finds Guantánamo Follows
Geneva Conventions, N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 2009, at A11.  As of October 12, 2009, the
findings of the Guantanamo Detainee Review Task Force had not been made public.  See
Christopher Flavelle, Why Many Guantanamo Detainees Ordered Released Are Still Stuck
There, ProPublica, Oct. 12, 2009, at http://www.propublica.org/feature/gitmo-
guantanamo-detainees-ordered-released-are-still-stuck-there-1012 (on file with the Columbia
Law Review).  However, in December of 2009, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates testified
that the task force had cleared 116 of some 215 detainees then remaining for transfer.
That number may include some of the persons for whom habeas relief was granted.  See
Afghanistan:  Assessing the Road Ahead:  Hearing on Afghanistan Policy Before the S.
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 111th Cong. (2009), LEXIS, Federal News Service Transcript
(on file with the Columbia Law Review).
24. See Andy Worthington, The Guantánamo Files:  The Stories of the 774 Detainees
in America’s Illegal Prison (2007); The Guantánamo Docket, N.Y. Times, at http://
projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo (last visited Jan. 17, 2010) (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) [hereinafter The Guantánamo Docket].  Somewhat different numbers come
from the Washington Post.  See Wash. Post, Guantanamo Bay Timeline, at http://projects.
washingtonpost.com/guantan amo/timeline/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2009) (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Guantánamo Bay Timeline].  The exact numbers are
imprecise because the “Pentagon has consistently refused to comprehensively identify
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about twenty of the thirty who had prevailed in their habeas petitions had
in fact been released from Guantánamo,25 along with dozens of others
who had left by virtue of executive action.
The 9/11 case law has prompted diverse assessments, with arguments
that the judiciary has done too much, or too little, or left unanswered
important questions about the permissible scope of executive detention
and surveillance powers.26  Evaluations depend on a baseline, and my fo-
cus is on how these rulings illuminate the “federal courts canon” address-
ing the constitutionality of detention of various populations in jails, pris-
ons, and immigration centers.  The 9/11 habeas decisions have afforded
more opportunities for these detainees to contest the legality of their
confinement than do current rules governing access for prisoners con-
those it holds.”  Benjamin Wittes & Zaahira Wyne, Brookings Inst., The Current Detainee
Population of Guantánamo:  An Empirical Study 1 (2008), available at http://www.
brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/reports/2008/1216_detainees_wittes/1216_detainees_
wittes.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review); see also David Bowker & David Kaye,
Guantanamo by the Numbers, N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 2007, at A15.  Researchers at the
Washington Post generated a comprehensive list, through checking court documents and
international sources, of the names and countries of origin of 550 Guantánamo detainees
held between 2002 and 2006.  See Names of the Detained in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba,
Wash. Post, at http://projects.washingtonpost.com/guantanamo (last visited Nov. 20,
2009) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
25. See supra note 22.  The district judges involved in the litigation included Judges
Urbina, Leon, Huvelle, Kessler, and Kollar-Kotelly.  They had granted writs in various
cases, including seventeen Uighurs of whom four were released to Bermuda; five Bosnian-
Algerians, of whom four were released—three to Bosnia and one (Lakhdar Boumediene,
the named plaintiff in the 2008 Supreme Court judgment) to France; one person from
Chad released to that country; three Yemenis, of whom one was returned to Yemen; three
Kuwaitis, of whom one was returned to Kuwait; one Afghan, released to that country; and a
Syrian who remained in custody.  As noted supra note 22, eight writs had been denied;
those cases include Judge Leon’s denials of those filed by Belkacem Bensayah of Bosnia,
Hisham Sliti and Hammamy of Tunisia, and Muaz Al Alawi and Ghaleb Nassar Al Bihani of
Yemen; Judge Robertson’s denial of the writ from Waqas Mohammed Ali Awad of Yemen;
Judge Kollar-Kotelly’s denial of the writ from Fawzi Al Odah of Kuwait; and, Judge Collyer’s
denial of the writ from Sufyian Barhoumi of Algeria.  See Hafetz & Manes, Guantánamo
Detainee Judgments, supra note 22.  Given that, at some periods, more than 770 persons
had been known to have been held at Guantánamo and that the population in the fall of
2009 was estimated to be under 225, the decline in population through release and
relocation came primarily through executive action.  See supra notes 22–24.
26. Benjamin Wittes argued the judiciary had, or was likely to impose, too many
constraints on the other branches as they dealt with a warlike situation.  See Benjamin
Wittes, Law and the Long War:  The Future of Justice in the Age of Terror 103–13 (2008).
Jenny Martinez and Stephen Vladeck read the courts as doing too little.  Jenny S. Martinez,
Process and Substance in the “War on Terror,” 108 Colum. L. Rev. 1013, 1017–18 (2008);
see also Stephen I. Vladeck, The Long War, The Federal Courts, and the Necessity/
Legality Paradox, 43 U. Rich. L. Rev. 893, 896 (2009) [hereinafter Vladeck, The Long War]
(reviewing Wittes’s book).  In this volume, Richard Fallon looks to doctrine and political
science to explain the Court’s reticence to “resolve large questions” including “the legally
permissible breadth of the category of suspected ‘enemy combatants’ or terrorist suspects
that the Executive Branch can detain.”  See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court,
Habeas Corpus, and the War on Terror:  An Essay on Law and Political Science, 110
Colum. L. Rev. 352, 357 (2010) [hereinafter Fallon, Habeas Corpus].
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fined after convictions.  Indeed, the Court’s pronouncements have
helped to produce an all-branch, multiple-institution, and cross-border
debate about the treatment of 9/11 detainees.
But looking only at the habeas jurisprudence prompted by 9/11 is
too narrow a focus, for some litigants have also sought redress for past,
allegedly unlawful, confinement.  The seventh major Supreme Court
9/11 decision is Ashcroft v. Iqbal, a lawsuit seeking damages for alleged
abuse during a post-9/11 detention.27  Echoing the treatment accorded
ordinary prisoners seeking redress for oppressive conditions of confine-
ment and harsh treatment,28 the Supreme Court responded by creating
new doctrines to shelter government officials from liability.29  As detailed
below, during the period producing the seven 9/11 decisions, the Su-
preme Court issued some eighty rulings dealing with regular prisoners.
In a few instances, the Court provided relief, but more often concluded
that narrow routes to court for prisoners precluded merits reviews and
remedies.  Thus, by placing 9/11 case law in the context of the constitu-
tional law of detention, one can see both the impact of judicial rulings
and the deep reluctance of federal judges to take on roles policing the
violence entailed in custodial settings.
Furthermore, disquieting parallels emerge between conditions at
Guantánamo that have drawn international attention and those afforded
ordinary prisoners.  The prolonged isolation of some of the detainees at
that base is paralleled by conditions of confinement in “supermax” facili-
ties throughout the United States.  For example, as the Supreme Court
detailed in its 2005 decision of Wilkinson v. Austin,30 prisoners could be
placed for years in isolation cells, with constant surveillance facilitated by
lights illuminated twenty-four hours a day.  The Court did require a cor-
rectional system to conduct minimal procedural inquiries but imposed
no constitutional oversight of the underlying offenses justifying the isola-
tion of individuals or of the permissible duration of such confinement.31
To preview some of the conclusions in Part IV, the integration of the
law emerging from 9/11 detention with that governing confinement oc-
casioned by police, prison, and immigration officials provides several in-
sights.  A first is that the state regularly faces tremendous challenges in
securing safety, at both local and global levels. Sorting the dangerous
from the benign is a daunting task.  While the context of terror has dis-
tinctive features, including a scale of harm almost unimaginable, terror-
ism is part of a fabric of threats coming from diverse sources that chal-
lenge the peace and security of the state.  The point is captured by the
deployment of the metaphor of “war”—the “war on drugs,” “war on
crime,” and “war on terror.”  The result is that diverse groups of individu-
27. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
28. See infra Part III.C.
29. See infra notes 197–211 and accompanying text. R
30. 545 U.S. 209 (2005).
31. Id. at 225, discussed infra notes 261–288 and accompanying text.
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als are in detention, and that the 9/11 detainees are not the only set of
individuals confined outside the criminal process.
A second lesson is the special utility of a particular facet of litiga-
tion—that it generates “publicity,” a term borrowed from Jeremy Ben-
tham.32  The information-forcing function of public adjudication spawns
debate about the state’s practices.  What the judicial limits on 9/11 deten-
tion have helped to produce is widespread discussion about the legiti-
macy and sustainability of the confinement just as, episodically, court de-
cisions about treatment of other kinds of detainees have brought
attention to incarcerated individuals.33  But public debate ought not be
equated with particular outcomes.  Legislative initiatives since 9/11 have
repeatedly sought to bar detainees from access to redress,34 akin to ef-
forts by Congress to limit federal review of claims brought by onshore
prisoners and detained migrants.35  By reading 9/11 law alongside the
doctrine and statutes governing various detained populations, one finds
repeated patterns of lawmaking that leave confined persons with minimal
or no access to independent judges working before the public.
Thus, and third, decades of debate about detention have neither
produced a consensus nor securely anchored an engaged role for courts
in developing norms.  At some points, judges have imposed substantive
and procedural constraints.  In the 1960s, for example, a federal court
outlawed the “whipping to the bare skin of prisoners” in an Arkansas
32. See Jeremy Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence (1827) [hereinafter
Bentham, Rationale], in 6 The Works of Jeremy Bentham 351 (John Bowring ed.,
Edinburgh, William Tait 1843) [hereinafter Bowring, Works]; infra Part IV.C.  Volumes of
the Works of Jeremy Bentham were published after Bentham’s death in 1832 by John Bowring,
Bentham’s literary executor.  Bowring’s editions are available online at http://oll.liberty
fund.org/index.php?option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show.php&title=1920 (last visited
Nov. 18, 2009).  Republication, with revisions reflecting a review of original manuscripts, is
underway through the Bentham Project, located at the University College London’s Law
Faculty (UCL) and guided by Professor Philip Schofield.  See UCL Bentham Project:
Publications, at http://www.ucl.ac.uk/Bentham-Project/Publications/public.htm (last
visited Nov. 18, 2009).
33. A contemporary illustration is the litigation about California prisons, which have
been held to be so overcrowded as to violate the prisoners’ constitutional rights.  See
Coleman v. Schwarzenegger (Coleman I), Nos. CIV S-90-0520 & C01-1351, 2009 WL 330960
(E.D. Cal. & N.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2009) (preliminary ruling); see also Coleman v.
Schwarzenegger (Coleman II), Nos. CIV S-90-0520 & C01-1351, 2009 WL 2430820 (E.D. Cal.
& N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2009) (subsequent order requesting development of a plan to reduce
population), discussed infra notes 268, 307–309 and accompanying text. R
34. See MCA of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified in scattered
sections of 10 and 18 U.S.C.), discussed infra notes 118, 134, and accompanying text; DTA R
of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
10, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
35. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.); Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321-66 (1996)
(codified in scattered sections of 11, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.); Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009
(codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) (2006)).
\\server05\productn\C\COL\110-2\COL208.txt unknown Seq: 11 17-MAR-10 7:55
2010] DETENTION AND THE FEDERAL COURTS 589
prison but noted that use of “the strap” for corporal punishment might
be permissible, if “appropriate safeguards” were put into place.36  In the
same era, the Supreme Court concluded that practices that had once
been common—conviction and imprisonment for felonies that were
achieved without the provision of lawyers for indigent defendants and
custodial interrogations without the right to silence—were unconstitu-
tional.37  In the 1980s, the Court addressed the duration of confinement,
concluding that life imprisonment based on a minor offense was dispro-
portionately harsh.38  More recently, both courts and legislatures have
been deeply deferential to executive action by limiting prisoner access
and licensing a great deal of discretion as to both the form and substance
of confinement.39  In 1987, in McCleskey v. Kemp, the Supreme Court re-
fused to evaluate claims of structural racial bias in sentencing, just as in
2003, the Court declined in Lockyer v. Andrade to license judges to inquire
regularly into the proportionality of life sentences.40
Fourth, this integrated approach offers insight into the relevance of
the political structure of federalism to the constitutional law of custody.
In the 1960s and 1970s, the state courts were seen as failing to provide
sufficient protections for defendants and prisoners, and hence in need of
federal court oversight via both habeas corpus and civil rights oversight
through § 1983 litigation.  In subsequent decades, federalism has been
invoked to justify deference to state officials.  The attention to federal
custody generated by 9/11 and immigration detention ought, however,
to serve as a reminder that custodial excesses can occur in any jurisdic-
tion, as can arguments for deference to jailers’ expertise.  The fundamen-
tal question of the proper role for outside oversight (judicial or other-
wise) is not an artifact of federalism, and thus the law of 9/11 detention
invites reconsideration of the part for state court judges to play in buffer-
ing the encounter between detainee and custodian.
Fifth, the political and legal culture framing decisionmaking about
detainees is not a product made from exclusively domestic exchanges.
When courts generate responses that are at times constraining and more
often licensing custodial authority, their judgments reflect—expressly
and at points implicitly—comparisons made between American and “for-
eign” norms.41  The Cold War dots the development of the law of the
Fourth and Fifth Amendment during the 1950s–1970s, just as the con-
36. Jackson v. Bishop, 268 F. Supp. 804, 812–16 (E.D. Ark. 1967), discussed infra note
296 and accompanying text.  The Supreme Court upheld the assessment of attorneys’ fees
against the state as part of the remedies in the Arkansas prison litigation in Hutto v.
Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 691–93 (1978).
37. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335,
344–45 (1963).
38. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 303 (1983).
39. See, e.g., discussion of statutes supra notes 34–35. R
40. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 319 (1987), discussed infra notes 400–402;
Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 77 (2003), discussed infra note 403.
41. See infra notes 223–244 and accompanying text.
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temporary War on Terror marks these decades’ decisions.  The
“American” law of detention and of criminal defendants’ rights more
generally is laced with jurisprudential rights and fears that criss-cross the
boundaries of the nation-state.
Finally, what Henry Monaghan called “self-regulating official behav-
ior”42 remains central.  Monaghan used that phrase in the 1970s to bring
attention to the relationship between federal law and first-tier deci-
sionmakers, such as schoolteachers and police officers, whose judgments
were central to students and to individuals suspected of crimes.  In the
context of this discussion, the relevant officials include employees of the
Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, and Immigra-
tion and Customs Enforcement; line officers and soldiers in the armed
forces; lawyers in the Department of Justice; police officers; immigration
judges, and other initial adjudicators in specialized tribunals, as well as
state and federal trial judges.  These various frontline personnel have a
more immediate and greater role to play than do appellate courts, sitting
at a distance from the underlying interactions.  Hence it is their “official
behavior” that is pivotal.
But the issue is the content of such “self-regulation.”  What treatment
is to be required, in what Monaghan called “sufficiently concrete terms,”
for detainees and what incentives for compliance will law impose?43  Is
preventive detention permissible?  The placement of individuals in long-
term solitary confinement?  What institutions—courts, legislatures, pro-
fessional organizations of these various first-tier authorities—determine
the answers?  The 9/11 decisions put these questions—at the core of the
federal courts’ canon—vividly on display.  Some officials claimed the to-
tality of government power over the bodies of other human beings, while
other members of the government insisted on the limits of state author-
ity.  What human dignity required was, and is, deeply contested.
II. JURISPRUDENTIAL CONTAINMENT:  MARGINALIZING 9/11 DETENTION
A. “War” Cases
Various arguments can be marshaled for jurisprudential contain-
ment of the 9/11 Supreme Court case law.  The cases could be clustered
under the rubric of war, to resurface when again at war.  Precedent for
this approach comes from another group of cases that have returned to
currency through the 9/11 case law.  Once relegated to a very brief dis-
cussion in federal courts jurisprudence, these newly rediscovered “old”
war cases include the 1866 decision of Ex parte Milligan,44 the 1942 judg-
42. Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term—Foreword:  Constitutional
Common Law, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 26 (1975) [hereinafter Monaghan, Constitutional
Common Law].
43. I am paraphrasing Monaghan’s discussion about how to control “official
misbehavior.”  Id. at 21 & n.111.
44. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
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ment of Ex parte Quirin,45 the 1948 Hirota v. MacArthur opinion,46 and the
1950 ruling of Johnson v. Eisentrager.47
In brief summary, the Civil War era decision of Milligan held that the
military’s effort to try civilians, in lieu of a trial in the federal courts, was
unconstitutional.48  Lambdin P. Milligan, a “lawyer and a minor politi-
cian . . . with well-known Southern sympathies,” was arrested in October
of 1864 in Indiana and charged with “conspiracy against” the govern-
ment, giving “aid and comfort to rebels,” and violating the laws of war.49
Tried by a military commission and ordered “to be hanged,” Milligan and
four codefendants sought relief directly from President Lincoln, who ap-
peared willing to review the issue but was then assassinated.  President
Andrew Johnson’s direction that the executions go forward was met by
“frantic efforts” to save the defendants’ lives, including Milligan’s
Supreme Court litigation challenging the jurisdiction of the
commission.50
That 1866 decision drew a sharp distinction between wartime, when
martial law governed and ordinary courts could not function, and the
aftermath, when courts were open.  Drawing on “precedents in English
and American history,” including post-1789 English parliamentary de-
bates,51 the majority rejected the Executive’s security assessment; the
Court concluded that the safety of the country had not required martial
law in Indiana.52  Thus, because Milligan had been arrested when federal
courts were open, he was entitled to the protections of the Fourth, Fifth,
and Sixth Amendments—the “birthright of every American citizen.”53
Milligan appeared to cabin non-Article III adjudication through the
Court’s insistence on citizens’ constitutional rights of access to courts, if
they were functioning. Milligan thus divested Union military officers of
45. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
46. 338 U.S. 197 (1948).
47. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).  Several other decisions could be included, but these four
have framed much of the discussion in the 9/11 habeas judgments.
48. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 123; see also Brian McGinty, Lincoln and the Court 249–50
(2008).
49. McGinty, supra note 48, at 248.  McGinty detailed that Milligan and his R
codefendants were members of the “Sons of Liberty,” dedicated to “ending the war on
terms favorable to the South.”  Id.
50. Id. at 249–50.
51. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 128.
52. Id. at 127.
53. Id. at 119.  While the majority provided a constitutional basis for release, a
concurring opinion by Chief Justice Chase argued that Indiana was a military district at the
time of Milligan’s arrest and that, given the potential for invasion, Congress had authority
to create special tribunals.  But Chase thought that Milligan should prevail based on a
statutory claim—that in contradiction of the Habeas Corpus Act of 1863, which gave
persons arrested under military authority rights to release unless a grand jury had indicted
them, Milligan had not been indicted by a grand jury.  Id. at 133–35 (Chase, C.J.,
concurring); see also Daniel J. Meltzer, The Story of Ex Parte McCardle:  The Power of
Congress to Limit the Supreme Court’s Appellate Jurisdiction, in Federal Courts Stories,
supra note 11, at 57, 60–61 [hereinafter Meltzer, Ex Parte McCardle]. R
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power in favor of judges and juries in Southern and border states, pre-
sumptively less enthusiastic about Reconstruction and more likely sympa-
thetic to the defendants.
In contrast, the World War II era ruling in Ex parte Quirin upheld the
authority of an ad hoc military commission despite the availability of civil-
ian courts and the possibility that one of the defendants was a U.S. citi-
zen.54  Moreover, Quirin validated a military-based process in which sev-
eral individuals, apprehended on U.S. shores after a botched plan to
engage in sabotage, were sentenced to death.55  As unpacked in later de-
cades, the decisionmaking process in Quirin was infused with unfairness.
At least one Justice was involved in the initial decision to constitute the ad
hoc tribunal whose constitutionality the Court subsequently reviewed.56
The Supreme Court’s own process was truncated and its decision
premature.  In a special sitting in July of 1942,57 the Court heard argu-
ments as the defendants were on trial before the military commission.
Given just a few days to brief the issues, the lawyers began their argu-
ments although not all the Justices had returned to Washington for the
session.58  On July 31, the Court issued a per curiam decision upholding
the commission’s authority.59  On August 8, six of the eight were exe-
cuted.  Some three months later, on October 29, 1942, the Court issued
its opinion justifying what had already occurred.
As Justice Scalia commented in 2004 in Hamdi (when Quirin gained
what Carlos Vázquez has called its “second life”60), the 1942 decision did
not represent “the Court’s finest hour.”61  But in one respect, Quirin was
admirable.  President Roosevelt’s July 7, 1942, Proclamation provided
that persons to be tried by military commissions “shall not be privileged
to seek any remedy or maintain any proceeding directly or indirectly . . .
in the courts of the United States, or of its States.”62  Yet, the Court in-
54. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 48 (1942).
55. One of those before the Supreme Court claimed to be an American citizen, but
the Quirin Court distinguished the holding in Milligan by characterizing the American as
an “unlawful belligerent,” whereas Milligan argued his loyalty.  Id. at 45.
56. Carlos M. Vázquez, “Not a Happy Precedent”:  The Story of Ex parte Quirin, in
Federal Courts Stories, supra note 11, at 219, 230 [hereinafter Vázquez, Quirin]. R
57. 317 U.S. at 19.
58. Vázquez, Quirin, supra note 56, at 229. R
59. 317 U.S. at 18.  The July 31, 1942, per curiam opinion is included, as an unmarked
initial note, within Justice Stone’s full opinion for the Court, filed on October 29, 1942.
The July per curiam stated that the Court had “fully considered the questions raised in
these cases and thoroughly argued at the bar, and has reached its conclusion upon them.”
Id.  It therefore announced “its decision and enters its judgment in each case, in advance
of the preparation of a full opinion which necessarily will require a considerable period of
time.”  Id.
60. Vázquez, Quirin, supra note 56, at 220. R
61. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 569 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
62. See Denying Certain Enemies Access to the Courts of the United States,
Proclamation No. 2561, 3 C.F.R. § 309 (1968), reprinted in 56 Stat. 1964 (1942).  The
order provided that
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sisted that its own authority reached “enemy aliens.”63  Thus, Quirin
stands for federal court authority to review military tribunal rulings de-
spite the effort by President Roosevelt to close off judicial redress.64
A few years thereafter, the Supreme Court refused to entertain
habeas petitions coming from convictions of “war criminals” in military
tribunals convened in the “Far East,” such as the 1948 judgment of Hirota
v. MacArthur,65 and in Germany, exemplified by the 1950 decision of
Johnson v. Eisentrager.66 The cases involved claims that offshore tribunals
controlled by the United States had tried and sentenced individuals in a
manner violative of constitutional rights.  The Supreme Court repeatedly
declined jurisdiction over various petitions, often ruling by divided deci-
sions and offering little by way of explanation.67
all persons who are subjects, citizens or residents of any nation at war with the
United States or who give obedience to or act under the direction of any such
nation, and who during time of war enter or attempt to enter the United States or
any territory or possession thereof, through coastal or boundary defenses, and are
charged with committing or attempting or preparing to commit sabotage,
espionage, hostile or warlike acts, or violations of the law of war, shall be subject
to the law of war and to the jurisdiction of military tribunals; and that such
persons shall not be privileged to seek any remedy or maintain any proceeding,
directly or indirectly, or to have any such remedy or proceeding sought on their
behalf, in the courts of the United States, or of its States, territories, and
possessions . . . .
Id.
63. “[N]either the Proclamation nor the fact that they are enemy aliens forecloses
consideration by the courts of petitioners’ contentions that the Constitution and laws of
the United States constitutionally enacted forbid their trial by military commission.”
Quirin, 317 U.S. at 25.
64. As Vázquez recounted, on the same day this Proclamation was issued, President
Roosevelt issued a Military Order that created the commission, appointed its members,
and appointed prosecutors and defense counsel.  The commission was to make its own
rules for fair trials “consistent with the powers of military commissions under the Articles of
War,” and could receive evidence that had “probative value to a reasonable man.”
Convictions and sentencing required a two-thirds agreement.  None of the seven generals
who were picked by the government to preside had legal training. See Exec. Order No.
9185, 7 Fed. Reg. 5103 (July 2, 1942); Vázquez, Quirin, supra note 56, at 224–26. R
65. 338 U.S. 197 (1948) (per curiam).  A group of Japanese officials, including the
former premier, Koki Hirota, filed motions under the Supreme Court’s original
jurisdiction after having been convicted by the International Military Tribunal for the Far
East, which they argued was under U.S. control.  Id. at 198; see also Timothy P. Maga,
Judgment at Tokyo:  The Japanese War Crimes Trials 2–3 (2001).
66. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).  German nationals, alleged to have committed war crimes
outside the United States, were apprehended and convicted in China and then detained in
an American military prison in occupied Germany.  Id. at 765–66.  They sought relief, but
unlike Hirota and several other World War II cases, Johnson v. Eisentrager was first filed in
the federal lower courts.  Id. at 765.  The Court held that lower courts lacked jurisdiction.
Id. at 778.  The scope and basis of that judgment was central to the debate in Boumediene,
discussed infra notes 77–78. R
67. See, e.g., Everett v. Truman, 334 U.S. 824 (1948).  The petition in Everett (brought
by seventy-four Germans seeking “relief from sentences upon the verdicts of a General
Military Government Court at Dachau”) was one of a series in 1948 in which the Court
split, four to four, and hence refused to permit motions for filing of original writs of
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habeas corpus.  Id. at 824.  Chief Justice Vinson as well as Justices Reed, Frankfurter, and
Burton were of the “opinion that there is want of jurisdiction,” while Justices Black,
Douglas, Murphy, and Rutledge would have permitted the petition and put the cases on
the argument calendar.  Id.  Justice Jackson, who had been the presiding jurist at
Nuremburg, did not participate.  Id.  As Hart and Wechsler explained, “identical orders”
denied fifteen more petitions that term and another thirteen the following.  Paul M. Bator,
Paul J. Mishkin, David L. Shapiro & Herbert Wechsler, Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal
Courts and the Federal System 305 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter 1973 Hart & Wechsler].
Justice Jackson altered his approach in Hirota v. MacArthur, 335 U.S. 876 (1948),
which arose from decisions in Asia in which he had not been involved.  He noted that the
country needed to get beyond the “stalemate.”  Id. at 881 (Jackson, J., concurring in
granting leave to file petitions for writs of habeas corpus); see 1973 Hart & Wechsler,
supra, at 305.  As Justice Jackson explained:
If I add my vote to those who favor denying these applications for want of
jurisdiction, it is irrevocable.  The Japanese will be executed and their partisans
will forever point to the dissents of four members of the Court to support their
accusation that the United States gave them less than justice . . . . If, however, I
vote with those who would grant temporary relief, it may be that fuller argument
and hearing will convert one or more of the Justices on one side or the other
from the views that have equally divided them in the German cases.  In those
cases I did not feel at liberty to cast the deciding vote and there was no course to
avoid leaving the question unresolved.  But here I feel that a tentative assertion of
jurisdiction, which four members of the Court believe does not exist, will not be
irreparable if they ultimately are right.
Hirota, 335 U.S. at 880.
Thereafter, a brief per curiam decision was issued in December of 1948.  The Court
concluded that under the circumstances—including the fact that the International
Tribunal for the Far East was not created or directly controlled by the United States and
that the petitioners were all Japanese citizens and residents—courts of the United States
had “no power or authority to review, to affirm, set aside or annul the judgments and
sentences.” Hirota, 338 U.S. at 198.
Six months later, in June of 1949, Justice Douglas filed a concurrence in which he
stated that jurisdiction did lie in the District Court for the District of Columbia, but that
the disposition was permissible because the international nature of the problem rendered
it a political question about which the “President as Commander-in-Chief, and as
spokesman for the nation in foreign affairs, had the final say.”  Id. at 215 (Douglas, J.,
concurring).  Justice Jackson continued after the decision in Hirota not to participate in
cases coming from Germany, and petitions continued to be denied based on the same split
that had preceded the Hirota ruling.  See 1973 Hart & Wechsler, supra, at 307.
Hirota gained new saliency in 2008, when the Court decided Munaf v. Geren, 128 S.
Ct. 2207 (2008), addressing habeas access for American citizens detained or convicted by
an Iraqi criminal tribunal that had been set up after the U.S. invasion.  The Court (per
Chief Justice Roberts) found that citizen detainees were in United States custody and
therefore the district court had jurisdiction.  Id. at 2217–18.  The “equitable principles”
governing habeas, however, precluded the federal courts from enjoining the transfer of
the petitioners to the control of a foreign sovereign (Iraq) alleging violation of its laws.  Id.
at 2220–25 (citation omitted).
The majority also concluded that allegations that transfer would “result in torture”
were to be dealt with “by the political branches, not the judiciary.”  Id. at 2225.  Justice
Souter, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, concurred and underscored that the Court
had reserved judgment on what the majority had termed an “extreme case in which the
Executive has determined” that transfer would result in torture.  Id. at 2228 (Souter, J.,
concurring, joined by Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ.) (citation omitted).  The concurrence
added that “the caveat” ought to extend to “a case in which the probability of torture is well
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The four (old) cases—Milligan, Quirin, Hirota, and Eisentrager—ad-
dress some of what Henry Monaghan termed “timeless” problems, includ-
ing the power of the President to close off access to Article III courts, the
obligations of the executive branch within and outside the United States,
the role to be played by Congress in configuring non-Article III adjudica-
tion, and the degree of deference to be accorded when claims of military
necessity are proffered.  Yet until 9/11, legal and political theorists rarely
asked their students to think about military tribunals as exemplary of
these broad (and hard) questions.
One can see this marginality by using the four military tribunal cases
as bellwethers and examining the five editions of Hart and Wechsler pub-
lished from 1953 through 2003, the 2008 supplement, and a sixth edition
that hit the bookstands in the spring of 2009.68  Until 2003, the most
extended treatment was a few-page subsection headed “Note on the War
Crimes Cases” and focused on whether the Supreme Court would hear
petitions filed directly by individuals convicted abroad after World War
II.69  After 9/11, however, the length of the Hart and Wechsler materials
jumped to ten pages in 2003 and to more than ninety in the supplement
documented, even if the Executive fails to acknowledge it.”  Id.  Further, the concurrence
noted that “habeas would not be the only avenue open to an objecting prisoner.”  Id.
68. The seven versions of Hart and Wechsler are, in chronological order:  1953 Hart &
Wechsler, supra note 13; 1973 Hart & Wechsler, supra note 67; Paul M. Bator, Daniel J. R
Meltzer, Paul J. Mishkin & David L. Shapiro, Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and
the Federal System (3d ed. 1988) [hereinafter 1988 Hart & Wechsler]; Richard H. Fallon,
Jr., Daniel J. Meltzer & David L. Shapiro, Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the
Federal System (4th ed. 1996) [hereinafter 1996 Hart & Wechsler]; Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
Daniel J. Meltzer & David L. Shapiro, Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the
Federal System (5th ed. 2003) [hereinafter 2003 Hart & Wechsler]; Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
John F. Manning, Daniel J. Meltzer & David L. Shapiro, Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal
Courts and the Federal System:  2008 Supplement (5th ed. 2008) [hereinafter 2008
Supplement to 2003 Hart & Wechsler]; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., John F. Manning, Daniel J.
Meltzer & David L. Shapiro, Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal
System (6th ed. 2009) [hereinafter 2009 Hart & Wechsler].
69. The four cases were mentioned briefly in relation to an elaboration of
congressional authority over federal court jurisdiction, the scope of the Supreme Court’s
original jurisdiction, and suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.  See (in chronological
order) 1953 Hart & Wechsler, supra note 13, at 284–87; 1973 Hart & Wechsler, supra note R
67, at 304–08; 1988 Hart & Wechsler, supra note 68, at 357–61; 1996 Hart & Wechsler, R
supra note 68, at 344–47.  The most extensive “Note on War Crimes Cases” provided R
excerpts from two of the per curiam decisions rendered in 1948—Everett v. Truman, 334
U.S. 824, and Hirota, 338 U.S. 197, discussed supra note 67. R
The limited court review of the commissions evidently troubled the authors of the
casebook.  In the short note used through 1988, the comments invoked a 1949 law review
article that detailed how confusing the information in the original petitions had been, and
explained the need for decisionmaking in the lower courts rather than reliance on original
habeas petitions in the Supreme Court.  See, e.g., 1973 Hart & Wechsler, supra note 67, at R
304 (citing Charles Fairman, Some New Problems of the Constitution Following the Flag, 1
Stan. L. Rev. 587 (1949)).  Furthermore, in the original version of the famous “dialogue,”
reproduced through 1988 as it was in the first edition, one of the “answers” insisted that
Quirin stood for access to courts and that Johnson and Hirota were sufficiently “obscure” as
to leave “undecided” the question of the “position of a citizen imprisoned abroad who
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provided for 2008.70  The 2009 edition codifies this expansion.71  The
point is summarized through a table (Figure 1), called “Chapter and
Verse:  War Detainees in Hart and Wechsler” (detailed in part to reflect
Henry Monaghan’s affection for the casebook).72
states a genuine challenge to the legality, or even the constitutionality, of his detention.”
See, e.g., 1988 Hart & Wechsler, supra note 68, at 422. R
One can hear the echoes of the Vietnam War in the 1973 edition, for that volume
devoted some commentary to military courts and to selective service challenges.  1973 Hart
& Wechsler, supra note 67, at 365–72.  By the fourth edition, in 1996, these issues came R
under the subject matter of “extraordinary writs and the original jurisdiction” of the
Supreme Court, in a few pages devoted to a “Note on the War Crimes Cases.”  1996 Hart &
Wechsler, supra note 68, at 344–47.  The jurisdiction of military tribunals is included, with R
a reference to Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435 (1987), as well as to Ex parte Quirin,
317 U.S. 1 (1942) (per curium).  1996 Hart & Wechsler, supra note 68, at 345 n.2.
Solorio—dealing with the question of jurisdiction over military personnel—was mentioned
again in the context of abstention under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).  1996 Hart
& Wechsler, supra note 68, at 1274 n.16.
In addition, Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, can be found in the 1996 edition in a
few scattered footnotes relating to postconviction habeas or congressional control over
access to Article III courts.  Both the lower court decision of Eisentrager v. Forrestal, 174
F.2d 961 (D.C. Cir. 1949), and the reversal by the Supreme Court in Johnson v. Eisentrager
were mentioned as part of the inquiry into whether Article III court access would be
required, if state courts were not able to hear cases.  The commentary on Johnson v.
Eisentrager also underscored that the opinion had not been clear about whether the
“detention was lawful or . . . simply beyond the reach of jurisdictional inquiry.”  1996 Hart
& Wechsler, supra note 68, at 365.  A footnote also mentioned Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S.
137 (1953), which did not address the jurisdictional issue directly.  1996 Hart & Wechsler,
supra note 68, at 365 n.15.  Both Milligan and Quirin also appeared in brief commentary
related to habeas corpus, military commissions, or federal court jurisdiction.  See, e.g., id.
at 1239, 1338 n.4, 1369 n.1.
70. 2008 Supplement to 2003 Hart & Wechsler, supra note 68.  Some materials were R
presented in relationship to Chapter IV’s discussion of congressional power to regulate the
federal courts.  Id. at 54–80.  About sixty pages related to the topic augmented Chapter
XI’s discussion of habeas corpus.  Id. at 177–236.  By way of comparison to the law
governing postconviction detention, the 2008 Supplement provided about twenty-five
pages devoted to doctrinal changes.  Id. at 237–62.
71. The “Note on the War Crimes Cases” was reproduced, largely intact, in a three-
page form.  2009 Hart & Wechsler, supra note 68, at 271–73.  In addition, in the context of R
discussing congressional control over federal court jurisdiction, the 2009 edition added a
“Further Note on Preclusion of All Judicial Review and on the Right to Seek Judicial
Redress:  Habeas Corpus and the Suspension Clause.” Id. at 314–20.  The note wove
together the efforts to cut off jurisdiction for immigrants, the Court’s response in INS v. St.
Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001), and some of the 9/11 case law.  In the later chapter devoted to
“Federal Habeas Corpus,” more than fifty pages were devoted to “Habeas Corpus and
Executive Detention.”  2009 Hart & Wechsler, supra note 68, at 1159–213. Boumediene R
formed that section’s centerpiece.  Id. at 1168–78, 1192–210.
72. One can watch the introduction of questions about the breadth of executive
authority by looking closely at the 2003 version (the fifth edition).  2003 Hart & Wechsler,
supra note 68, at 316–18.  One goal was to reduce the length, resulting in a volume 100
pages shorter than the 1996 version, which in turn had 160 fewer pages than the 1973
version.  Id. at v.
In the 2003 volume, the brief “Note on the War Crimes Cases” reappeared.  Id. at
316–18.  The case about the German saboteurs, Ex parte Quirin, was again a short note, but
this time accompanied by reference to a rich description of the case.  Id. at 316 & n.2
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Chapter and Verse:
War Detainees in Hart and Wechsler, 1953–2009
1953   1st edition Note on the War Crimes Cases pages 283–287
1973   2d edition Note on the War Crime Cases pages 304–308
Habeas Corpus and Executive pages 1159–1213
Detention
Further Note on Preclusion pages 314–320
of All Judicial Review and on
the Right to Seek Judicial 
Redress: Habeas Corpus and 
the Suspension Clause
2009   6th edition Note on War Crime Cases pages 271–273
Note on the Availability of pages 177–236
Habeas Corpus to Challenge
Detention Arising from the
“War on Terror”
2008   Supplement Note on Military Tribunal pages 54–79
or Commissions (including 
Hamdan)
Note on Military Tribunals pages 407–415
or Commissions
2003   5th edition Note on the War Crime Cases pages 316–319
1996   4th edition Note on the War Crimes Cases pages 344–347
1988   3d edition Note on the War Crimes Cases pages 356–361
Court Martial Jurisdiction pages 372–374
FIGURE 1
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But the trajectory can go in the other direction.  Over time, one
could put the case law back in the box of “war” through a retitled note
that revised the discussion of the “War Crimes Cases” by expanding the
rubric to “Military Commissions and Detention.”  One could read the
twenty-first century cases along with the classic discussion about congres-
sional control over Supreme Court jurisdiction in the Civil War era case
of Ex parte McCardle,73 make brief mention of Milligan,74 Quirin,75 and
the like, all to be defined by the idiosyncrasy of their historical moments.
One could thus hop from the Civil War to World War II to 9/11 when
thinking about access to federal courts in a time of war—an issue that
returns to interest only when parallels occur.
B. “Guantánamo” Cases
Another way to see the specificity of the problem of detention
presented after 9/11 is through the peculiarity of its best known site—
Guantánamo, a military base on a bay in Cuba at which some (but by no
means all) of the habeas petitioners have been detained.76  In both Rasul
(citing Boris Bittker, The World War II German Saboteurs’ Case and Writs of Certiorari
Before Judgment by the Court of Appeals:  A Tale of Nunc Pro Tunc Jurisdiction, 14
Const. Comment. 431 (1997)).  In addition, a new set of materials, titled a “Note on
Military Tribunals or Commissions,” provided a ten-page discussion of the relationship
between Article III courts and non-Article III federal tribunals that included references to
President George W. Bush’s November 13, 2001, Executive Order creating military
tribunals and the possible pertinence of the Geneva Conventions.  Id. at 407–16.  Some of
the text of the decision of Ex parte Milligan was reproduced, followed by discussion of Ex
parte Quirin, Johnson v. Eisentrager, and the role of habeas corpus in permitting access by
detainees to Article III courts.  Id. at 408–16. Quirin and Milligan were also discussed in
relationship to suspension of the writ as the authors addressed postconviction remedies.
Id. at 1285, 1289.
73. Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868).
74. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
75. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
76. The petitioners in Rasul, Hamdan, and Boumediene were at Guantánamo. Rasul
was a case brought on behalf of fourteen detainees.  Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 470
(2004).  Hamdan brought an individual challenge to trial by a military commission.
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 566–67 (2006).  The Boumediene decision was issued in
response to two petitions for certiorari, one filed by thirty-nine Guantánamo prisoners.
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, Al Odah v. United States, decided sub nom.
Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008) (No. 06-1196).  The other petition had been
filed on behalf of six Guantánamo prisoners.  Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 4–6,
Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (No. 06-1195).
Yaser Esam Hamdi was originally held at Guantánamo Bay, but was transferred to a
naval brig in Norfolk, Virginia and then to another brig in Charleston, South Carolina.
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510 (2004) (plurality opinion).  José Padilla was also
held in a naval brig in South Carolina.  Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 432 (2004).
Shawqi Omar and Mohammad Munaf were both detained in Iraq.  Munaf v. Geren, 128 S.
Ct. 2207, 2214–15 (2008).  A case presented in the 2008–2009 term, Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli,
129 S. Ct. 680 (2008) (granting certiorari), arose from detainee Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri’s
capture in the United States and subsequent detention at a naval brig in South Carolina.
Al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160, 164–65 (4th Cir. 2007), rev’d en banc sub nom.  Al-Marri
v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2008) (en banc).  After the government lodged
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and Boumediene, the government argued that the base, under United
States jurisdiction through a long-term agreement with Cuba, was outside
the boundaries of United States law.77  The majority opinions disagreed,
holding that activities there were subject to statutory and constitutional
constraints.78  Yet both decisions are laced with discussions of why
Guantánamo fell within the authority of the federal courts, even if some
other (unspecified) offshore sites under U.S. control might not.79  In the
2008 Munaf decision, the Court also recognized that another narrow cat-
egory—American citizens held abroad by the United States—could gain
access to Article III courts by way of habeas petitions.80
Figure 2 reproduces a portion of the material displayed on the
Department of Defense website to capture the isolation and peculiar his-
tory of the base at Guantánamo.  Less easily reported are the facts about
criminal charges in federal district court in the Central District of Illinois, the Supreme
Court vacated the Fourth Circuit’s decision and remanded with instructions to dismiss the
case as moot.  Al-Marri v. Spagone, 129 S. Ct. 1545 (2009), discussed infra notes 197–198
and accompanying text.
Several cases in the lower courts deal with efforts to obtain habeas relief by individuals
held at Bagram Airfield, Afghanistran.  See, e.g., Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205
(D.D.C. 2009), appeal pending, Nos. 06-1669, 08-1307, 08-2143, 620 F. Supp. 2d 51 (D.D.C.
2009); Al Bakri v. Obama, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205 (D.D.C. 2009); al-Najar v. Gates, 604 F.
Supp. 2d 205 (D.D.C. 2009); see also Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 620 F. Supp. 2d 51 (D.D.C.
2009) (granting the government’s motion for certification, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b), for interlocutory review); In re Gates, No. 09-8003, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 17032
(D.C. Cir. July 30, 2009) (granting petition for permission to appeal).
77. See Brief for the Respondents at 9–10, Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (Nos. 06-1195
& 06-1196); Brief for the Respondents at 10–11, Rasul, 542 U.S. 466 (Nos. 03-334 & 03-
343).
78. Rasul read 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to authorize federal courts to hear such claims.  542
U.S. at 484.  In Boumediene, the Court concluded that the Constitution likewise required
that those held at the base should have access to federal courts.  128 S. Ct. at 2262.  Justice
Souter added, in his concurrence, that the government ought to have read Rasul to have
made plain what the Constitution would require.  Id. at 2278 (Souter, J., concurring).
79. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2253–62; Rasul, 542 U.S. at 475–79.  See generally
Sarah H. Cleveland, Embedded International Law and the Constitution Abroad, 110
Colum. L. Rev. 225 (2010); David D. Cole, Rights over Borders:  Transnational
Constitutionalism and Guantanamo Bay, 2008 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 47; Gerald L. Neuman,
The Extraterritorial Constitution After Boumediene v. Bush, 82 S. Cal. L. Rev. 259 (2009).  In
Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, a district court judge concluded that three
detainees, transferred from elsewhere to Bagram Theater Internment Facility in
Afghanistan, could pursue their federal habeas claim, as the United States’s control over
Bagram was “not appreciably different” from its control over Guantánamo, and that any
existing “practical barriers” were caused by the U.S. government’s decision to bring those
particular individuals to that site.  Id. at 209.  Another detainee, an Afghan whose site of
capture was disputed, did not obtain relief.  Id.
80. Munaf, 128 S. Ct. at 2213.  One could understand the import of Munaf, as well as
Milligan and Hamdi, to be that U.S. citizens can invoke constitutional rights of habeas
corpus regardless of where in the world they are confined.  See Stephen I. Vladeck,
Deconstructing Hirota:  Habeas Corpus, Citizenship, and Article III, 95 Geo. L.J. 1497,
1499 n.3 (2007).  Sarah Cleveland argues that the acknowledgement of extraterritorial
obligations aligns the U.S. doctrine with that of transnational law.  Cleveland, supra note
79, at 269–78. R
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https://www.cnic.navy.mil/Guantanamo/index.htm, website excerpt from week of Feb. 29, 2008.
FIGURE 2
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all the people who have been detained there; the government has not
provided a public accounting.  Estimates are that at some point, about
770 people were detained at the base.81  After the 2004 Supreme Court
decision in Hamdi, the Department of Defense created a special adminis-
trative process and set up plans for military commissions to be held in a
recycled building designated for the “Joint Task Force” (JTF) for
Guantánamo,82 depicted in Figure 3.83  Enlarged above the photograph
is the text above the doorway.  There inscribed is the phrase “Honor
Bound to Defend Freedom,” which comes from the “call” (Honor
bound) and “response” (to defend freedom) that personnel on the base
are described as exchanging regularly as a greeting.84  (By way of con-
81. See Worthington, supra note 24; The Guantánamo Docket, supra note 24; The
Guantánamo Bay Timeline, supra note 24.
82. The website describes the Guantanamo JTF’s “Mission” as follows:
JTF-Guantanamo conducts safe and humane care and custody of detained enemy
combatants.  We conduct interrogation operations to collect strategic intelligence
in support of the Global War on Terror.  We support law enforcement and war
crimes investigations.  We are committed to the safety and security of American
servicemembers and civilians working inside the wire.
CNIC-Naval Station Guantanamo Bay, Joint Task Force, at https://www.cnic.navy.mil/
Guantanamo/Fighters/JointTaskForce/index.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 2009) (on file with
the Columbia Law Review).
83. In February 2006, several images of the JTF Commission Building and its hearing
room appeared on the Joint Task Force Guantanamo Public Affairs website.  Joint Task
Force Guantanamo, at http://www.jtfgtmo.southcom.mil (last visited Oct. 31, 2009) (on
file with the Columbia Law Review).  Figure 3 and Figure 4 (the interior of a hearing room)
are reproduced with permission of Major Jeffrey Weir, who served in 2006 as the Deputy
Director of Public Affairs at Joint Task Force Guantanamo.  Eugene Fidell assisted in
locating the images.  An observer who traveled to the base in Fall 2009 reported viewing
what appeared to be the same room (somewhat reconfigured) during a proceeding in the
military commission dealing with United States v. Khadr, Court of Military Commission
Review Case No. 07-001 (2009) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).  See Valarie Kaur,
October 5–8, 2009, in 2 NIMJ Reports from Guantánamo 14, 14–15 (2010), available at
http://www.wcl.american.edu/nimj/documents/finalreport2.pdf [hereinafter Kaur, NIMJ
Report]; Email from Valarie Kaur, Student, Yale Law School, to author (Oct. 10, 2009) (on
file with the Columbia Law Review).
84. John Van Natta, GTMO Superintendent, explained that the exchange was meant
to “encourage esprit de corps among the soldiers.”  Frontline:  The Torture Question (PBS
television broadcast Oct. 18, 2005), available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/front
line/torture/etc/script.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review).  The text can also be
found on “handouts and official documents and signs and is constantly recited, soldier to
soldier, at the camp’s checkpoints.”  Ted Conover, In the Land of Guantánamo, N.Y.
Times, June 29, 2003, § 6 (Magazine), at 42.  The phrase has also been used as the name
for a book and a play critical of the treatment of detainees.  See Victoria Brittain & Gillian
Slovo, Guantanamo:  ‘Honor Bound to Defend Freedom’ (2004); see also Timeline
Theatre Co., Guantanamo:  Honor Bound to Defend Freedom, at www.timelinetheatre.
com/guantanamo/index.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2010) (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
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trast, the words “Equal Justice Under Law” are the words inscribed above
the Supreme Court’s entrance.85)
“HONOR BOUND TO DEFEND FREEDOM.”
Inscription on the door below
Building entrance of the Joint Task Force (JTF) Guantanamo Commissions Building,
February 2006.  Photograph reproduced courtesy of JTF Guantanamo Bay Public Affairs,
and with the assistance of Major Jeffrey Weir, then serving as the Deputy Director of
Public Affairs at JTF.
FIGURE 3
Inside the JTF building sat a deliberation room (Figure 4) that could
be described as court-like—or court-lite, given what is now understood
about the processes provided.  Some detainees were assessed and classi-
fied via procedures called Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs),
bodies comprised of military personnel.86  Those procedures could, at
85. Those words are reiterated in various decisions by the Supreme Court, as Justices
explain their injunction to administer laws impartially.  See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541
U.S. 267, 317 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 20 (1958).
86. See Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Sec’y of Def., Order Establishing Combatant Status
Review Tribunal (July 7, 2004), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/
d20 040707review.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).  The initial provisions for
classification came by way of the November 2001 Executive Order that had sought to
foreclose judicial review.  See Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, Detention, Treatment, and
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Interior of a hearing room, Guantánamo Bay, January 2006.  Photograph reproduced
courtesy of Joint Task Force (JTF) Guantanamo Bay Public Affairs and with the assis-
tance of Major Jeffrey Weir.
FIGURE 4
the sole discretion of the Department of Defense, be followed by a review
conducted by the Administrative Review Board (ARB), another group of
military officials charged with making a yearly decision about “whether
each detainee should be released, transferred or further detained.”87
Through such procedures, some people were confirmed as properly la-
beled “unlawful enemy combatants” and a very few (perhaps two dozen)
were put into a pipeline for trial before military commissions, for which
the room depicted in Figure 4 was to provide the setting.88
Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16,
2001) [hereinafter Nov. 13, 2001 Executive Order on Detention].  More of the policies
stemming from that order were codified at 32 C.F.R. § 10.3 (2003).  As discussed infra,
Congress codified some procedures through the Detainee Treatment Act and the Military
Commissions Acts of 2006 and 2009.  See infra note 118. R
87. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Def., Guantanamo Bay Detainee Administrative
Review Board Decisions Completed (Feb. 9, 2006), available at http://www.defenselink.
mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=9302 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
88. See Nov. 13, 2001 Executive Order on Detention, supra note 86; U.S. Dep’t of R
Def., Military Commission Order No. 1 (Mar. 21, 2002), available at http://www.defense
link.mil/news/Mar2002/d20020321ord.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
[hereinafter Military Commission Order No. 1].  In 2004, challenges were brought to the
configuration of those tribunals, and the process was halted for a time.  See Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 560 (2006).
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By the summer of 2009, individuals held at the base were in another
form of the Guantánamo limbo.  After President Obama came into office
in January of 2009, he issued an Executive Order aimed at closing
Guantánamo within a year.89  But thereafter, a concerted effort by oppo-
nents depicted the detainees as too threatening to confine on the main-
land.90  During the fall of 2009, Congress enacted legislation refusing the
President’s request for eighty million dollars in funding for closing the
detention facility.  Congress first prohibited the use of authorized funds
for the release of detainees into the United States and subsequently im-
posed requirements on decisions about transfers of detainees to the
mainland.91
The 2009 legislation, micromanaging the Executive, contrasts with
Congress’s initial response in the fall of 2001.  Then, Congress had given
the Executive great leeway in its Authorization for the Use of Military
Force (AUMF)92—subsequently read broadly by the plurality in Hamdi to
license executive decisionmaking and permit what could be understood
as preventive detention.93  In the 2009 legislation, however, Congress re-
89. Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897 (Jan. 22, 2009).  That order stated that
the detention facilities at Guantánamo Bay should be “closed as soon as practicable, and
no later than 1 year from the date of this order.”  Id. at 4898.
90. FBI Director Robert Mueller told members of the House of Representatives that
“Guantánamo detainees could foment terrorism if they were sent to the United States.”
David M. Herszenhorn, Funds to Close Guantánamo Denied, N.Y. Times, May 20, 2009, at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/21/us/politics/21detain.html (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Senator John Thune, a
Republican of South Dakota, told reporters, “The American people don’t want these
detainees held at a military base or federal prison in their back yard . . . .”  Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted).  One argument was that the place where detainees were held
(or tried) would become a site for terrorists to attack.
91. See Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-32, § 14103(a),
123 Stat. 1859, 1920 (“None of the funds made available in this or any prior Act may be
used to release an individual who is detained as of the date of enactment of this Act, at
Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, into the continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii,
or the District of Columbia.”).  In October 2009, Congress made these provisions
applicable from October 1, 2009 through December 31, 2010 but added the proviso that
funds could be used for transfers, subject to a presidential explanation of specific needs to
do so, such as for trial, as is discussed infra note 426.  See National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 1041(a)–(e), 123 Stat. 2190, 2454–55 (2009);
Andrew Taylor, Senate OKs Transfer of Gitmo Prisoners for Trials, Associated Press, Oct.
20, 2009, available at LexisNexis, AP File (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
92. Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
93. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518–22 (2004) (O’Connor, J., plurality
opinion).  That decision did not refer to “preventive detention” as such but upheld the
detention of individuals for those within a “narrow category” who were “part of or
supporting forces hostile to the United States or coalition partners in Afghanistan” and
who there “engaged in an armed conflict against the United States.”  Id. at 516–17
(internal quotation marks omitted).  In that sense, one could understand the plurality as
focused on detention as an ordinary incident of warmaking, functioning as a form of
incapacitation to preclude individuals from participating during the war and followed,
presumably, by repatriation after a war’s end.  Further, the opinion expressly noted that
indefinite detention would cause the interpretation of the AUMF to “unravel.”  Id. at 521.
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quired the President to provide information on each decision related to
detainee mainland transfers.  Congress instructed that, at least forty-five
days before a proposed mainland transfer, the President was to submit a
classified report explaining whether the transfer presented “any risk to
the national security of the United States,” the associated costs, a “plan
for mitigation of any” national security risk, and the “legal rationale” for
the transfer.94
The question of the closing of Guantánamo is analytically distinct
from whether some of those detained will be subjected to military com-
missions.  But, because Milligan stands for the proposition that, when
courts are open, trial by commission is suspect, keeping the detainees at
bay (literally and metaphorically) makes more plausible the use of mili-
tary commissions.  In October of 2009, Congress enacted the Military
Commissions Act (MCA) of 2009.  The 2009 MCA provided a new defini-
tion of “unprivileged enemy belligerent” to replace “unlawful enemy
combatant” and set forth many details on the procedures for military
commissions.95  On November 13, 2009, Attorney General Eric Holder
announced that five detainees would appear before military commissions
(the place of which was not specified) and that the 9/11 co-conspirators
would be tried in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York; the Attorney General also noted the intention of
transferring the detainees through the specified notification proce-
dures.96  On November 18, 2009, President Obama acknowledged that
Yet, as was learned subsequently, not all detainees held at Guantanámo fell within
those parameters.  See Kiyemba v. Bush, Nos. 08-5424, 08-5425, 08-5426, 08-5427, 08-5428
& 08-5429, 2008 WL 4898963, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 20, 2008), cert. granted sub nom.
Kiyemba v. Obama, 77 U.S.L.W. 3237, 78 U.S.L.W. 3010, 78 U.S.L.W. 3233, 78 U.S.L.W.
3237 (U.S. Oct. 20, 2009) (No. 08-1234), 2009 WL 935637; Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834,
836 (D.C. Cir. 2008).  See generally David Cole, Out of the Shadows:  Preventive
Detention, Suspected Terrorists, and War, 97 Cal. L. Rev. 693 (2009) [hereinafter Cole,
Preventive Detention].  Cole argued that, while not so labeled, various statutes and
practices in the United States have authorized preventive detention—with 9/11
Guantánamo detainees as one example of a group so confined.  Id. at 703–06.
Dissenting in Hamdi, Justices Souter and Ginsburg concluded that the AUMF was not
sufficiently specific to limit a prior statute, the Non-Detention Act, 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a)
(2006), that required that no “citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the
United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress.”  542 U.S. at 547–48 (Souter, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment, joined by
Ginsburg, J.).  That legislation was enacted in 1971 to avoid repeating internments such as
had occurred for Japanese-Americans.  See Non-Detention Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-128,
85 Stat. 347 (codified at scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).  Discussion of the 1971 enactment
can be found in Laurence H. Tribe & Patrick O. Gudridge, The Anti-Emergency
Constitution, 113 Yale L.J. 1801, 1833 (2004).
94. Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2009 § 14103(d).
95. See MCA of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 948a–d, 123 Stat. 2190, 2574–76 (defining
“unprivileged enemy belligerent”); id. § 948r (changing the criteria for admissibility of
evidence obtained through torture, or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment).
96. See Charlie Savage, U.S. to Try Avowed 9/11 Mastermind Before Civilian Court in
New York, N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 2009, at A1.  The question had been debated over the
summer.  See Del Quentin Wilber & Julie Tate, Criminal Charges Against Detainee
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his administration would not be able to close Guantánamo’s detention
center by the deadline originally set—January of 2010.97  During the fall,
a detainee was sent to the mainland to await trial in Article III courts;
proceedings on preliminary issues in military commissions resumed at
Guántanamo,98 and, as noted, plans were announced to proceed at some
undetermined date to try a few detainees by military commissions.99
These details illuminate why Guantánamo is an apt signifier for read-
ing the set of 9/11 Supreme Court cases as circumscribed.  The pictures
(Figures 2–4) are provided because the base is a place to which the public
has no access, absent visits on the web.  One needs special clearances,
producing a seat on a ferry or on planes flying onto the base, to travel
there.100  The controlled routes mimic the procedures provided for de-
tainees.  Decisionmaking processes have been closed, subject to being
opened by the Department of Defense (“the Appointing Authority”),
which issued regulations according itself sole discretion to permit or to
block public attendance.101  The Department of Defense positioned itself
Weighed, Wash. Post, July 25, 2009, at A2; Lyle Denniston, Civilian Court:  First Stop for
Terrorism Cases?, SCOTUSBlog, July 20, 2009, at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/civilian-
court-first-stop-for-terrorism-cases/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review); see also Lyle
Denniston, Civilian Trials for 9/11 Accused, SCOTUSBlog, Nov. 13, 2009, at http://
www.scotusblog.com/wp/civilian-trials-for-911-accused (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
97. See Anne E. Kornblut, Obama Admits Guantanamo Won’t Close by Jan. Deadline,
Wash. Post, Nov. 18, 2009, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2009/11/18/AR2009111800571.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
98. Observers may, with permission of the Department of Defense, attend; the
National Institute of Military Justice has sent some individuals to do so, and they have
reported on what they have seen.  See, e.g., Travis Crum, October 19–22, 2009, in 2 NIMJ
Reports from Guantánamo 20 (2010), available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/nimj/
documents/finalreport2.pdf; Kaur, NIMJ Report,  supra note 83.
99. See Peter Finn, Resumed Military Panels Face New Challenges, Wash. Post, Dec. 4,
2009, at A15; Savage, supra note 96.
100. See Clive Stafford Smith, Eight O’Clock Ferry to the Windward Side:  Seeking
Justice in Guantánamo Bay, at xi–xii, 1–19 (2007).
101. Military Commission Order No. 1, supra note 88, at 6(B)(3).  The regulation R
provided that the Commission should:
Hold open proceedings except where otherwise decided by the Appointing
Authority or the Presiding Officer in accordance with the President’s Military
Order and this Order.  Grounds for closure include the protection of
information classified or classifiable under reference (d); information protected
by law or rule from unauthorized disclosure; the physical safety of participants in
Commission proceedings, including prospective witnesses; intelligence and law
enforcement sources, methods, or activities; and other national security interests.
The Presiding Officer may decide to close all or part of a proceeding on the
Presiding Officer’s own initiative or based upon a presentation, including an ex
parte, in camera presentation by either the Prosecution or the Defense.  A
decision to close a proceeding or portion thereof may include a decision to
exclude the Accused, Civilian Defense Counsel, or any other person, but Detailed
Defense Counsel may not be excluded from any trial proceeding or portion
thereof.  Except with the prior authorization of the Presiding Officer . . . Defense
Counsel may not disclose any information presented during a closed session to
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as facilitating access through a planned broadcast feed, depicted in mock
format on the Department’s website in 2004 (Figure 5).  As one can read
from the text reproduced in the picture, the plan was to broadcast the
“first U.S. military commissions in more than 50 years.”102  The Hamdan
http://www.defenselink.mil/photos/newsphoto.aspx?newsphotoid=5762, image posted
on Oct. 29, 2004 and available as of Sept. 1, 2009 at the photo archive of the U.S.
Department of Defense.
FIGURE 5
litigation, challenging the legality of the Commissions, interrupted that
plan.103  While an independent organization, the National Institute of
Military Justice, has collected and published a volume of all “publicly
available” and “known” decisions issued by military commissions at the
base, the Department of Defense continues to control both the flow of
individuals excluded . . . . Open proceedings may include, at the discretion of the
Appointing Authority, attendance by the public and accredited press, and public
release of transcripts at the appropriate time.  Proceedings should be open to the
maximum extent practicable.  Photography, video, or audio broadcasting, or
recording of or at Commission proceedings shall be prohibited, except
photography, video, and audio recording by the Commission pursuant to the
direction of the Presiding Officer as necessary for preservation of the record of
trial.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
102. This image, borrowed from the website of the U.S. Department of Defense, and
modified for legibility but not content, was online in 2004, and can be found in the
archives of the Department.  See Photo of Closed-Circuit Television System at
Commissions Rehearsal, U.S. Dep’t of Def., DefenseLINK News Photos (2004), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/photos/newsphoto.aspx?newsphotoid=5762 (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
103. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
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and access to information.104  That the Department could have cut
whatever video links would be used for broadcasting reflected how events
at the base were subject to unique laws and, hence, could be understood
to produce sui generis federal court rulings.
C. “Torture” Cases
If one way to contain the new habeas law of 9/11 is to view it as a
product of war and a second is to locate it in the peculiarity of
Guantánamo, a third rationale for containment comes from influential
underlying facts that (one would hope) are also rare—the continuing rev-
elations of torture and of cruel, unusual, and degrading treatment.  The
decision by the executive branch to create a secret alternative dispute
resolution system for detainees at Guantánamo was intertwined with the
decision to torture and to extract information by coercion.
The sequence of public disclosures about the horrific treatment of
detainees in various sites provides the context in which to understand the
evolution of the Supreme Court’s majority decisions about 9/11 deten-
tion.  The 2004 decision in Hamdi rejected the government’s claim of
immunity from oversight in holding citizen detainees indefinitely; the
Court held that some process was the required predicate for ongoing de-
tention.105  The Court, however, gave no deadlines for the creation of
adequate procedures or specific directions about their qualities.106  In
contrast, when concluding that Congress had illegally suspended the writ
of habeas corpus in the five-to-four Boumediene decision in 2008, the
Court insisted on an independent factfinding role for life-tenured
judges.107  Moreover, Boumediene moved beyond the premise of Hamdi—
that citizens had rights—to recognize rights-holding by aliens, just as it
limited Eisentrager’s rejection of rights-assertion by individuals beyond the
boundaries of the United States.
Boumediene should be viewed through the frame of facts not detailed
in the opinion.  Between 2004 and 2008, pictures from Abu Ghraib108
104. As explained by Eugene Fidell, the President of The National Institute of Military
Justice, in the 2009 publication of the Military Commission Reporter, Volume I, the aim
was to provide “every publicly available decision, order, and ruling issued by the military
commissions conducted at the U.S. Naval Base, Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, and all known
substantive opinions and rulings of the United States Court of Military Commission Review
from October 2006 through June 1, 2009.”  See Eugene R. Fidell, Preface, I Military
Commission Reporter, at xiii (2009) [hereinafter Military Commission Reporter].
105. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 538–39 (2004) (plurality opinion).
106. Id. at 532–37 (referring to “basic process,” a citizen’s “core rights to challenge
meaningfully . . . and to be heard,” and holding that “due process demands some system”
of procedures).
107. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2262–66 (2008).  The contrast between
these two opinions is also explored in Linda Greenhouse, The Mystery of Guantánamo
Bay, 27 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 1, 17–21 (2009).
108. See generally Seymour M. Hersh, Chain of Command:  The Road from 9/11 to
Abu Ghraib 20–46 (2004).
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and the text of the “Torture Memos”109 came into public view.  I replicate
excerpts of one of those memoranda (Figure 6) to underscore their offi-
cialdom.  (The Department of Justice logo has been enlarged to make it
legible, and only a few lines of the many-page memorandum are repro-
duced.)  As can be seen from the excerpt, in August 2002, Department of
Justice officials set forth their view that to violate federal statutes prohibit-
ing “torture,” acts must be “extreme . . . . Where the pain is physical, it
must be of an intensity akin to that which accompanies serious physical
injury such as death or organ failure.  Severe mental pain requires suffer-
ing not just at the moment of infliction but it also requires lasting psycho-
logical harm.”110  Moreover, torture required the specific intent to tor-
ture.111  The memos also opined that the President, when acting as
commander in chief during a war, was not bound by various treaties and
conventions the United States has signed, nor constrained by domestic
law when authorizing interrogation procedures.112
Why were these memos written?  The United States Constitution af-
fords detainees guarantees against mistreatment, and the United States
has joined with nations around the world in a treaty banning torture.113
Violations of federal statutes put individuals in jeopardy of criminal pros-
109. See Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal
Counsel, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, on Standards of Conduct for
Interrogation Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–40A (Aug. 1, 2002), available at http://
news.findlaw.com/nytimes/docs/doj/bybee80102ltr.html (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) [hereinafter Bybee Memorandum].  The Washington Post put these materials
online on June 13, 2004.  See Dana Priest, Dana Milbank & R. Jeffrey Smith, Justice
Department Memo Said Torture ‘May Be Justified,’ Wash. Post, June 13, 2004, at A3; see
also Memorandum from Alberto Gonzales, Att’y Gen., to President George W. Bush, on
Decision Re:  Application of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War to the Conflict
with Al Qaeda and the Taliban (Jan. 25, 2002), available at http://www.gwu.edu/
~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/02.01.25.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review);
Memorandum from John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to
William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Def., on Application of Treaties and Laws
to Al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Jan. 9, 2002), available at http://www.gwu.edu/
~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/02.01.09.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
An overview, prepared by the New York Times, and links to PDFs of the Torture Memos
are available online.  See A Guide to the Memos on Torture, N.Y. Times, at http://
www.nytimes.com/ref/international/24MEMO-GUIDE.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2009)
(on file with the Columbia Law Review).  The Bybee Memorandum can also be found, along
with other Justice Department documents written between 2002 and 2004 and related to
the treatment of detainees, in The Torture Debate in America 283–393 (Karen J.
Greenberg ed., 2006).
110. Bybee Memorandum, supra note 109, at 46. R
111. Id. at 16.
112. See Owen Fiss, The Example of America, 119 Yale L.J. Pocket Part 1, 6 (2009), at
http://www.yalelawjournal.org/content/view/764/23/.html (on file with the Columbia
Law Review).
113. See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S.
85.
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Office of the Assistant Attorney General Washington, DC 20530
August 1, 2002
Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales
Counsel to the President
Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§2340-2340A
Excerpts from the “Torture Memos”
(pages 1, 46)
U.S. Department of Justice
Office of Legal Counsel
[logo enlarged]
          You have asked for our Office’s views regarding the standards of conduct under 
the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane and Degrading Treatment
or Punishment as implemented by Sections 2340-2340A of title 18 of the United States 
Code. As we understand it, this question has arisen in the context of the conduct of 
interrogations outside the United States. We conclude below that Section 2340A 
proscribes acts inflicting, and that are specifically intended to inflict, severe pain or 
suffering, whether mental or physical. Those acts must be of an extreme nature to rise 
to the level of torture within the meaning of Section 2340A and the Convention. We 
further conclude that certain acts may be cruel, inhuman, or degrading, but still not 
produce pain and suffering of the requisite intensity to fall within Section 2340A’s 
proscription against torture. We conclude by examining possible defenses that would 
negate any claim that certain interrogation methods violate the statute.
          . . . We conclude that torture as defined in and proscribed by Sections 2340–2340A,
covers only extreme acts. Severe pain is generally of the kind difficult for the victim to 
endure. Where the pain is physical, it must be of an intensity akin to that which 
accompanies serious physical injury such as death or organ failure. Severe mental pain 
requires suffering not just at the moment of infliction but it also requires lasting 
psychological harm, such as seen in mental disorders like posttraumatic stress disorder. 
Additionally, such severe mental pain can arise only from the predicate acts listed in 
Section 2340. Because the acts inflicting torture are extreme, there is significant range 
of acts that though they might constitute cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or 
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ecutions and perhaps civil lawsuits.114  By crafting, on Department of
Justice stationery, what Chris Edley has described as “tortured definitions
of ‘torture’” that reduced the “Rule of Law to the Reign of Politics,”115
Bush Administration lawyers sought to manufacture legal defenses for in-
terrogators and for others involved in the mistreatment of detainees.116
Thus, one could also dub these documents “alibi memos,” in that
they were written to protect those imposing such pain from liability.117
This facet gives the memos, in retrospect, an oddly (if chillingly) appeal-
ing quality.  They were drafted before Congress sought, through the en-
actments of the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA) of 2005 and the Military
Commissions Act of 2006 (2006 MCA), to limit the federal courts author-
ity to hear such claims of wrongdoing.118  The memo writers assumed—as
114. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340A, 2441 (2006).
115. Press Release, Christopher Edley, Jr., Dean, U.C. Berkeley Sch. of Law, The
Torture Memos and Academic Freedom (Apr. 10, 2008), available at http://www.law.
berkeley.edu/news/2008/edley041008.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review).  David
Cole offered another critique focused on the role played by members of the Office of
Legal Counsel in 2005.  David Cole, The Torture Memos:  The Case Against the Lawyers,
N.Y. Rev. Books, Oct. 8, 2009, at 14–16; see also Anthony Lewis, Official American Sadism,
N.Y. Rev. Books, Sept. 25, 2008, at 45.
116. Under various doctrines relating to the availability of implied causes of action
from statutes and the Constitution and official immunity, lower courts have concluded that
efforts to obtain damages and declaratory relief against government officials for “torture
and abuse” cannot proceed.  See, e.g., Arar v. Ashcroft, No. 06-4216-CV, 2009 U.S. App.
LEXIS 23988, at *5–*12 (2d Cir. Nov. 2, 2009) (en banc), affirming the panel decision of
532 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2008); In re Iraq & Afg. Detainees Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d. 85, 88
(D.D.C. 2007); see also discussion of Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), infra notes
199–215 and accompanying text. R
117. Judith Resnik, When the Justice Department Played Defense, Slate, Oct. 27,
2006, at http://www.slate.com/id/2152211/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review).  In a
book about the decisionmaking around these issues, Jack Goldsmith, who held the
position of Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), discussed
the memos.  He noted that CIA officials “viewed the opinion as a ‘golden shield’” and were
upset when he ordered one of the OLC opinions withdrawn.  Jack Goldsmith, The Terror
Presidency:  Law and Judgment Inside the Bush Administration 144, 162–63 (2007).  As
Goldsmith also explained, the “message of the August 1, 2002 OLC opinion was indeed
clear:  violent acts aren’t necessarily torture; if you do torture, you probably have a defense;
and even if you don’t have a defense, the torture law doesn’t apply if you act under color of
presidential authority.”  Id. at 144.
118. In December of 2005, Congress enacted the DTA, discussed supra notes 20, 34. R
That legislation condemned torture, but also sought to limit the ability of aliens at
Guantánamo to access courts as well as to provide defenses to those who were accused of
torturing or imposing grave harms on individual detainees.  See DTA of 2005, Pub. L. No.
109-148, §§ 1001–1006, 119 Stat. 2680, 2739–44 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of titles 10, 28, and 42 U.S.C.); see also id. § 1005(e), 119 Stat. at 2742 (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 2241(e) (2008)) (“[N]o court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or
consider an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien
detained by the Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.”).  The section further
deprived courts of jurisdiction to hear “any other action against the United States or its
agents relating to any aspect of the detention by the Department of Defense of an alien at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, who (A) is currently in military custody; or (B) has been
determined . . . to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant” by the United
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did many others119—a world in which public courts were functioning and
defendants would be required to explain their actions.
The Torture Memos sanctioned actions that, as hundreds of pages of
reports from an array of sources now document, took place.  Indepen-
dent investigations (by, inter alia, the United States Senate,120 the
Canadian government,121 and the International Committee of the Red
Cross122) detail the abuses at various detention sites.  Under the direction
or with the approval of the United States government, individuals were
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in accordance with the DTA of 2005.
Id.
In the MCA of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of titles 10, 28, and 42 U.S.C.), Congress again sought to close off
jurisdiction by providing that no “court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or
consider an application for a writ of habeas corpus” from detainees at Guantánamo, as well
as “any other action . . . relating to any aspect of the detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or
conditions of confinement of an alien who is or was detained by the United States . . . .”  28
U.S.C. § 2241(e).  Neither the DTA of 2005 nor the MCA of 2006 directly addressed the
jurisdiction of prosecutors to bring criminal actions.  The MCA of 2009, enacted after
Boumediene, continued to centralize litigation in the D.C. Circuit but omitted the door-
closing prohibition.  Pub. L. No. 111-84, §§ 950g(a), 1801–1807, 123 Stat. 2190, 2603,
2574–614.
119. For example, in an argument held in December of 2003, a lawyer for the
Department of Justice took the position before a panel of three judges of the Ninth Circuit
that the United States could imprison anyone it deemed an “enemy combatant” and that
no court had the power to oversee the detention.  As the opinion recounts, during the
argument, judges posed questions about torture as a rhetorical device to probe the
position.  Would the Justice Department be making the same argument against judicial
review, “even if the claims were that [the government] was engaging in acts of torture or
that it was summarily executing the detainees”?  Gherebi v. Bush, 352 F.3d 1278,
1299–1300 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for
further consideration in light of Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 952 (2004).  The question
might have seemed to be a “gotcha”—backing the government lawyer into the obvious
admission that, of course, the Constitution grants a right of access to court under such
circumstances.  But the Justice Department lawyer said otherwise, answering that no court
could hear claims, even of torture or of summary executions.  As the published appellate
decision records, the judges were taken aback.  “To our knowledge, prior to the current
detention of prisoners at Guantanamo, the U.S. government has never before asserted
such a grave and startling proposition.”  Id. at 1300.  About a year later, in 2004, the
rhetorical proved to be real, with revelations of the Torture Memos, followed by disclosures
of waterboarding and other forms of abuse, and then congressional enactments
purporting to strip the federal courts of jurisdiction.
120. Inquiry into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody Before the S. Comm. on
Armed Services, 110th Cong. (2008), available at http://levin.senate.gov/newsroom/
supporting/2008/Detainees.121108.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
[hereinafter Armed Services Inquiry].
121. Comm’n of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher
Arar, Report of the Events Relating to Maher Arar:  Analysis and Recommendations
(2006), available at http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/206/301/pco-bcp/commissions/
maher_arar/07-09-13/www.ararcommission.ca/eng/AR_English.pdf (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Canadian Arar Inquiry].
122. Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, ICRC Report on the Treatment of Fourteen “High
Value Detainees” in CIA Custody (2007), available at http://www.nybooks.com/icrc-
report.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
\\server05\productn\C\COL\110-2\COL208.txt unknown Seq: 35 17-MAR-10 7:55
2010] DETENTION AND THE FEDERAL COURTS 613
subjected to solitary confinement and “incommunicado detention,”123
extremes of temperature,124 lights left on unremittingly twenty-four
hours a day,125 shackling,126 standing for hours or days,127 “prolonged
nudity,”128 waterboarding (what the Red Cross describes as “suffocation
by water poured over a cloth placed over the nose and mouth”129), and
on some occasions, beatings.130  As the Senate Armed Services
Committee concluded in 2008, the “abuse of detainees in U.S. custody
cannot simply be attributed to the actions of ‘a few bad apples’ acting on
their own”131 but rather was the result of senior officials who were willing
to consider more aggressive techniques and “redefine[d] torture.”132
The labels “enhanced interrogation,” “harsh” techniques, and “coer-
cion” have been offered up in lieu of the words torture, and cruel, inhu-
man, and degrading treatment.133  In 2005, Congress objected to these
practices even as it also authorized use in military commissions of infor-
mation extracted through some forms of coercive interrogations, pro-
vided that other indices of reliability existed and various conditions were
satisfied.134  In 2009, Congress imposed additional constraints on infor-
123. See id. at 4, 7.
124. See id. at 9.  The report stated that some detainees were purposely exposed to
cold air and made to lie in cold water with only their heads protruding from the water.  Id.
125. Id. at 36.
126. See id. at 6, 11–12.
127. See id. at 11–12.
128. Id. at 14.  The report stated that nudity was the “most common method of ill-
treatment” found in the inquiry.  Id.
129. Id. at 8.
130. See id. at 8, 12–13.
131. Armed Services Inquiry, supra note 120, at xii. R
132. Id. at xiii, xvi.  According to the Senate Report, Secretary Rumsfeld added a
handwritten note related to stress positions that read:  “I stand for 8–10 hours a day.  Why
is standing limited to 4 hours?”  Id. at xix (internal quotation marks omitted).  Following
Secretary Rumsfeld’s approval of a variety of “aggressive interrogation” methods,
“techniques such as waterboarding, nudity, and stress positions . . . were authorized for use
in interrogations of detainees in U.S. custody.”  Id. at xxvi.  Further, the Senate Committee
concluded that the President had made a “written determination” that the Geneva
Conventions did not apply to al Qaeda or Taliban detainees.  As a consequence,
individuals were put at “serious risk of physical and psychological harm.”  Id.
133. What to call the underlying acts prompted exchanges in the New York Times
about what terms the press ought to use.  See, e.g., Clark Hoyt, Telling the Brutal Truth,
N.Y. Times, Apr. 26, 2009, at WK12.
134. See 10 U.S.C. § 948r(d) (2006).  The MCA of 2006 authorizes “statements
obtained” after the DTA of 2005’s enactment, “in which the degree of coercion is
disputed,” to be admitted into evidence “only if” three requirements are met:
(1) the totality of the circumstances renders the statement reliable and possessing
sufficient probative value; (2) the interests of justice would best be served by
admission of the statement into evidence; and (3) the interrogation methods
used to obtain the statement do not amount to cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment prohibited by section 1003 of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005.
Id. In contrast, the “chief prosecutor for the military commissions at Guantánamo” took
the position that “evidence derived through waterboarding was off limits.”  Overruled for
taking that position, he resigned.  See Morris Davis, Op-Ed., Unforgivable Behavior,
\\server05\productn\C\COL\110-2\COL208.txt unknown Seq: 36 17-MAR-10 7:55
614 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 110:579
mation obtained through such aggression.135  Terms once demanding ex-
planation (such as “waterboarding”) became all too familiar, as argu-
ments continued about whether such practices constituted torture and
were, in any event, appropriate.136
Revelations of mistreatment continued into 2009.  Under court-or-
dered disclosures, the Department of Justice released a report written in
2004 by the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA).137  Provided there (and in other materials) was further evidence
“in grim detail” of abuses including “how CIA officers carried out mock
executions and threatened at least one prisoner with a gun and a power
drill.”138  New debates emerged about whether the government should
disclose pictures documenting the gross mistreatment of detainees, as a
lower court had ordered.139  In the fall of 2009, Congress proffered its
Inadmissible Evidence, N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 2008, at WK12.  Colonel Davis served in
Guantánamo from 2005 to 2007.  Id.
135. Congress broadened the application of its provisions to statements beyond those
extracted after enactment of the DTA.  See MCA of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 948r, 123
Stat. 2190, 2580.  Congress also required that, for use, statements had either to be made
“incident to lawful conduct” or voluntarily.  The MCA of 2009 added criteria for a military
commission tribunal judge to use to determine voluntariness—including the “details of the
taking of the statement,” the “characteristics of the accused, such as military training, age,
and education level,” the pattern of interrogation, and the persons conducting the
interrogations.  Id.
136. See Rachel L. Swarns, Cheney Offers Sharp Defense of C.I.A. Interrogation
Tactics, N.Y. Times, Aug. 31, 2009, at A1; Letter from Michael B. Mukasey, U.S. Att’y Gen.,
to Senator Patrick J. Leahy, Chair, Senate Judiciary Comm. (Jan. 29, 2008), available at
http://i.a.cnn.net/cnn/2008/images/01/29/letter.to.senator.leahy.pdf (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).  Examinations of the theory and practice of torture as well as the
normative import of a “debate” about torture can be found in many recent publications.
See generally Paul W. Kahn, Sacred Violence:  Torture, Terror, and Sovereignty (2008);
Torture:  A Collection (Sanford Levinson ed., 2004); The Torture Debate in America,
supra note 109; Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive Law:  Jurisprudence for the White R
House, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 1681 (2005); see also Judith Resnik, Moving American Mores:
From Women’s Education to Torture, 36 Women’s Stud. Q. 339 (2008).  For the canonical
history of torture in English law, see John H. Langbein, Torture and the Law of Proof:
Europe and England in the Ancien Régime (2006).
In his discussion of the 9/11 habeas jurisprudence, Richard Fallon concluded that the
case law proved George Bush a failed “reconstruction” president, because courts insisted
on an oversight role.  See Fallon, Habeas Corpus, supra note 26, at 39–74.  Another metric R
of the President’s impact, however, comes from the conflicts about the permissibility of
torture and its analogues.  By that yardstick, President Bush succeeded in reorienting the
norms of what constituted permissible treatment of detainees.
137. See ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 339 F. Supp. 2d 501, 505 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Orders
of July 20 in ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., No. 04 Civ. 4151 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 2009); ACLU v.
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 05 Civ. 9620 (AKH) (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 2009).  Those orders
provided some of the injunctive relief requested.  Another lawsuit, also successful, sought
the names of detainees and transcripts of CSRTs.  See Associated Press v. U.S. Dep’t of
Def., 410 F. Supp. 2d 147, 149 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
138. Mark Mazzetti, Report Provides New Details on C.I.A. Prisoner Abuse, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 23, 2009, at A4 [hereinafter Mazzetti, New Details on C.I.A. Abuse].
139. See ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 543 F.3d 59, 63–64 (2d Cir. 2008) (affirming
lower court’s order directing the Department of Defense to release photographs depicting
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answer, precluding disclosure.140  By then, the Attorney General had au-
thorized a designated prosecutor to investigate whether treatment of de-
tainees constituted a violation of federal law.141  The debate shifted to
whether the inquiry would include Guantánamo as well as Iraq and
Afghanistan, whether the focus would be only on those interrogators who
exceeded “guidelines” such as those put forth in the 2002 document ex-
cerpted in Figure 6 (thereby reinscribing the function of the Torture
memos as “alibi” memos) and whether attorneys or other officials would
be considered as potential violators.142
The uncovering of layers of brutality, sanctioned in some respects by
the Executive, interacted with congressional attempts to cut Article III
judges out of decisionmaking and thus close off avenues for forcing such
information into public view.  These developments framed the Court’s
abusive treatment of detainees by U.S. soldiers); Scott Wilson, Obama Shifts on Abuse
Photos; Releasing Images of Detainee Mistreatment Would Endanger U.S. Troops,
President Says, Wash. Post, May 14, 2009, at A1.
140. See Protected National Security Documents Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-83, 123
Stat. 2142.  Under this legislation, notwithstanding “any other provision of the law to the
contrary, no protected document . . . shall be subject to disclosure” under FOIA.  Id.
§ 565(b).  “Protected documents” were defined to include photography taken between
September 11, 2001 and January 22, 2009 relating to the “treatment of individuals
engaged, captured, or detained after September 11, 2001, by the Armed Forces . . . outside
of the United States.”  Id. § 565(c).  To obtain the status of a protected document, the
Secretary of Defense had to so certify that “disclosure . . . would endanger” citizens or
employees “deployed outside the United States.”  Id. § 565(d)(1).  The certification
expires in three years unless renewed.  Id. § 565(d)(2).
To the extent that it purports to direct outcomes different than that adjudicated by a
federal court, this statute raises what federal courts’ jurisprudence calls a “Klein problem.”
See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128 (1871).  In Klein, the Court invalidated a federal
statute that would have required the courts to interpret the grant of a presidential pardon
to be proof of Confederate affiliation and therefore ineligible for the return of property.
The basis for that decision has perplexed jurists and scholars; one could read the case as
protecting presidential pardon powers and/or judicial authority to apply law to facts.
Contemporary case law addressing variations of this issue include Miller v. French, 530 U.S.
327, 348–49 (2000); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218–19 (1995).  See
generally Amanda L. Tyler, The Story of Klein:  The Scope of Congress’s Authority to
Shape the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, in Federal Courts Stories, supra note 11, at R
87, 87–113.
141. See Mark Mazzetti & Scott Shane, Investigation Is Ordered into C.I.A. Abuse
Charges, N.Y. Times, Aug. 25, 2009, at A1 [hereinafter Mazzetti & Shane, Investigation into
C.I.A. Abuse].
142. See David Johnston, Justice Report Advises Pursuit of Abuse Cases, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 24, 2009, at A1.  The Department of Justice Report recommended a focus on
allegations of detainee abuse in Iraq and Afghanistan, where some held in detention had
died.  Id.  The Torture Memos may work to circumscribe such an inquiry as the press
reported the investigation was aimed at identifying acts that exceeded the guidelines set
forth “in a series of legal opinions by the Justice Department” that were “abandoned” by
the Obama Administration.  Id.  Some commentators argue that the Justice Department
directives did not constitute a “dramatic break with the past,” as post-World War II law had
given a good deal of “latitude” used by interrogators thereafter.  See William Ranney Levi,
Interrogation’s Law, 118 Yale L.J. 1434, 1442, 1483 (2009).
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rulings in the 9/11 sextet ending in Boumediene, the first instance in
which the Supreme Court held that Congress had unconstitutionally sus-
pended the writ of habeas corpus.143  Yet the judgments are largely silent
about the evidence of torture and brutality, as is the sixth edition of Hart
and Wechsler, which does not explore the impact of the Torture
Memos.144  Nonetheless, the stream of normatively painful revelations
(including congressional efforts to suspend the writ of habeas corpus
through the DTA and the MCA) could provide a basis for an argument
that a jurisprudence borne from extremity ought to be confined to ex-
traordinary events.
D. Aberrational Collapses of Procedural Fairness
An additional reason to cabin the doctrinal developments comes
from another form of abuse—the abuse of process.  Several individuals
who served at Guantánamo made public the profound procedural fail-
ures that laced decisions about detention of several individuals.  For ex-
ample, a military prosecutor, Lt. Col. Darrel Vandeveld, submitted a dec-
laration in 2008 in support of Mohammed Jawad, one of the detainees
whom he had prosecuted before resigning.145  Vandeveld detailed a lit-
any of procedural deficiencies, including the fact that “[p]otentially ex-
culpatory evidence has not been provided.”146  Vandeveld’s disclosures
followed upon those of Lt. Col. Stephen Abraham, a civilian lawyer and a
reservist commissioned in 1982 as an officer in the Intelligence Corps,147
143. That holding is “notable as the only case clearly to hold that a congressional
enactment purporting to limit federal court jurisdiction is unconstitutional.”  Meltzer, Ex
Parte McCardle, supra note 53, at 84. R
144. In Munaf v. Geren, 128 S. Ct. 2207 (2008), the majority and concurrence
debated what courts should do in the face of allegations that a transfer of an American
citizen to Iraqi custody could result in torture.  See supra note 67.  The evidence of and
memos on torture are not the subject of discussion in the Hart and Weschler casebook.
See 2009 Hart & Wechsler, supra note 68, at 1166–213.  The discussion of the 9/11 R
litigation is within the chapter on “Federal Habeas Corpus;” included are excerpts or notes
on the DTA of 2005, id. at 1158; the MCA of 2006, id. at 1158, 1212; the Suspension Clause
(Art. I, § 9, cl. 2), id. at 1159; the “territorial reach of the writ,” id. at 1164; Johnson v.
Eisentrager, id. at 1165; Rasul v. Bush, id. at 1166–68; Boumediene v. Bush, id. at 1168–78,
1192–204; Rumsfeld v. Padilla, id. at 1180–82; Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, id. at 1183–90; al-Marri v.
Pucciarelli, id. at 1190–92; and the “exhaustion of non-habeas remedies,” id. at 1210.
145. Declaration of Lieutenant Colonel Darrel J. Vandeveld, United States v.
Mohammed Jawad, CMCR No. 08-004 (U.S. Sept. 22, 2008), available at http://s3.
amazonaws.com/propublica/assets/docs/vandeveld_declaration_080922.pdf (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Vandeveld Declaration].  Details of the treatment of
Mr. Jawad are provided in Major David J.R. Frakt, Closing Argument at Guantanamo:  The
Torture of Mohammed Jawad, 22 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 1, 19–21 (2009).  In August 2009,
Jawad was released and returned to his native Afghanistan.  Associated Press, Guantanamo
Detainee Released, N.Y. Times, Aug. 25, 2009, at A8.
146. Vandeveld Declaration, supra note 145, ¶ 10. R
147. Declaration of Lieutenant Colonel Stephen Abraham, Reply to Opposition to
Petition for Rehearing of Denial of Certiorari app. ¶¶ 1–24, Al Odah v. United States, 127
S. Ct. 3067 (2007) (No. 06-1196) [hereinafter Abraham Declaration].  In an interview,
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whose submissions have been cited as pivotal to the Court’s decision to
hear the Boumediene case.148
Abraham had prepared information for CSRTs and served as a deci-
sionmaker on one; he made his declaration in June 2007 when detainee
lawyers sought a rehearing of the denial of the certiorari petition in
Boumediene.149  Abraham explained the poverty of the “information used
to prepare the files [that] . . . frequently consisted of finished intelligence
products of a generalized nature—often outdated, often ‘generic,’ rarely
specifically relating to the individual subjects of the CSRTs or to the cir-
cumstances related to those individuals’ status.”150  Further, “[w]hat were
purported to be specific statements of fact lacked even the most funda-
mental earmarks of objectively credible evidence.”151  The one CSRT on
which Abraham sat “determined that there was no factual basis for con-
cluding that the individual should be classified as an enemy combat-
ant.”152  After being ordered to “reopen the hearing,” the panel did not
change its ruling, and Abraham was never again assigned to sit on a
CSRT.153
Abraham’s account underscores the contributions made by indepen-
dent tribunals staffed by decisionmakers free to insist on quality informa-
tion.  The holding in Boumediene, in turn, is a resounding endorsement of
Abraham later explained that he joined a group of workers ill trained to create quality
decisionmaking procedures and unable to access the kind of information requisite for
making fact-based decisions about detainees.  See Andy Worthington, An Interview with
Guantanamo Whistleblower Stephen Abraham (Dec. 30, 2008), at http://
www.lewrockwell.com/orig9/worthington7.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
[hereinafter Abraham Interview]; see also Carol D. Leonnig & Josh White, An Ex-Member
Calls Detainee Panels Unfair, Wash. Post, June 23, 2007, at A3.
148. See William Glaberson, In Shift, Justices Agree to Review Detainees’ Case, N.Y.
Times, June 30, 2007, at A1.
149. See Reply to Opposition to Petition for Rehearing of Denial of Certioari at 5, Al
Odah, 127 S. Ct. 3067 (No. 06-1196).  Abraham explained that, between September 2004
and March 2005, he had been assigned to the Office for the Administrative Review of the
Detention of Enemy Combatants to gather and review information for CSRTs.  Abraham
Declaration, supra note 147, ¶ 1. R
150. Abraham Declaration, supra note 147, ¶ 8. R
151. Id. ¶ 22; see also Kyndra Miller Rotunda, Honor Bound:  Inside the Guantanamo
Trials 133–36 (2008).  Criticism of the quality of information came from many of the
detainee lawyers, some of whom attended proceedings, and from observers dispatched by
NGOs such as Human Rights Watch.  See, e.g., H. Candace Gorman, My Experiences
Representing a Guantánamo Detainee, Litig., Spring 2009, at 10, 12–14; Audrey Macklin,
The Omar Khadr Case, Jurist, Oct. 31, 2008, at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2008/
10/omar-khadr-case-redefining-war-crimes.php (on file with the Columbia Law Review); Ben
Wizner, Impressions of Guantanamo, Blog of Rights:  Official Blog of the American Civil
Liberties Union, Jan. 13, 2006, at http://blog.aclu.org/2006/01/13/impressions-of-
guantanamo (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
152. Abraham Declaration, supra note 147, ¶ 23. R
153. Id. ¶¶ 23–24.  Abraham later commented that “tribunal members were told to
trust all of the information presented against the detainee without hesitation or question,
and to distrust any inconsistent testimony or other information.”  Abraham Interview,
supra note 147. R
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the importance of factfinding by Article III judges.  Over an acerbic dis-
sent by the Chief Justice,154 Justice Kennedy’s majority identified the core
attribute of habeas jurisdiction as the capacity to make inquiries, when
necessary, into factual predicates for detention—“to call the jailer to ac-
count.”155  The same month, judges in the D.C. Circuit demonstrated the
utility of that practice when they concluded that a CSRT had no basis to
require detention of an “ethnic Uighur, who fled his home in the
People’s Republic of China” out of fear of persecution of Muslims.156
The Guantánamo cases are thus rare instances when participants—
prosecutors and lower tier decisionmakers within the CSRT process—
broke ranks to report failures in their own work.  Further, in several in-
stances, the government conceded the lack of evidence to support ongo-
ing detention, even as it also argued for the authority to continue to con-
fine certain individuals.  As Patricia Wald, a retired judge from the D.C.
Circuit who served on the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia, described, the military commission process had an “almost
hopeless lopsidedness” in its evidentiary rules.157  Further, decisions often
lacked explanations—making plain the “risk of a system . . . created
uniquely for a widely despised group of defendants,” who were given
“substantively fewer rights and protections,” and lacked access to structur-
ally independent judges.158  One might therefore isolate the import of
this set of judgments by arguing that the peculiarity of the CSRTs and the
pressures of terrorist threats resulted in irregularities that, through docu-
mentation, produced exceptional federal court decisions.159
154. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2279 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  The Chief
Justice protested that the majority had found the administrative adjudication defective but
failed to specify what was required.  See id. at 2279, 2299.
155. Id. at 2247 (majority opinion).  The Court “consider[ed] it uncontroversial . . .
that the privilege of habeas corpus entitles the prisoner to a meaningful opportunity to
demonstrate that he is being held pursuant to ‘the erroneous application or
interpretation’ of relevant law.”  Id. at 2266 (quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 302
(2001)).
156. Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834, 835 (D.C. Cir. 2008).  A CSRT had found Huzaifa
Parhat, one of a group who fled from China to Pakistan but whom local villagers
“handed . . . over to Pakistani officials who turned them over to the U.S. military” in 2001,
to be an “enemy combatant.”  Id. at 837.  But as the D.C. Circuit detailed in a lengthy
opinion, the documents alleging that the Uighur group was “‘associated’ with al Qaida and
the Taliban” included insufficient “indicia of the statements’ reliability.”  Id. at 836.  The
court ordered a release or transfer, or a new CSRT that complied with the evidentiary
requirements set forth.  Id. at 854.
157. Patricia M. Wald, Foreword to the Military Commission Reporter, supra note
104, at xv, xvi.
158. Id. at xvi–xvii.
159. An alternative argument is that threats of terrorism license procedural
irregularities.  See Eric Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Terror in the Balance:  Security,
Liberty, and the Courts 12 (2007).  For a critique of this approach, see Alice Ristroph,
Professors Strangelove, 11 Green Bag 2d 245, 257 (2008).
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E. Federal Executive Detention as a Basis for Doctrinal Differentiation
A fifth basis for containment of the principles that emerge in the
9/11 habeas cases comes not from a focus on the place of detention, the
personal degradation suffered, or the contexts of war and of procedural
disarray, but from the status of the petitioners.  All of those seeking relief
were subjected to pretrial executive detention by the federal government
operating outside the criminal justice system.  The number of persons so
affected is minuscule when contrasted with those confined through the
criminal justice and immigration systems run by the state and federal
governments.
The prison at Guantánamo held only a few hundred people.  As
noted, estimates put the highest number in the 700s and, by the end of
2008, the population was down to under 250, reduced by December of
2009 to about 215.160  Adding detainees at Bagram held for longer terms
(maybe some 630),161 as well as those in “temporary” detention including
“black” and secret sites abroad,162 a much higher estimate—perhaps
reaching 10 or 20,000 persons detained over the years—can be imagined.
But those numbers are dwarfed by the 2.3 million people who, as of
2008, were in state and federal prisons pursuant to convictions and other
court orders.163  Another group, whose numbers are not readily calcu-
lated, are those detained or subjected to supervision after service of
sentences for violating various sex offender laws.164  Further, in 2008,
more than 378,000 people had been held by Immigration and Customs
160. As of December 16, 2008, following a series of prisoner releases, approximately
250 detainees remained at Guantánamo.  See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Def., Detainee
Transfer Announced (Dec. 16, 2008), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/Releases/
Release.aspx?ReleaseID=12394 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
161. In January 2008, the New York Times reported that there were approximately 630
detainees held at Bagram.  Tim Golden, Defying U.S. Plan, Prison Expands in Afghanistan,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 2008, at A1.
162. See Dafna Linzer & Julie Tate, New Light Shed on CIA’s “Black Site” Prisons,
Wash. Post, Feb. 28, 2007, at A1; Marcel Rosenbach & John Goetz, New Report Cites Proof
of CIA Black Sites, Spiegel Online, Aug. 6, 2007, at http://www.spiegel.de/international/
world/0,1518,487325,00.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review); Human Rights First,
The CIA’s Secret Detention Program, May 1, 2008, at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/
blog/torture/2008/05/cias-secret-detention-program.html (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
163. See Pew Center on the States, One in 100:  Behind Bars in America 2008, at 5
(2008), available at http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/One%20in
%20100.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Pew, One in 100].
164. See Daniel M. Filler, Silence and the Racial Dimension of Megan’s Law, 89 Iowa
L. Rev. 1535, 1549–50 (2004).  One calculation comes from the Department of Justice,
which in 2001 stated that over 386,000 people were registered in state sex offender
registries.  See Devon B. Adams, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Summary of State Sex Offender
Registries, 2001, at 2 (2002), available at http://ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/sssor01.pdf
(on file with the Columbia Law Review).  In addition, the KlaasKids Found. maintains a
tabulation of sex offender registrants per state.  KlaasKids Foundation, Megan’s Law
Legislation in All 50 States, at http://www.klaaskids.org/pg-legmeg.htm (last visited Oct.
23, 2009) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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Enforcement in some 300 detention facilities; daily counts run at about
31,000 in detention.165
The Supreme Court’s 9/11 case law is likewise dwarfed, numerically,
by holdings related to these many regular detainees.  As illustrated in the
chart, “U.S. Supreme Court Decisions on Detainee or Prisoner Cases,
October 2003–June 2009” (Figure 7), during the same six terms in which
the Court ruled on seven 9/11 cases, the Court also decided eighty other
cases filed by state or federal prisoners.  Sixty-three cases came from post-
conviction habeas corpus petitions, mostly brought by state prisoners,166
In the fall of 2009, the Supreme Court agreed to decide whether congressional powers
under the “Necessary and Proper Clause” of Article I supported legislation authorizing
ongoing detention of mentally ill, “sexually dangerous” persons found either incompetent
to stand trial or nearing the expiration of their sentences.  See United States v. Comstock,
551 F.3d 274 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2828 (2009).  The statute at issue,
Title III of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, is codified at 18
U.S.C. § 4248 (2006).  Commitment occurs after a hearing in federal district court.  See
§ 4248(a)–(d).  The statute expressly provides that persons committed pursuant to its
provisions may seek release through habeas corpus.  See § 4247(g).  State procedures for
the commitment of “dangerous persons” have been upheld, albeit with due process
constraints imposed.  See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 368–69 (1997).
165. See Dora Schriro, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Immigration Detention
Overview and Recommendations 2 (2009), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/
091005_ice_detention_report-final.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter
Schriro, Immigration Detention].  The 31,000 figure is the number in detention on
September 1, 2009.  Id.; see also Organizational Structure, Spending, and Staffing for the
Health Care Provided to Immigration Detainees:  Testimony Before the Subcomm. on
Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 111th Cong. 2 (2009) (statement of
Alicia Puente Cackley, Director Health Care, Government Accountability Office), available
at http://appropriations.house.gov/Witness_testimony/HS/Alicia_Cackley_03_03_09.pdf
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Cackley, Health Care for Immigration
Detainees]; Fact Sheet, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., Detention Management (Nov. 20, 2008), available at http://www.ice.gov/
pi/news/factsheets/detention_mgmt.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review).  The
Cackley materials have somewhat different numbers for 2007.
166. These cases are filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which authorizes jurisdiction in
federal courts for persons in state custody.  The cases in Figure 7 filed under § 2254
include (in chronological order):  Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1 (2003); Mitchell v.
Esparza, 540 U.S. 12 (2003); Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668 (2004); Baldwin v. Reese, 541
U.S. 27 (2004); Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386 (2004); Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433
(2004); Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652 (2004); Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225 (2004);
Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274 (2004); Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004); Beard
v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406 (2004); Holland v. Jackson, 542 U.S. 649 (2004); Brown v. Payton,
544 U.S. 133 (2005); Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005); Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S.
408 (2005); Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660 (2005); Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175
(2005); Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005); Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005);
Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005); Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644 (2005); Bell v.
Thompson, 545 U.S. 794 (2005); Dye v. Hofbauer, 546 U.S. 1 (2005); Schriro v. Smith, 546
U.S. 6 (2005); Kane v. Garcia Espitia, 546 U.S. 9 (2005); Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74
(2005); Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189 (2006); Brown v. Sanders, 546 U.S. 212 (2006); Rice
v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333 (2006); Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198 (2006); House v. Bell, 547
U.S. 518 (2006); Ayers v. Belmontes, 549 U.S. 7 (2006); Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70
(2006); Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147 (2007); Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327 (2007);
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some of which entailed interpretations of the meaning of restrictions on
access to habeas that Congress imposed in 1996 in the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).167
As Figure 7 also illustrates, a few cases raised claims about conditions
of confinement or the procedures for execution under a capital sentence.
Under Supreme Court doctrine, if prisoners do not seek release as the
remedy, they must rely on jurisdictional bases other than habeas
corpus—such as invoking rights protected under statutes such as 42
U.S.C. § 1983.168  Finally, some cases filed by prisoners in the state courts
reach the Court through its authority to review state court judgments.169
The sheer number of decisions reflect that post-trial detention is the com-
mon state of affairs for tens of thousands of individuals.
Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406 (2007); Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233
(2007); Brewer v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 286 (2007); Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465
(2007); Roper v. Weaver, 550 U.S. 598 (2007); Uttecht v. Brown, 551 U.S. 1 (2007); Fry v.
Pliler, 551 U.S. 112 (2007); Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007); Panetti v. Quarterman,
551 U.S. 930 (2007); Allen v. Siebert, 128 S. Ct. 2 (2007); Wright v. Van Patten, 128 S. Ct.
743 (2008); Arave v. Hoffman, 128 S. Ct. 749 (2008); Hedgpeth v. Pulido, 129 S. Ct. 530
(2008); Jimenez v. Quarterman, 129 S. Ct. 681 (2009); Waddington v. Sarausad, 129 S. Ct.
823 (2009); Knowles v. Mirzayance, 129 S. Ct. 1411 (2009); Harbison v. Bell, 129 S. Ct. 1481
(2009); Cone v. Bell, 129 S. Ct. 1769 (2009); and Bobby v. Bies, 129 S. Ct. 2145 (2009).
Federal prisoners challenging their convictions file “post-conviction motions” under
28 U.S.C. § 2255.  See, e.g., Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353 (2005); Johnson v. United
States, 544 U.S. 295 (2005); Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375 (2003).  The chart does
not include cases brought by individuals detained through the immigration system.
167. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 28 U.S.C.); see, e.g., Lawrence, 549 U.S. at 331 (holding that AEDPA’s statute of
limitations period for seeking federal habeas corpus relief is tolled when a petition for
postconviction relief is pending in state court); Evans, 546 U.S. at 198, 201 (holding state
supreme court decision denying petition on the merits does not automatically mean
petition was timely for purposes of tolling AEDPA’s statute of limitations, and requiring
federal courts to decide whether petition was filed in state court within reasonable time—
six months, without explanation, was not reasonable).  See generally James S. Liebman &
William F. Ryan, “Some Effectual Power”:  The Quantity and Quality of Decisionmaking
Required of Article III Courts, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 696 (1998); infra notes 389–436, and
accompanying text.
168. Cases pursuing claims based on § 1983 included, in chronological order:
Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749 (2004); Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637 (2004);
Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005); Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74 (2005);
Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209 (2005); Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573 (2006);
Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81 (2006); Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521 (2006); Jones v. Bock,
549 U.S. 199 (2007); Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197 (2007); and Dist. Atty’s Office v.
Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308 (2009).  In United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151 (2006), the
prisoner sought relief under both § 1983 and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).
Examples of cases relying on other statutory predicates include:  Ali v. Fed. Bureau of
Prisons, 128 S. Ct. 831 (2008) (Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671–2680
(2006)), and Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005) (Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc–2000cc-5 (2006)).
169. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2006); see, e.g., Haywood v. Drown, 129 S. Ct. 2108 (2009);
Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008); Medellı́n v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008); Danforth v.
Minnesota, 128 S. Ct. 1029 (2008); Smith v. Texas, 127 S. Ct. 1686 (2007); Sanchez-Llamas
v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331 (2006).
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U.S. Supreme Court Decisions in Detainee or Prisoner Cases
October 2003 – June 2009
FEDERAL AND STATE PRISONER CASES (80 DECISIONS)
2003-2004 Term
§ 2254 Habeas
Yarborough v. Gentry (2003)
Mitchell v. Esparza (2003)
Banks v. Dretke (2004)
Baldwin v. Reese (2004)
Dretke v. Haley (2004)
Middleton v. McNeil (2004)
Yarborough v. Alvarado (2004)
Pliler v. Ford (2004)
Tennard v. Dretke (2004)
Schriro v. Summerlin (2004)
Beard v. Banks (2004)
Holland v. Jackson (2004)
§ 2255 Habeas
Castro v. United States (2003)
§ 1983 Claims
Muhammad v. Close (2004)
Nelson v. Campbell (2004)
2006-2007 Term
§ 2254 Habeas
Ayers v. Belmontes (2006)
Carey v. Musladin (2006)
Burton v. Stewart (2007)
Lawrence v. Florida (2007)
Whorton v. Bockting (2007)
Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman (2007)
Brewer v. Quarterman (2007)
Schriro v. Landrigan (2007)
Roper v. Weaver (2007)
Uttecht v. Brown (2007)
Fry v. Pliler (2007)
Bowles v. Russell (2007)
Panetti v. Quarterman (2007)
§ 1983 Claims
Jones v. Bock (2007)
Erickson v. Pardus (2007)
Review via § 1257
Smith v. Texas (2007) 
2004-2005 Term
§ 2254 Habeas
Brown v. Payton (2005)
Rhines v. Weber (2005)
Pace v. DiGuglielmo (2005)
Medellin v. Dretke (2005)
Bradshaw v. Stumpf (2005)
Miller-El v. Dretke (2005)
Rompilla v. Beard (2005)
Gonzalez v. Crosby (2005)
Mayle v. Felix (2005)
Bell v. Thompson (2005)
§ 2255 Habeas
Dodd v. United States (2005)
Johnson v. United States (2005)
§ 1983 Claims
Johnson v. California (2005)
Wilkinson v. Dotson (2005)
Wilkinson v. Austin (2005)
RLUIPA
Cutter v. Wilkinson (2005)
2007-2008 Term
§ 2254 Habeas
Allen v. Siebert (2007)
Wright v. Van Patten (2008)
Arave v. Hoffman (2008)
Federal Tort Claims Act
Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons (2008)
Review via § 1257
Danforth v. Minnesota (2008)
Medellín v. Texas (2008)
Baze v. Rees (2008)
Rumsfeld v. Padilla (2004)
Rasul v. Bush (2004)
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (2004)
2005-2006 Term
§ 2254 Habeas
Dye v. Hofbauer (2005)
Schriro v. Smith (2005)
Kane v. Garcia Espitia (2005)
Bradshaw v. Richey (2005)
Evans v. Chavis (2006)
Brown v. Sanders (2006)
Rice v. Collins (2006)
Day v. McDonough (2006)
House v. Bell (2006)
§ 1983 Claims
Hill v. McDonough (2006)
Woodford v. Ngo (2006)
Beard v. Banks (2006)
§ 1983 and ADA Claim
United States v. Georgia (2006)
Review via § 1257
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon (2006)
2008-2009 Term
§ 2254 Habeas
Hedgpeth v. Pulido (2008)
Jimenez v. Quarterman (2009)
Waddington v. Sarausad (2009)
Knowles v. Mirzayance (2009)
Harbison v. Bell (2009)
Cone v. Bell (2009)
Bobby v. Bies (2009)
§ 1983 Claims
Haywood v. Drown (2009)
District Attorney’s Office v.
Osborne (2009)
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (2006)
Boumediene v. Bush (2008)
Munaf v. Geren (2008)
“WAR ON TERROR” DETAINEE CASES (7 DECISIONS)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal (2009)
FIGURE 7
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Yet the problems posed by the 9/11 detainees have become the cen-
terpiece of much academic commentary and case law, produced through
tens of thousands of lawyer and judge hours devoted to the questions
raised by government decisions on 9/11.170  In addition to rulings by the
170. A full analysis of the comparisons requires consideration of the differences
among the lawyers who represent various groups of detainees, as well as the sociology of
detention and distinctions or overlap among custodial and administrative officials.  For
example, a small literature addresses the specific issues of lawyering at Guantánamo, once
discouraged by some government officials and becoming a sought-after assignment.  See
Neil A. Lewis, Official Attacks Top Law Firms Over Detainees, N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 2007, at
A1.  As Jenny Martinez described,
More than one thousand attorneys were involved in the litigation of the Hamdan
case in the Supreme Court in 2006, for example.  Dozens of the nation’s biggest
law firms and hundreds of attorneys are currently involved in representing the
Guantanamo detainees or filing amicus briefs on their behalf.  At this point, a law
firm that does not have its own Guantanamo detainee might have difficulty
attracting summer associates.
Martinez, supra note 26, at 1062–63 (footnotes omitted); see also Stacy Sullivan, The R
Minutes of the Guantanamo Bay Bar Association, N.Y. Mag., June 26, 2006, at 44.
Further, as of 2006, statutory rights to counsel attached for those subjected to military
commissions.  See MCA of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified at 10 U.S.C.
§§ 948a–950w (2006) and scattered sections of titles 10, 18, and 42 U.S.C.); 10 U.S.C.
§ 949a(b)(1)(C) (“The accused shall receive the assistance of counsel as provided for by
section 948k.”); id. § 948k(b) (providing criteria for trial counsel); see also MCA of 2009,
Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 948k(b), 123 Stat. 2190, 2578 (reenacting 2006 MCA’s trial counsel
provisions); id. § 950h, 123 Stat. 2190, 2604 (reenacting 2006 MCA’s appellate counsel
provisions).  Nonetheless, lawyers have faced various obstacles, including difficulties in
communicating with their clients.  See Mark P. Denbeaux & Jonathan Hafetz, Introduction
to The Guantánamo Lawyers:  Inside a Prison, Outside the Law 1–2 (Mark P. Denbeaux &
Jonathan Hafetz eds., 2009); David Luban, Lawfare and Legal Ethics at Guantánamo, 60
Stan. L. Rev. 1981, 1989–98 (2008).
State and federal prisoners have no constitutional rights to postconviction
representation, even when death row prisoners are pursuing habeas remedies.  See Murray
v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 3–4 (1989).  Further, Sixth Amendment counsel rights apply to
the initial trial followed by an appeal, if one is provided as of right, but not to discretionary
reviews thereafter, including to the Supreme Court.  See Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600,
604–05 (1974).  A federal statute, however, makes provision for appointment of lawyers for
indigent defendants sentenced to death in federal or state court and pursuing
postconviction relief under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254–2255.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3599(a)(2) (2006).
That statute also specifies the experience required for counsel, support for experts, and
the availability of counsel for federal defendants charged with capital crimes.  Id.
§ 3599(c)–(f).  Moreover, an interpretation of that statute held that federally appointed
lawyers may represent and must be compensated for assisting those individuals in state
clemency proceedings.  See id. § 3599(e); Harbison v. Bell, 129 S. Ct. 1481, 1491 (2009).
In addition, the PLRA of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321–66 (1996) (codified in
scattered sections of 11, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.), imposes various limitations on the fees to
be awarded for successful representation of prisoners challenging conditions of
confinement.  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(3) (2006) (“No award of attorney’s fees in an
action described in paragraph (1) shall be based on an hourly rate greater than 150
percent of the hourly rate established under section 3006A of title 18 for payment of court-
appointed counsel.”).
Another group of detainees, immigrants, has neither statutory nor constitutionally
established rights to counsel for those unable to afford representation.  Several
commentators have noted the lack of lawyers, and a few have launched projects to improve
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Supreme Court, those attentive to 9/11 detainees can review a host of
opinions from the lower courts, with decisions on the availability of im-
plied causes of action, the defense of state secrets,171 and the continuing
questions of the lawfulness of detention and the conditions of confine-
ment at Guantánamo.172  (Indeed, the writing of this Essay required the
the quality of representation.  See M. Margaret McKeown & Allegra McLeod, The Counsel
Conundrum:  Effective Representation in Immigration Proceedings, in Jaya Ramji-Nogales,
Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Philip G. Schrag, Refugee Roulette:  Disparities in Asylum
Adjudication and Proposals for Reform 286 (2009) [hereinafter Ramji-Nogales,
Schoenholtz & Schrag, Disparities in Asylum Adjudication]; see also Robert A. Katzmann,
The Legal Profession and the Unmet Needs of the Immigrant Poor, 21 Geo. J. Legal Ethics
3, 7–8 (2008).
171. Two well-known cases are Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250 (E.D.N.Y 2006),
aff’d, 532 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2008), aff’d en banc, No. 06-4216-cv, 2009 WL 3522887 (2d Cir.
Nov. 2, 2009), and Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 563 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2009),
reh’g en banc granted (argued Dec. 15, 2009).  Maher Arar, a citizen of both Canada and
Syria, was detained by U.S. officials while in transit through John F. Kennedy International
Airport and then sent to Syria where he was interrogated under torture by Syrian
authorities. Arar brought claims against the United States and various government
officials under the Torture Victims Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA), Pub. L. No. 102-256,
106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006)). Arar, 532 F.3d at 162–63.  The
Canadian government investigated the case, cleared Arar of any links to terrorism, and
found that it was likely that the United States relied on inaccurate information about Mr.
Arar that had been provided by Canadian officials.  See Canadian Arar Inquiry, supra note
121, at 13, 59.  The Second Circuit, sitting en banc and splitting 7–4, held that Arar could R
not pursue remedies in federal court, as the court declined to recognize both his Bivens
and statutory claims—in part because open court proceedings could undercut the security
needs entailed in the “extraodinary rendition context.” Arar, 2009 WL 3522887, at
*11–*17.  Each of the four dissenting judges (Calabresi, Parker, Pooler, and Sack) wrote
separately to record their disagreements, as they also joined each other “to underscore the
miscarriage of justice that leaves Arar without a remedy in our courts.”  Id. at *43.  (Parker,
J., dissenting).
In Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., plaintiffs Mohamed, Agiza, Britel, al-Rawi, and
Bashmilah sued Jeppesen Dataplan, a subsidiary of Boeing.  Jeppesen Dataplan was alleged
to have helped transport the plaintiffs to prisons in Morocco, Egypt, Afghanistan, and an
unknown location (the CIA “black site” prison), under the CIA’s extraordinary rendition
program.  See 563 F.3d at 997–98.  The government argued that the complaint had to be
dismissed because the defense would reveal “state secrets,” and the district court agreed.
Id. at 1000.  The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, concluding that the proper
approach was to “excis[e] secret evidence on an item-by-item basis,” rather than to
“foreclos[e] litigation altogether at the outset.” Id. at 1003 (citations omitted).  That
decision is under review, en banc.  See Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., No. 08-15693,
2009 WL 3526219 (9th Cir. Oct. 27, 2009) (granting rehearing en banc).
172. While no longer adhering to the classification of individuals as “enemy
combatants,” the Obama Administration asserted its authority to detain anyone who had
“substantially supported, Taliban or al-Qaida forces or associated forces that are engaged
in hostilities against the United States.”  Respondents’ Memorandum Regarding the
Government’s Detention Authority Relative to Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay at 2, In
re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., No. 09-442 (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2009), available at http:/
/www.justice.gov/opa/documents/memo-re-det-auth.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
District judges have responded differently to the question of what suffices to sustain
detention.  Compare In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., 581 F. Supp. 2d 33 (D.D.C.
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imposition of an artificial deadline, early December of 2009, as daily news
reports would have necessitated constant revision.)
The oddity of executive pretrial detention at Guantánamo produces
arguments for limiting the import of the resulting Supreme Court inter-
ventions.  The specific statutory regimes differ; the DTA and the two
MCAs structure routes to court for 9/11 detainees, while AEDPA controls
the path for convicted prisoners.  Further, one could focus on pretrial de-
tention as the pivotal variable; none of the 9/11 detainees had been
through either a public trial or regular judicial procedures, and the vast
majority would never face formal accusations in American criminal
courts.  Thus, they could be understood as specially authorized to access
Article III jurists, in contrast to those who dominate the prison popula-
tion—convicted defendants.  Yet the DTA and the MCAs also provide evi-
dence of the opposite view—that, as alleged terrorists, these individuals
ought to have less access than ordinary detainees.
F. The Unique Vindication of Habeas Jurisdiction or Pyrrhic Procedural
Victories Resulting in Preventive Detention
Additional reasons for seeking to isolate the judgments come by way
of either special praise or critique.  One interpretation of the 9/11 law is
that, despite the popularity of cutting off alleged terrorists’ access to
courts and rights, federal courts held their ground.  The Court’s 2004
Hamdi decision could be read as a wise placeholder, firmly insistent on a
role for the courts and carving out a space for further action that proved,
subsequently, to be needed.  Through the dialectic exchange thereafter
2008), rev’d sub nom. Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022, 1024 (D.C. Cir. 2009), cert.
granted, 77 U.S.L.W. 3237, 78 U.S.L.W. 3010, 78 U.S.L.W. 3233, 78 U.S.L.W. 3237 (U.S.
Oct. 20, 2009) (No. 08-1234), 2009 WL 935637, with Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63
(D.D.C. 2009).  In another high profile case, U.S. District Court Judge Ellen Segal Huvelle,
noted that, after seven years, the case was “riddled with holes.”  Transcript of Hearing at 7,
Bacha v. Obama, No. 05-2385, 2009 WL 2149949 (D.D.C. July 16, 2009).  At issue was the
imprisonment of an Afghan, Mohammed Jawad, captured and detained as a teenager and
allegedly abused by both Afghan and U.S. officials.  See supra note 145.  Jawad’s case R
evoked international protests.  Later in July, the judge reiterated that the government’s
case “fell apart,” in large part because of “the judicial findings that almost all of the
evidence against Mr. Jawad was the confessions he made as a result of torture.”  William
Glaberson, U.S. Judge Challenges Evidence on a Detainee, N.Y. Times, July 23, 2009, at
A22 (internal quotation marks omitted).  In August, Jawad was released in Kabul.  See
Associated Press, Guantánamo Detainee Released, N.Y. Times, Aug. 24, 2009, at A8.
Thereafter, Jawad announced plans to seek redress against the U.S. government.  Heidi
Vogt, Young Afghan Freed From Guantanamo to Sue US Gov’t, Seattle Times, Aug. 27,
2009, at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2009754090_apasafghan
guantanamoprisoner.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
In the fall of 2009, Congress offered different parameters for prosecution through
military commissions as well as a revised definition of “unprivileged enemy
belligerent[s]”—to be individuals who have “engaged in hostilities” or “purposefully and
materially supported hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners,” or who
were members of al Qaeda when they committed an alleged offense prosecutable under its
parameters.  MCA of 2009 § 948a.
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between the courts and the other branches, judges were able to moderate
the harshness of the confinement regime and engage in serious oversight
of the decisions on detention.
Congress pressed back, but the Court continued to identify the con-
stitutional mandate for the judiciary, prompting the first-ever holding of
a violation of the Suspension Clause.  After Boumediene, district judges ad-
mirably took up the task of oversight.  They have shaped a common law
of habeas corpus rights and remedies as, in dozens of rulings, district and
appellate judges mined the parameters of lawful confinement for alleged
enemy combatants.  In several instances, the lower courts found insuffi-
cient evidence to continue the detention,173 and on occasion, the govern-
ment did not contest those rulings.174  Thus, through an incremental ap-
proach, life-tenured judges made plain that 9/11 detainees were not
“outside the law”175 because the Court drew “the line when it needed to
be drawn.”176
The problems of release that have ensued, on this account, come
primarily from diplomatic challenges.  Various detainees—such as a
group of Uighurs fleeing their country of origin—have no easy berth.  Yet
judges have continued to be vigilant.  For example, a district judge has
ruled that, if repatriation or other countries were not available for reloca-
tion, a group of Uighurs should be released in the United States.177  The
D.C. Circuit then concluded that the lower court lacked the power to
order entry into the United States because border-crossing was a decision
committed to immigration authorities.178  In 2009, the Supreme Court
173. See Hafetz & Manes, Guantánamo Detainee Judgments, supra note 25. R
174. After the Parhat decision in the D.C. Circuit, the “government saw no material
differences in its evidence against the other Uighurs, and therefore decided that none . . .
should be detained as enemy combatants.” Kiyemba, 555 F.3d at 1024.  For a discussion of
Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834 (D.C. Cir. 2008), see supra note 156 andy accompanying text.
175. See, e.g, Fallon, Habeas Corpus, supra note 26, at 355–57. R
176. Vladeck, The Long War, supra note 26, at 913. R
177. Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., 581 F. Supp. 2d at 43.
178. Kiyemba, 555 F.3d. 1022.  Judge Randolph, for himself and Judge Henderson,
held that the district court could not order the inclusion of these persons in the United
States.  Id. at 1029.  Judge Rogers, who concurred, objected that the majority’s view was not
“faithful to Boumediene,” nor in compliance with the Great Writ, but that the release order
was “prematurely” issued.  Id. at 1032 (Rogers, J., concurring).  She also noted that the
Executive had not filed returns on petitions.  Id.  The detainees then petitioned for
Supreme Court review, in part predicated on the claim that Article III courts could not be
“powerless to remedy indefinite and illegal Executive detention.”  Petition for Certiorari at
1, Kiyemba, 77 U.S.L.W. 3237, 78 U.S.L.W. 3010, 78 U.S.L.W. 3233, 78 U.S.L.W. 3237 (No.
08-1234), 2009 WL 934097.  In response, the government argued that the lower court
lacked the power to order transfer to the United States “outside of the framework of the
federal immigration laws.”  Letter from Elena Kagan, Solicitor Gen. of the U.S., to William
K. Suter, Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court (Sep. 23, 2009), available at http://www.scotusblog
.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2009/09/SG-letter-re-Kiyemba-9-23-091.pdf (on file with
the Columbia Law Review).  But, the government explained, it had helped some of the
detainees resettle in Bermuda.  Id.  Further, the government reported it was “working
diligently to find an appropriate place to resettle the remaining Uighur detainees.”  Id.
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agreed to take up this issue, to decide the scope of federal court remedial
authority under the writ.179  As of this writing, the government continues
its relocation efforts, a measure that would obviate the need to explain to
the Court why individuals found eligible for habeas remain detained.180
In addition to releases through court action, scores more had been sent
out of Guantánamo by virtue of executive decisions made “in the shadow
of the law.”  The 9/11 litigation could thus be seen as a success but one
driven by the exceptional actions of all three branches—therefore offer-
ing little guidance on Court/Congress/Executive interactions under dif-
ferent circumstances.
An alternative interpretation is that the Court’s rulings were pain-
fully slow, enabling a regime of preventive detention and doing relatively
little to alter the conditions of those in detention, to reorient popular
understandings about treatment to be accorded such detainees, or to
provide remedies for individuals wrongfully detained or abused.  This
view suggests that the rulings ought not be proffered as jurisprudential
models because, in several respects, the decisions have had a relatively
minimal impact.  The 2004 decision in Hamdi181 provides a first example.
There, the Court departed from the traditional remedial order in habeas
proceedings—that either a person be tried in accordance with due pro-
cess within a specified period of time or released.  Instead, the plurality
read the 2001 AUMF to license what has proved over the years to be pre-
ventive detention.182  Moreover, the Court did not exercise its preroga-
tive183 to give much direction on the procedural parameters of the pro-
179. See Kiyemba, 555 F.3d 1022.
180. Soon after the Supreme Court granted certiorari, six of the thirteen remaining
Uighurs were transferred from Guantánamo and released in Palau, an archipelago in the
Pacific Ocean.  Lyle Denniston, Six Uighurs Resettled, SCOTUSBlog, Oct. 31, 2009, at
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/six-uighurs-resettled/ (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).  If all the individuals seeking relief are relocated outside of the United States, the
case could be mooted.  See Adam Liptak, Justices to Hear Appeal From Uighurs Held at
Guantánamo, N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 2009, at A14.
181. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
182. See id. at 517 (plurality opinion).  As discussed supra note 93, the plurality
decision did impose a limiting condition on its reading of the AUMF:  “indefinite
detention for the purpose of interrogation is not authorized.” Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 521
(plurality opinion).  Thus, at some point, its interpretation of the AUMF as supporting
detention could “unravel.”  Id.  In contrast, Justices Souter and Ginsburg thought Hamdi’s
detention illegal, in that it violated the Non-Detention Act, 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2000).
That specific federal statute, in their view, was not overridden by the generality of the
AUMF; they joined the plurality insofar as it required procedural protections. Hamdi, 542
U.S. at 540 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the
judgment, joined by Ginsburg, J.).
183. In earlier cases, the government had argued that deference was owed to the
legislature (and potentially the executive branch) on the quantum of process due.  That
view was rejected in Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542–46
(1985).  Thus, the Court has taken it upon itself to determine when liberty interests, and
even certain forms of property interests, exist as well as to decide the kind of process
appropriate to particular kinds of interests.  See, e.g., Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472
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cess it insisted was “due.”  Justice O’Connor’s decision for the plurality
upheld a burdenshifting system, which permitted “a presumption in favor
of the Government’s evidence.”
The opinion’s optimism that such evidentiary rules would suffice to
prevent the “errant tourist, embedded journalist, or local aid working” to
show “military error” in detention has not (as exemplified by the
Uighers) proved warranted.184  Further, while calling for a “neutral deci-
sionmaker,” the plurality did not rule out deployment of individuals
within the chain of the military to make classification decisions.185  More-
over, instead of indicating that the delineated due process rights flowed
to persons detained outside the theatre of war by the United States, the
plurality described the entitlement as limited to individuals, such as
Hamdi, who were “citizen[s] held in the United States.”186
In hindsight, this approach could be read as minimalism at its
worst,187 resulting in glacial changes that have been criticized by a range
of commentators starting from very different premises.  The Honorable
Richard Leon, sitting in the District of Columbia, had (in rulings before
the 2008 decision of Boumediene) registered his views that federal judges
had no authority over “non-resident aliens” held at Guantánamo and that
no “viable theory” provided them with a basis for relief.188  In the remand
(1995), discussed infra notes 277–281.  Criticism of the Court’s approach, both in terms of
its theoretical underpinnings and its directives modeling process on court-based traditions,
are set forth in Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court’s Due Process Calculus for
Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge:  Three Factors in Search of a Theory of
Value, 44 U. Chi. L. Rev. 28, 37–57 (1976).
184. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 534 (plurality opinion).
185. Id. at 509, 537–38.  The plurality was insistent that “interrogation by one’s
captor . . . hardly constitutes a constitutionally adequate factfinding before a neutral
decisionmaker.”  Id. at 537.
186. Id. at 509, 533.  Justices Scalia and Stevens viewed the detention of citizens such
as Hamdi to be unconstitutional under the Suspension Clause and dissented.  Id. at 554
(Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, J.).  Justice Thomas also dissented on the view that
detention was permissible. Id. at 579 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
187. See Owen Fiss, The Perils of Minimalism, 9 Theoretical Inquiries L. 643, 646–48
(2008); Jerry L. Mashaw, Due Process of Governance: Terror, the Rule of Law, and the
Limits of Institutional Design, 22 Governance: Int’l J. Pol’y Admin. & Institutions 353, 358,
363 (2009) (discussing lack of “clear specification” of process required and lack of
guidance on substantive rights).  The virtues of minimalism are examined by Cass R.
Sunstein, One Case at a Time:  Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court (1999); Cass R.
Sunstein, Minimalism at War, 2004 Sup. Ct. Rev. 47.
188. As explained in a 2005 decision, Judge Leon found no “viable” theories that gave
a court the authority to “issue a writ of habeas corpus challenging the legality of the
detention of non-resident aliens captured abroad and detained outside the territorial
sovereignty of the United States, pursuant to lawful military orders, during a
Congressionally authorized conflict.”  Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311, 314 (D.D.C.
2005), vacated and dismissed by Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007).  The
court in Khalid read Supreme Court case law to conclude that such individuals had “no
cognizable constitutional rights,” and specifically interpreted Rasul narrowly, to relate only
to statutory habeas corpus.  Id. at 320–23; see also Al Alwi v. Bush, 593 F. Supp. 2d 24,
28–29 (D.D.C. 2008) (concluding government did not need to prove individual “actually
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of Boumediene in November 2008, however, Judge Leon not only granted
habeas relief to five of six Algerian men then held at Guantánamo (in-
cluding Lakhdar Boumediene, the lead plaintiff), but also called on the
government not to prolong the detention by filing an appeal.189  Further
proceedings, he declared, would only strip the detainees of “another 18
months to two years of their lives.”190  He wrote, “[s]even years of waiting
for our legal system to give them an answer to a question so important, in
my judgment, is more than plenty.”191
Another cri de coeur comes from Professor Jenny Martinez, who had
litigated on behalf of detainees.  Martinez focused on the degree to which
the “war on terror” had produced “profound infringements of individual
rights;”192 she detailed that detainees had been subjected to torture,
other forms of cruel treatment, and prolonged imprisonment or deporta-
tion.193  And yet, in the years after September 11, 2001, court decisions
had rarely addressed directly the claims of violation of substantive rights.
Instead, the judgments had focused on process, including whether
particular courts had jurisdiction to entertain claims, whether individuals
had standing to bring challenges, whether the proper branch of govern-
ment had authority to issue a particular policy, whether evidence was pro-
tected from discovery by the state secrets privilege, and the like.194  Pro-
fessor Martinez wrote before the decision in Boumediene but her thesis
could be reiterated in that context.  Despite the majority’s evident dis-
comfort and concern with the CSRTs process, the Supreme Court did not
rule out administrative decisionmaking nor specify how to restructure
procedures to be constitutionally adequate.195  Rather, the Court again
us[ed] arms against U.S. or coalition forces” for that person to be classified as an enemy
combatant); Sliti v. Bush, 592 F. Supp. 2d 46, 51 (D.D.C. 2008) (denying habeas relief
because government “established by a preponderance of the evidence that . . . petitioner
traveled to Afghanistan as an al Qaeda recruit and trained at the local military training
camp”).
189. Transcript of Open Habeas Opinion Hearing at 28–30, Boumediene v. Bush, 579
F. Supp. 2d 191 (D.D.C. 2008) (No. CV04-1166).
190. Id. at 30.
191. Id. at 28–29.  While noting the government’s right to appeal, Judge Leon
commented that he, too, had a right to appeal to the leadership of the “Department of
Justice, Department of Defense, and the CIA and other intelligence agencies.”  Id. at 28.
“My appeal to them is to strongly urge them to take a hard look at the evidence, both
presented and lacking, as to these five detainees.”  Id.
192. Martinez, supra note 26, at 1015.
193. Martinez’s critique was broader, objecting to the failure of the Court to curb
governmental surveillance of the public’s private phone calls and other personal records.
Id. at 1015, 1031.  Martinez’s concerns parallel those of Stephen Vladeck.  See Vladeck,
The Long War, supra note 26, at 897–98 (lamenting Supreme Court’s passivity in “missing
opportunities to identify limits on the government’s authority in a number of cases”).
194. Martinez, supra note 26, at 1015. R
195. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2266 (2008) (“We do not endeavor to
offer a comprehensive summary of the requisites for an adequate substitute for habeas
corpus.”).  The Boumediene opinion continues, noting that “[a]lthough [the Court]
make[s] no judgment as to whether the CSRTs, as currently constituted, satisfy due process
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ceded initial judgments, including the crafting of procedures for making
judgments to executive officials overseen by lower court judges.196
As discussed above, the praiseworthy analysis of the Court’s 9/11 de-
cisions underscores the resiliency of the Supreme Court and the prompt-
ness with which, after Boumediene, the lower courts have responded.  The
critical approach argues that a full accounting requires looking at more
cases, ranging from rulings on relief other than habeas to the claims that
the Supreme Court did not reach, either through jurisprudential doc-
trines or by declining to grant review.  The question of indefinite preven-
tive detention in the United States was posed by Ali Saleh Kahlah al-
Marri, an alien who had entered the country lawfully.197  The Court, how-
ever, concluded that, because of the government’s decision to transfer al-
Marri out of military custody and indict him in federal district court, the
case was moot.198
A second decision, Iqbal,199 addressing the question of remedies be-
yond a plaintiff’s release and decided on its merits, provides further argu-
ments for critiquing the Court’s response to 9/11.  A Pakistani national,
Javaid Iqbal, had been detained in the Metropolitan Detention Center
(MDC) in New York in November 2001 because of charges that his identi-
fication documents were fraudulent.  For several months, Iqbal was put in
solitary confinement in a special housing unit.200  Released after more
standards . . . there is considerable risk of error in the tribunal’s findings of fact.”  Id. at
2270.  The Court also found that “[t]he Executive is entitled to a reasonable period of time
to determine a detainee’s status before a court entertains that detainee’s habeas corpus
petition,” and that “[e]xcept in cases of undue delay, federal courts should refrain from
entertaining an enemy combatant’s habeas corpus petition at least until after the
Department, acting via the CSRT, has had a chance to review his status.”  Id. at 2276.
196. Id. at 2277.  The Court also left open the route to the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia to review the decisions, but the D.C. Circuit concluded thereafter that
the provisions in the DTA of 2005 that shaped that provision could not be severed from
the language precluding habeas jurisdiction.  See Bismullah v. Gates, 551 F.3d 1068,
1070–71 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
197. Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213, 217 (4th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (Motz, J.
concurring), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 680 (2008), vacated and remanded with instructions
to dismiss as moot sub nom. Al-Marri v. Spagone, 129 S. Ct. 1545 (2009); see also Padilla v.
Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 701–11, 717–18 (2d Cir. 2003), vacated as moot sub nom.
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004).
198. Al-Marri’s lawyers argued that it was not moot because the government had not
“renounced the legal authority under which al-Marri was designated and detained as an
‘enemy combatant’ and has made no commitment that al-Marri will not be re-designated
and re-detained as an ‘enemy combatant’ in the future.”  Brief Opposing Motion to
Dismiss at 1, Al-Marri, 129 S. Ct. 1545 (No. 08-368).  Thereafter Al-Marri pled guilty to one
count of conspiracy to provide material support to Al Qaeda, and the government dropped
the second count.  See John Schwartz, Plea Agreement Reached with Agent for Al Qaeda,
N.Y. Times, May 1, 2009, at A16.
199. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
200. Id. at 1943.  Iqbal was arrested on November 2, 2001, and was detained “in the
MDC’s general prison population until January 8, 2002, when he was removed from the
general prison population and assigned to a special section of the MDC known as the
Administrative Maximum Special Housing Unit (‘ADMAX SHU’), where he remained
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than a year, Iqbal sought damages for the violence to which he alleged he
had been subjected.201  Iqbal also claimed that Attorney General John
Ashcroft, FBI Director Robert Mueller, and many other officials had vio-
lated his constitutional rights to equal protection and free exercise by
relying on Iqbal’s race, national origin, and Muslim faith to designate
him a person of  “high interest” and then to impose abusive conditions of
confinement.202  Iqbal’s complaint described that the “lights in his cell
were left on almost 24 hours a day, and MDC staff deliberately turned on
air conditioning during the winter and heating during the summer.”  He
also alleged that he “was not provided with adequate food and lost 40
pounds while in custody.”203  Further, he alleged that he had been “bru-
tally beaten by MDC guards on two occasions,” “denied medical care for
two weeks even though he was in excruciating pain,” and “subjected to
daily strip and body-cavity searches.”204
At issue before the Supreme Court were the sufficiency of the com-
plaint and the immunity of high-level government officials.205  In
Boumediene, the five-person majority (in an opinion by Justice Kennedy)
had insisted that the precept of separation of powers required access to
courts through habeas corpus for detainees.  In contrast, the Iqbal five-
person majority decision (also written by Justice Kennedy) made bringing
damage claims—at least against government officials (and arguably in
general for all kinds of plaintiffs)—more difficult.206 Iqbal shaped a new
rule for assessing pleadings:  Before defendants were to be required to
until he was reassigned to the general prison population at the end of July 2002.”  Iqbal v.
Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 148 (2d Cir. 2007).  In April 2002, Iqbal pled guilty; he was released
from the ADMAX SHU before being sentenced in September.  In January 2003, Iqbal was
released and “was removed to Pakistan.”  Id. at 149.
201. Second Amended Complaint and Jury Demand at 4, 44, Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft,
No. 04 CV 1809, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21434 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005).
202. Elmaghraby, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21434, at *2–*4.  Other officials named in the
complaint included Michael Rolince, former Chief of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s
International Terrorism Operations Section, Counterterrorism Division; Kenneth Maxwell,
former Assistant Special Agent in Charge, New York Field Office, Federal Bureau of
Investigation; and employees of the Federal Bureau of Prisons at national or regional
levels—Kathleen Hawk Sawyer, former Director; David Rardin, former Director of the
Northeast Region; Michael Cooksey, former Assistant Director for Correctional Programs;
individuals running the Metropolitan Correction Center; Dennis Hasty, former Warden;
Michael Zenk, Warden; Linda Thomas, former Associate Warden of Programs; Associate
Warden Sherman, Associate Warden of Custody; and additional corrections officers.
Petitioning to the Supreme Court were only John Ashcroft and Robert Mueller, both of
whom challenged the sufficiency of the complaint and the degree to which they could be
held personally responsible.  See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.
Ct. 1937 (2008) (No. 07-1015).
203. Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 149.
204. Id.
205. See, e.g., Brief for the Petitioners at I, Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (No. 07-1015).
206. The majority wrote that a Bivens action could not be brought against government
officials on a theory of “supervisory liability” and that allegations of knowledge of the
actions of subordinates—without more—were not sufficient to plead that the named
defendants had the requisite intent to discriminate. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.
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answer, district judges were to evaluate the “plausibility” of allegations
based on “judicial experience and common sense.”207
The Court also took the occasion to narrow the possibility of assert-
ing rights of action implied from the Constitution’s text;208 the decision
insulated senior government officials from liability.  The allegations in
the complaint alleged that Attorney General Ashcroft had been the “prin-
cipal architect” of the invidious policy and that FBI Director Mueller had
been “instrumental” in adopting it.209  Further, various official reports
provided supporting evidence of government-directed mistreatment of
9/11 detainees.  But the majority concluded that Iqbal’s allegations did
not suffice to state claims against Ashcroft and Mueller:  “Threadbare re-
citals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.”210
Thus, what could have been understood to be the core premise of
the majority decision in Boumediene, that courts played a critical role by
standing between individuals and the Executive, did not carry forward—
at least at the Supreme Court—to protect detainees such as Mr. Iqbal
who, once released, sought redress.211 Iqbal means that Boumediene is
confined to the unusual circumstances of pretrial habeas corpus, forecast,
perhaps by the stress placed in the Boumediene opinion on the unique
history of habeas corpus as one of the “few safeguards” specified in the
Constitution prior to the addition of the Bill of Rights.212 Iqbal could
207. Id. at 1949–50.  The majority remanded for the lower courts to apply the new
test.  Id. at 1954. Iqbal followed the path laid out by Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
556 (2007).
208. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1947–48.  The majority stated that “implied causes of action
are disfavored.”  Id. at 1948.  Further, the Court noted that it had not recognized a cause of
action implied “under the Free Exercise Clause” and implicitly would be unlikely to do so.
Id.  The Court previously had frowned upon implied constitutional causes of action.  See,
e.g., Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S. Ct. 2588 (2007).
209. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1944, 1951.
210. Id. at 1949.  Further, the allegations were not “plausible” because
nondiscriminatory reasons could have supported Iqbal’s classification.  Id. at 1951.
211. The impact of Iqbal is debated, with some lower courts finding that it does not
require dismissal of claims, including one lodged against former Attorney General
Ashcroft.  See, e.g., al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 974–78 (9th Cir. 2009).  Al-Kidd, a
U.S. citizen, was seized at Dulles Airport, confined for days in “high security cells,” and
placed under supervision for fifteen months, by which time he had lost his job and
separated from his wife.  Id. at 951.  The government acted based on alleged authority to
hold him through the “federal material witness statute.”  Id. at 954.  Refusing to dismiss the
complaint, the Ninth Circuit explained, “unlike Iqbal’s allegations, al-Kidd’s complaint
‘plausibly suggest[s]’ unlawful conduct,” by providing “specific statements that Ashcroft
himself made regarding the post-September 11th use of the material witness statute” to
take “suspected terrorists off the street.”  Id. at 975.  As of this writing, the government’s
petition for rehearing en banc is pending before the court.  See Petition for Rehearing En
Banc, No. 06-36059 (9th Cir. Oct. 19, 2009).
212. “[P]rotection for the privilege of habeas corpus was one of the few safeguards of
liberty specified in a Constitution that, at the outset, had no Bill of Rights.” Boumediene v.
Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2244 (2008).  The constitutional parameters of the Suspension
Clause have occasioned debate.  See generally Trevor W. Morrison, Hamdi’s Habeas
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limit individual accountability and civil liability for the harms imposed
during detention—thereby offering a measure of protection for those in-
volved in the ongoing program of preventive detention that, functionally,
has been put into place.213
Moreover, as Stephen Vladeck counsels, to assess the import of the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on 9/11 requires consideration of what
the Court did not decide when it declined to accept jurisdiction over peti-
tions raising important substantive claims.  The Court refused to take on
issues such as the closure of immigration hearings, the definition of mate-
rial witnesses, the reach of the state secrets privilege, and the legality of
wiretapping.214  The mootness of al-Marri, the new doctrinal limits on
rights assertion under Iqbal, the claims not explored underscore the lim-
ited nature of habeas corpus as a remedy.  Not only has the case law not
confronted the horrific experiences of some detainees, lower courts have
generally refused to address requests to ameliorate conditions of confine-
ment.  Detainees have, for example, generally been rebuffed when seek-
ing less restrictive confinement at Guantánamo, blankets and mattresses,
and a ban on forced feeding.215  Habeas’s remedy of release (even when
implemented) has not been responsive to the array of injuries exper-
ienced due to the detention.
Thus, as Richard Fallon put it, the Supreme Court’s 9/11 decisions
operate “at the margins,”216 and one could then add, distressingly so.
While painful to acknowledge, the Torture Memos (even after being with-
drawn) could be seen to have produced a more profound change on the
ground, not only for the detainees but also in popular discourse and in
political and legal theory, than the Supreme Court habeas decisions.  As a
2006 volume’s title—The Torture Debate217—makes plain, what might have
Puzzle:  Suspension as Authorization?, 91 Cornell L. Rev. 411 (2006); Trevor W. Morrison,
Suspension and the Extrajudicial Constitution, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 1533 (2007); Amanda
L. Tyler, Suspension as an Emergency Power, 118 Yale L.J. 600 (2009).
213. The impact of detention does not, of course, end with release.  See generally
Laurel E Fletcher & Eric Stover, The Guantánamo Effect:  Exposing the Consequences of
U.S. Detention and Interrogation Practices (2009).
214. Vladeck, The Long War, supra note 26, at 913–17.  Examples included El-Masri R
v. United States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 373 (2007); ACLU v.
NSA, 493 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1334 (2008).
215. See In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., Misc. No. 08-0442, 580 F. Supp. 13
(D.D.C. 2008) (less restrictive confinement); 2008 WL 4725712 (D.D.C. 2008) (less
restrictive visiting for counsel); 577 F. Supp. 2d 312 (D.D.C. 2008) (blanket and mattress);
Al-Adhai v. Obama, 596 F. Supp. 2d. 211 (D.D.C. 2009) (forced feeding).
216. Fallon, Habeas Corpus, supra note 26, at 367 & n.63.  As he noted there, he had R
(along with Daniel Meltzer) previously argued that constitutional doctrine supported
rights of access of detainees at Guantánamo Bay to civilian courts, and further, that
American citizens had constitutional rights not to be detained indefinitely.  Richard H.
Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction, Substantive Rights, and the War
on Terror, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 2029, 2031 (2007).
217. The Torture Debate in America, supra note 109. R
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been understood to be beyond “debate” has become normatively
plausible.
III. THE CORE AND THE COMMONPLACE PHENOMENA OF POLICING,
INTERROGATING, AND DETAINING
I have outlined various arguments that could be deployed to cabin
the import of the 9/11 law.  But consider the key elements that form the
predicate for 9/11 detention:  interrogation and the need to get informa-
tion from people who may well be planning to or have done terrible
harm to others; holding some set of people for prolonged interrogation
and creating incentives for them to provide information; sorting out peo-
ple who are guilty from those who are innocent; deciding who to detain,
and dealing over long periods of time with people determined to be egre-
giously dangerous, even as they too are in need of safety or discipline
while confined.  These challenges are not sui generis to 9/11 but are vari-
ations on the core problems of criminal law and of national security more
generally.
Turn to the revelations of terrible treatment of 9/11 detainees.
Harsh treatment of detainees by police and correctional officials, some of
which rises to cruel, inhuman, degrading, and even torturous behavior,
can be found stateside as well as offshore.218  The brutality of super secur-
ity prisons—“supermax”—detailed below, imposes indefinite postconvic-
tion solitary confinement on tens of thousands of prisoners.  The streams
of facts emerging about abuse at Guantánamo are radical exemplars of
the illegal and immoral use of the state’s power but have precedents and
parallels in other arenas in the United States.
Another strand potentially rendering 9/11 law exotic is the fear of
war.  Yet the impact of war can be found in case law about ordinary crimi-
nal defendants.  As I sketch below in discussing the Supreme Court deci-
sions leading up to Miranda v. Arizona,219 new interpretations of constitu-
tional rights have long been developed in a complex relationship with
foreign affairs and wars, both threatened and active.  The effects of World
War II and the Cold War influenced the expansion of criminal defend-
ants’ rights between the 1940s and the 1960s, as judges sought to distin-
guish the treatment accorded by the United States from that of totalitar-
ian countries.  In addition, during that era, the term “dignity”—so central
to the 1948 United Nations Declaration of Human Rights but not found
in the text of the United States Constitution—was domesticated through
interpretation of the Bill of Rights.220  During several decades of the
218. See James Forman, Jr., Exporting Harshness:  How the War on Crime Has Made
the War on Terror Possible, 33 N.Y.U. Rev. of L. & Soc. Change 331, 350–52 (2009); John
T. Parry, Torture Nation, Torture Law, 97 Geo. L.J. 1001, 1022–28 (2008).
219. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
220. See Judith Resnik & Julie Chi-hye Suk, Adding Insult to Injury:  Questioning the
Role of Dignity in Conceptions of Sovereignty, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 1921, 1933–58 (2003)
[hereinafter Resnik & Suk, The Role of Dignity].  While the Supreme Court had many
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twentieth century, new commitments to racial equality coupled with sub-
stantial anxiety about crime and safety, both local and global, generated
revised understandings of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth
Amendments.  The doctrine stemmed from an interaction between
American practices and those of other countries.  At times, foreign law
provided a negative example, as efforts were made to distinguish the
United States from regimes described as totalitarian.  In other instances,
transnational premises were embraced or abjured—either because they
were seen as congruent with or as colonizing of American constitutional
norms.
Further, the kinds of critiques of 9/11 law—that it has provided too
narrow a band of remedies focused on process and failed to elaborate a
body of constitutional constraints on detention and confinement221—can
be leveled against detention law more generally.  Indeed, the Supreme
Court’s pattern in the 9/11 cases—a modicum of oversight coupled with
a great deal of deference to officials in other branches of government,
even when the Court is faced with evidence of violence done to detain-
ees—was foreshadowed in the Court’s dealings with police and prison
officials.  The tension among tiers within the federal judiciary is also pat-
ent across sets of detainees.  In several cases involving ordinary defend-
ants or prisoners, lower court judges, close to the facts, have imposed
substantive constraints on the behavior of custodians but those judgments
were subsequently undone on appeal.
Similarly, efforts by Congress to limit access to courts span detention
contexts.  All the branches of government have created rules imposing
judicial distance and, at times, disengagement,222 resulting in a failure to
stop and a refusal to impose liability for abuses in detention.  In short, the
recent 9/11 law, produced through a three-branch interaction, is contin-
uous with judgments made about the treatment and confinement of vari-
ous sets of detainees over the last sixty years.  Therefore, the 9/11 deci-
sions are exemplary of what Monaghan termed the “timeless” questions
within the federal courts canon, and hence offer several lessons for con-
times referred to “dignity” before then, it was in the context of institutional protections,
such as “the peace and dignity of the state,” rather than the Bill of Rights.  Id. at 1934–42.
221. Critiques of the Court akin to that of Martinez, supra notes 192–194, for using
narrow conceptions of process to miss larger unfairness are paralleled in the domestic
context.  Tracey Meares, for example, has argued that the Supreme Court’s decision
announcing a right to counsel for felons under the right to counsel in the Sixth
Amendment has not produced an appropriate level of oversight on the overall substantive
fairness of trials.  See Tracey L. Meares, What’s Wrong with Gideon, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 215,
215–16 (2003); see also Charles D. Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, 96 Cal. L. Rev. 1519
(2008) [hereinafter Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda], discussed infra notes 429, 450–456
and accompanying text.
222. Richard Fallon called for understanding the Court as a “they,” not an “it.”
Fallon, Habeas Corpus, supra note 26, at 384–85.  In addition, disaggregation is also R
needed across the tiers of the federal judiciary.  See generally Vicki Jackson, Introduction:
Congressional Control of Jurisdiction and the Future of the Federal Courts—Opposition,
Agreement, and Hierarchy, 86 Geo. L.J. 2445, 2452–55 (1998).
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stitutional scholars about the relationship between judges, Congress, and
populations detained through executive action.
A. The Cold War Predicates of Miranda v. Arizona
A few examples of decisions culminating in the 1966 Supreme Court
ruling of Miranda v. Arizona223 illuminate how American law came to
struggle with coercive detentions aimed at extracting information and
confessions.  In 1943, the United States Supreme Court insisted on rights
of individuals, detained by the police, to be brought before a neutral
third party.224  The majority opinion in McNabb v. United States, written by
Justice Frankfurter, stressed the need for a prompt appearance because a
“democratic society, in which respect for the dignity of all men is central,
naturally guards against the misuse of the law enforcement process.”225
In 1944, Justice Black reiterated that concern, as he distinguished the
United States from “certain foreign nations,” who would “wring from [de-
tainees’] confessions by physical and mental torture.”226
Less than a decade later, the Court replayed the theme of a demo-
cratic—as opposed to a “despotic”—criminal justice system.  The 1951
decision of United States v. Carignan227 upheld the reversal of a conviction
based on the grounds that a defendant had not been permitted to testify
before a jury about the “involuntary nature” of his confession.228  Al-
though no evidence appeared “of violence, of persistent questioning, or
of deprivation of food or rest,”229 the defendant confessed only after he
was assured by a court officer that no one had been hung in the past
twenty-seven years.230  In a concurring opinion, Justice William O.
Douglas detailed the disturbing degree of power held by jailors:
[T]he accused is under the exclusive control of the police, sub-
ject to their mercy, and beyond the reach of counsel or of
223. 384 U.S. 436.
224. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 342 (1943).
225. Id. at 343.  The use of the term “dignity” in relationship to individual rights was
one of the earliest deployments of the word in that context.  Resnik & Suk, The Role of
Dignity, supra note 220, at 1934.  Various legal commentaries of the era underscored the R
importance of distinguishing the United States from the oppressive Russia.  See, e.g.,
Jerome Hall, Police and Law in a Democratic Society, 28 Ind. L.J. 133 (1953).  Hall
explained that “private interrogation of suspects immediately after their arrest is essential
in any system of effective detection.  And, at the same time, one cannot avoid the duty to
subject law-enforcement, including interrogation, to democratic ideals.”  Id. at 176.
226. Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 155 (1944).  That case concluded that
“[t]he Constitution of the United States stands as a bar against the conviction of any
individual in an American court by means of a coerced confession.”  Id.
227. 342 U.S. 36 (1951).
228. Harvey Louis Carignan, who had been in custody in the Territory of Alaska for
another crime, was identified in a lineup and then questioned about a murder.  Id. at
39–40.  After time alone with a priest, Carignan confessed to some acts but not to the
murder.  Id. at 40–41.
229. Id. at 40.
230. Id. at 40–41.
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friends.  What happens behind doors that are opened and
closed at the sole discretion of the police is a black chapter in
every country—the free as well as the despotic, the modern as
well as the ancient.231
Although, Justice Douglas explained, coercive interrogations might be ef-
ficient, “[w]e in this country . . . early made the choice—that the dignity
and privacy of the individual were worth more to society than an all-pow-
erful police.”232
One can find a similar reference to American values in a decision of
the Second Circuit during the mid-1950s, when that court provided fed-
eral postconviction relief for Santo Caminito, who had been interrogated
while held “incommunicado” for twenty-seven hours.233  More than a dec-
ade earlier, Caminito had been convicted, based in large part on his con-
fession of felony murder, and sentenced with his two codefendants to life
imprisonment.234  Looking back, the federal appellate court criticized
the New York police for “refusing to allow his lawyer, his family, and his
friends to consult with him,” and for questioning him continually in a cell
that made “sleep virtually impossible.”235  Judge Jerome Frank explained
that “all decent Americans soundly condemn satanic practices,” which
were methods used by “totalitarian regimes” and did not “comport with
231. Id. at 46 (Douglas, J., concurring).  Justice Douglas also commented that the
“time-honored police method for obtaining confessions is to arrest a man on one charge
(often a minor one) and use his detention for investigating a wholly different crime.”  Id.
Under such circumstances, the “police can have access to the prisoner day and night.”  Id.
Justice Douglas highlighted the 1943 decision of McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332
(1943), finding unconstitutional the detention of individuals without an arraignment.
Carigan, 342 U.S. at 46–47 (Douglas, J., concurring).
232. Carigan, 342 U.S. at 46 (Douglas, J., concurring).  Other decisions at various
levels of courts adverted to the oppressions of totalitarianism.  See, e.g, Shaughnessy v.
United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 218 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting).  The
majority rebuffed a constitutional challenge by an alien to detention, while the dissent
objected and invoked both the English history of habeas corpus as well as the Nazi regime’s
system of “protective custody.”  Id. at 218–19, 225–26.
233. United States ex rel. Caminito v. Murphy, 222 F.2d 698, 700–01 (2d Cir. 1955).
Caminito’s codefendants were Frank Bonino and Charles Noia.  A rich history of the case is
provided in Larry Yackle, The Story of Fay v. Noia:  Another Case About Another
Federalism, in Federal Courts Stories, supra note 11, at 192 [hereinafter Yackle, Fay v. R
Noia].  As Yackle noted, the bench that decided the case was comprised of “three titans”:
Jerome Frank, Charles E. Clark (both formerly on the faculty at Yale Law School), and
William H. Hastie, who had been the dean at Howard University Law School and was “then
the most prominent African American jurist in the country.”  Id. at 202.
234. The details of the murder of Murray Hammeroff and the interrogation of the
codefendants are detailed in Yackle, Fay v. Noia, supra note 233, at 197. R
235. Caminito, 222 F.2d at 701.  “Female undercover agents . . . had posed as
witnesses . . . [who] purported to identify” the codefendants, making the detainees believe
that resistance to questioning would be “futile.”  Yackle, Fay v. Noia, supra note 233, at 196. R
Alibi witnesses, as well as the defendant Caminito, testified.  Noia, who had previously been
convicted of robbery, did not testify.  Id. at 197.
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the barest minimum of civilized principles of justice.”236  Fourteen years
after the conviction, Caminito was released, followed soon thereafter by
one of his codefendants, Frank Bonino.237
That 1955 opinion, in turn, paved the way for the other codefend-
ant, Charles Noia, to be heard by the Supreme Court, which issued an
opinion, written by Justice Brennan in 1963.  The Court concluded that
Noia’s failure to appeal, as his codefendants had, would not serve as an
absolute bar (an “independent and adequate state ground” in Federal
Courts parlance238) to federal habeas corpus review.239  In Fay v. Noia,
the Brennan opinion concluded that absent a deliberate bypass by a crim-
inal defendant, state procedural errors should not cut off access to the
federal courts.240
The reference to despotic regimes was reiterated just a few years later
in the briefing on behalf of Ernesto Miranda.  His lawyer, John Frank,
quoted the words Justice Douglas had written in 1951 in his Carignan con-
currence about the totalizing powers of the jailer.241  Frank added:
We are not talking with some learned historicity about the lettre
de cachet of pre-Revolutionary France or the secret prisons of a
distant Russia.  We are talking about conditions in the United
States, in the Twentieth Century, and now.242
As is familiar, these arguments carried the day, resulting in the 1966 Su-
preme Court Miranda ruling, which has served as a major symbol of a
236. Caminito, 222 F.2d at 701.  Judge Charles Clark concurred but objected
specifically to his colleagues’ criticism of the police.  Id. at 706 (Clark, J., concurring).
237. Yackle, Fay v. Noia, supra note 233, at 204. R
238. See generally Henry Paul Monaghan, Supreme Court Review of State-Court
Determinations of State Law in Constitutional Cases, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1919, 1947–56
(2003) [hereinafter Monaghan, Supreme Court Review].
239. Noia, “alleged to have been the trigger-man, was independently charged with
premeditated murder.”  Yackle, Fay v. Noia, supra note 233, at 194.  When sentencing the R
three defendants the trial judge had told Noia that, given his “background as a robber,”
the judge had been disinclined to follow the jury recommendation of life imprisonment
but that Noia had had the luck of the judge’s wife.  “The last thing she told me this
morning is to give you a chance.”  Hence, Noia feared that had he appealed and won a
reversal, he risked the death penalty.  Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 397 n.3 (1963).
240. Id. at 433, 439.  In doing so, Justice Brennan distinguished habeas jurisdiction
from the direct review provided in the Supreme Court that was subject to the court-
imposed interpretation that it lacked authority to review state court decisions resting on
independent and adequate state grounds.  The Supreme Court’s rule in Noia, in turn,
paved the way for a somewhat more relaxed interpretation of that prohibition on direct
review.  See Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362 (2002); Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965).
The rule in Fay v. Noia has since been overturned.  See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S.
722 (1991).  Nonetheless, Chief Justice Roberts cited the decision when concluding that
the “equitable principles” governing habeas justified refusing to grant habeas relief to
Munaf, held by the United States, and arguing that his return to Iraqi control could result
in torture.  Munaf v. Geren, 128 S. Ct. 2207, 2220 (2008); see supra notes 67 & 144.
241. Brief for Petitioner at 46–47, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (No. 759)
(quoting United States v. Carignan, 342 U.S. 36, 46 (1951)).
242. Id. at 47.
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constitutional commitment against coercion of individuals subject to cus-
todial interrogations.243
As one can see by dipping into opinions such as Carignan that are
less regularly read today, as well as reading lower court decisions like
Caminito and the briefs in Miranda, the expansion of criminal defend-
ants’ rights was influenced by comparisons made to other legal systems,
some of which provided negative examples.  Federal constitutional law
development sometimes entailed express references to regimes abroad
and, at other points, the transnational dialogue has been sub silentio.244
B. The Total Isolation of Onshore Supermax
The question of government extraction of information from those
detained is one template; the confinement of persons found to be culpa-
ble and dangerous after pleas or trials is another.  Inside the territorial
United States, prison officials have built a new level of secured incarcera-
tion in facilities called “supermax,” subjecting inmates to a level of con-
finement beyond that in high security or temporary punitive segrega-
tion.245  These facilities rely on a practice of prolonged isolation that
some consider a form of torture—confining individuals in what one phy-
sician termed “hellhole.”246
Members of the medical establishment are not alone at raising con-
cerns about this form of confinement.  Social scientists,247 policy organi-
zations such as the Vera Institute,248 task forces chartered by the
243. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469–70.
244. See generally Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 Stan.
L. Rev. 61, 65 (1988); Judith Resnik, Law’s Migration:  American Exceptionalism, Silent
Dialogues, and Federalism’s Multiple Points of Entry, 115 Yale L.J. 1564, 1598–99 (2006)
[hereinafter Resnik, Law’s Migration]; David Alan Sklansky, Anti-Inquisitorialism, 122
Harv. L. Rev. 1635, 1636 (2009).
245. A variety of definitions exist for supermax.  See Daniel P. Mears, Urban Inst.
Justice Policy Ctr., Evaluating the Effectiveness of Supermax Prisons 4 (2006), available at
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411326_supermax_prisons.pdf (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Mears, Supermax Effectiveness].  A survey by the
National Institute of Corrections used the term to denote a “free-standing facility or a
distinct unit within a facility that provides for the management and secure control of
inmates who have been officially designated as exhibiting violent or serious and disruptive
behavior while incarcerated.”  Id.  See generally Sharon Dolovich, Foreword:
Incarceration American-Style, 3 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 237 (2009) (discussing conditions in
supermax and long-term isolation prisons).
246. Atul Gawande, Hellhole:  The United States Holds Tens of Thousands of
Inmates in Long-Term Solitary Confinement.  Is this Torture?, The New Yorker, Mar. 30,
2009, at 36.
247. See, e.g., Craig Haney, Mental Health Issues in Long-Term Solitary and
“Supermax” Confinement, 49 Crime & Delinq. 124, 130–32 (2003); William Glaberson,
Detainees’ Mental Health is Latest Legal Battle, N.Y. Times, Apr. 26, 2008, at A1.
248. Vera Inst. of Just., Confronting Confinement:  A Report of the Commission on
Safety and Abuse in America’s Prisons (2006), available at http://www.prisoncommission.
org/pdfs/Confronting_Confinement.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
[hereinafter Confronting Confinement].  The Vera Institute report specifically objected to
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American Bar Association,249 and, on occasion, legislators have criticized
the practice and argued for its regulation.250  Transnational human
rights law has also taken up the issue of isolation.  Judgments of the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights have concluded that, depending on the degree of isolation, the
conditions, and the length, solitary confinement can constitute a viola-
the overreliance on and counterproductive effect of solitary confinement.  Id. at 14–15,
52–61; see also Daniel P. Mears, An Assessment of Supermax Prisons Using an Evaluation
Research Framework, 88 Prison J. 43 (2008); Peter Scharff Smith, The Effects of Solitary
Confinement on Prison Inmates:  A Brief History and Review of the Literature, 34 Crime &
Just. 441 (2006).
249. In 2004, the American Bar Association chartered a new task force to “revise 25-
year old legal standards regarding the legal rights of prisoners.”  Margaret Love & Michelle
Deitch, Legal Status of Prisoners and Criminal Justice Standards, in The State of Criminal
Justice 2006, at 83, 83 (Victor Steib ed., 2007).  A proposed draft, temporarily posted,
became available in the fall of 2009.  See Am. Bar Ass’n Criminal Justice Standards Comm.,
Am. Bar Ass’n, The Treatment of Prisoners, in 23 Proposed ABA Standards for Criminal
Justice (Prof. Margo Schlanger rep., 3d ed. 2009), available at http://sites.google.com/
site/treatmentofprisoner/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter 2009
DRAFT ABA, Prisoner Standards].  Upon approval by the ABA Criminal Justice Section
Council the standards are to be submitted in February of 2010 to the ABA House of
Delegates to become official policy.  See Criminal Justice Standards Comm., Am. Bar Ass’n,
Who We Are, available at http://www.abanet.org/dch/committee.cfm?com=CR105000
(last visited Oct. 24, 2009) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
The proposed standards cover a host of issues including defining “long-term
segregated housing,” as extending “for a period of time exceeding 30 days.”  2009 DRAFT
ABA, Prisoner Standards, supra, § 23-1.0(m).  General principles include that “[n]o
prisoner should be subjected to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or conditions.”
Id. § 23-1.1(d).  The draft calls for segregation “for the briefest term and under the least
restrictive conditions practicable.”  Id. § 23-2.6(a).  Furthermore, prisoners “diagnosed
with serious mental illness” are not to be placed in “long-term segregated housing.”  Id.
§ 23-2.8(a).  The standards require that mental health screenings be provided within a day
of placement in such housing and that the mental health of prisoners be monitored daily.
Id. § 23-2.8(b)–(c).  Additionally, the proposed standards set forth more procedural
protections than those required by the Supreme Court in Wilkinson.  Included are
requirements of regular monitoring, full classification reviews at periodic intervals (with
ninety days proposed as of October, 2009), and a presumption in favor of release.  Id. § 23-
2.9(b)–(d).
250. See Lance Tapley, Limiting Supermax Solitary, Portland Phoenix, Oct. 8, 2009,
available at http://thephoenix.com/Portland/News/91025–Limiting-Supermax-solitary
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing proposal by Rep. James Schatz).  The
Act to Reduce the Use and Abuse of Solitary Confinement was, as of October of 2009, to be
taken up by the Maine House of Representatives in January.  See Susan Sharon, Limits
Sought on Use of Solitary Confinement in Maine Prisons (Me. Public Broad. Network
broadcast Oct. 16, 2009), available at http://www.mpbn.net/News/MaineNews/tabid/
181/ctl/ViewItem/mid/3475/ItemId/9414/Default.aspx (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).  Maine prisons held a relatively small number of inmates (around 2,260) of which
under thirty were said to be in solitary confinement.  Press reports, however, had described
prisoners being sent to supermax for minor infractions and without mechanisms to seek
return to the general population.  See Julia Dahl, Is It Time To Ban Solitary Confinement?,
Crime Rep., Oct. 12, 2009, at http://thecrimereport.org/2009/10/12/is-it-time-to-ban-
solitary-confinement (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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tion of prohibitions on torture or inhuman and degrading treatment.251
Moreover, under European law, states must provide mechanisms for reg-
ular review of solitary confinement.252
The Special Rapporteur for the United Nations’ Human Rights
Council concluded that the “weight of accumulated evidence to date
points to the serious and adverse health effects of solitary confinement”—
and hence that “prolonged solitary confinement” could constitute a
breach of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.253
Thus, in 2006, the United Nations Committee on Torture questioned the
United States representatives about monitoring the practice of solitary
confinement and its effects on detainees’ mental health.254  The federal
government responded that the “United States takes exception to the as-
251. See, e.g., Ramirez Sanchez v. France, 2006-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 1161.  In Ramirez-
Sanchez, the court concluded that an avowed political terrorist, who was held in a cell with
natural light and permitted regular visits by lawyers and family members, had not
established a violation of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights.  He
had, however, established a violation of Article 13, requiring “effective” remedies, because
national law had not provided him with sufficient methods to challenge his prolonged
confinement.  Id. ¶¶ 152–66; see also Ilascu v. Moldova, 2004-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 1030
(Grand Chamber).
In Loayza Tamayo Case, 4 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) 3, ¶¶ 54–55 (Sept. 17, 1997), the
Inter-American Court on Human Rights held that “incommunicado detention . . . solitary
confinement in a tiny cell with no natural light, . . . a restrictive visiting schedule . . . all
constitute forms of cruel, inhumane, and degrading treatment” violating Article 5(2) of
the Inter-American Convention.  In addition, administrative decisions address calls for
limits on such treatment.  See, e.g, Comm. of Ministers of the Council of Eur.,
Management by Prison Administrations of Life-Sentence and Other Long-Term Prisoners,
Recommendation 23, ¶ 19c, at 6 (2003), available at http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal_
affairs/legal_co-operation/prisons_and_alternatives/legal_instruments/(Rec%20_2003_
%2023%20E%20Manag%20PRISON%20ADM%20Life%20Sent%20Pris%20%20REPORT
%2015_205).pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).  The Inter-American Court also
noted that, under “exceptional circumstances” isolation may be required, but if used,
efforts should be made to “reduce the period of its use.” Loayza Tamayo, 4 Inter-Am. H.R.
¶¶ 54–55; see also Roy D. King, The Rise and Rise of Supermax:  An American Solution in
Search of a Problem?, 1 Punishment & Soc’y 163, 177–82 (1999).  King detailed the
“European Experience” with the use of supermax and the general refusal to rely on that
form of incarceration.
252. Ramirez-Sanchez, 2006-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 152–66.
253. See Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council, Interim Report of the
Special Rapporteur on Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment ¶¶ 77–85, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/63/175 (July 28,
2008).  The breach would be of Article 7, which provides that “[n]o one shall be subjected
to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”  International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, S. Exec. Doc. E, 95-2, 999 U.N.T.S.
171; see also Human Rights Comm., CCPR General Comment No. 20:  Article 7
(Prohibition of Torture, or Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment) ¶ 9, 44th Sess. (Mar. 10, 1992), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.
nsf/(Symbol)/6924291970754969c12563ed004c8ae5?Opendocument.
254. See Comm. Against Torture, Report of the Committee Against Torture 67, U.N.
Doc. A/61/44 (Nov. 14–15, 2005; May 1–19, 2006).  See generally Tracy Hresko, In the
Cellars of the Hollow Men:  Use of Solitary Confinement in U.S. Prisons and its
Implications Under International Laws Against Torture, 18 Pace Int’l L. Rev. 1 (2006);
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sumption contained in the question that prolonged isolation and indefi-
nite detention per se constitutes cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment
or punishment.”255
That answer did more than protect the government’s position with
respect to the many detainees then held in isolation at Guantánamo.256
According to one survey, as of 1996, “34 states reported to the National
Institute of Corrections that they had supermax prisons,” at which more
than 20,000 prisoners were detained.257  A list of facilities by region and
state, as well as the number of beds available in such institutions, is repro-
duced in “States with Supermax Facilities, 1997–1998” (Figure 8).258  By
2004, another ten states had opened supermax institutions, and wardens
Elizabeth Vasiliades, Solitary Confinement and International Human Rights:  Why the U.S.
Prison System Fails Global Standards, 21 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 71 (2005).
255. U.S. Dep’t of State, List of Issues to be Considered During the Examination of
the Second Periodic Report of the United States of America, Response of the United States
of America 107 (2006), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
68662.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review); see also Tom Monheim, Associate
Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Delegation Oral Responses to CAT Committee Questions 10–12
(May 5, 2006), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/68561.htm (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).  See generally U.S. Dep’t of State, Second Periodic Report of the
United States to the Committee Against Torture (CAT) (May 6, 2006), available at http://
www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/45738.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
256. As of 2008, 130 of some 250 detainees held at Guantánamo were described as
housed in solitary confinement at the base.  See Carol J. Williams, Guantánamo Detainees
Face Uncertain Future, L.A. Times, Dec. 9, 2007, at A3.  For a breakdown of the types of
detainees housed at Guantánamo as of 2008, see Wittes & Wyne, supra note 24, at 1–3.
257. Mears, Supermax Effectiveness, supra note 245, at ii. R
258. This chart is reproduced with the permission of Professors Mears and King; the
chart comes from Mears, Supermax Effectiveness, supra note 245, at app. tbl.1,
reproducing (with minor modifications) a chart by King, supra note 251, at 175 tbl.1.  The R
Mears data were based on a “national survey of state prison wardens in fall 2003” coupled
with some site visits, review of documents and policies, and telephone interviews.  Mears,
Supermax Effectiveness, supra note 245, at 10–14. R
After I showed this chart at the AALS Federal Courts session in January of 2009, law
professor Jeffrey Renz, familiar with conditions in Montana, commented that he thought
the information about that state was erroneous.  See Email from Jeffrey T. Renz, Professor,
Univ. of Mont. Sch. of Law, to author (Jan. 15, 2009) (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).  Our additional research located a 1997 National Institute of Corrections study
identifying Deer Lodge in Montana as a supermax facility that opened in 1986 and
provided sixty-four beds.  See Nat’l Inst. of Corrections, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Supermax
Housing:  A Survey of Current Practice 5 (1997), available at www.nicic.org/pubs/1997/
013722.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).  After reporting that description,
Professor Renz suggested that the maximum security unit was misclassified.  Email from
Jeffrey T. Renz, Professor, Univ. of Mont. Sch. of Law, to author (Jan. 23, 2009) (on file
with the Columbia Law Review).  The point of recounting this exchange is to underscore
that use of facilities may have changed since publication of the report and further, conflicts
over classification of programs as “supermax” exist.
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States with Supermax Facilities, 1997–1998
Table 1 from Daniel P. Mears, Evaluating the Effectiveness of Supermax Prisons 74 app.
tbl.1 (2006), originally published as Table 1 in Roy D. King, The Rise and Rise of
Supermax: An American Solution in Search of a Problem?, 1 Punishment & Soc’y 163,
175 tbl.1 (1999), reproduced with the permission of Professors Mears and King.
FIGURE 8
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reported housing about 25,000 inmates in such settings.259  Such counts
do not include individuals held in isolation outside supermax units.260
Details of one supermax, opened in Ohio in 1998 to confine more
than 500 prisoners, come from a 2005 unanimous Supreme Court deci-
sion, Wilkinson v. Austin.261  Like the 9/11 habeas cases, at issue was the
process due as a predicate to a particular form of incarceration.  As in
Guantánamo, the government—in this instance the State of Ohio, sup-
ported by an amicus filing from the United States262—had argued that it
had unfettered authority to put people in its supermax.  Unlike the Guan-
tánamo cases, in which little mention has been made of the particular
conditions of confinement, the Court’s opinion provided stark details of
what it meant for an individual to be placed in Ohio’s supermax.  Condi-
tions there were
more restrictive than any other form of incarceration in Ohio,
including conditions on its death row . . . . [A]lmost every aspect
of an inmate’s life is controlled and monitored.  Inmates must
remain in their cells, which measure 7 by 14 feet, for 23 hours
per day.  A light remains on in the cell at all times, though it is
sometimes dimmed, and an inmate who attempts to shield the
light to sleep is subject to further discipline.  During the one
hour per day that an inmate may leave his cell, access is limited
to one of two indoor recreation cells.
Incarceration . . . is synonymous with extreme isolation.  In
contrast to any other Ohio prison . . . [the] cells have solid
metal doors with metal strips along their sides and bottoms
which prevent conversation or communication with other in-
mates.  All meals are taken alone in the inmate’s cell instead of
259. See Mears, Supermax Effectiveness, supra note 245, at 4.  The numbers varied R
somewhat from those described by the Supreme Court in Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209
(2005), discussed infra notes 262–263, 269–275, 282–288 and accompanying text.  The
majority opinion reported that as of 2005, “About 30 States now operate Supermax prisons,
in addition to the two somewhat comparable facilities operated by the Federal
Government.”  Id. at 213–14.  For another data set, see Jamie Fellner & Joanne Mariner,
Human Rights Watch, Cold Storage:  Super-Maximum Security Confinement in Indiana 18
(1997).
260. Some of the new construction came through federal incentives to build new
prisons if state law required that eighty-five percent of sentenced time was served.  See
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
§ 20102(a)(1)–(2), 108 Stat. 1796, 1816 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 13704
(2006)) (also called the Violent Offender Incarceration/Truth-in-Sentencing Act); see also
Jennifer R. Wynn & Alisa Szatrowski, Hidden Prisons:  Twenty-Three Hour Lockdown
Units in New York State Correctional Facilities, 24 Pace L. Rev. 497, 504 (2004).
261. 545 U.S. at 214.
262. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners,
Wilkinson, 545 U.S. 209 (No. 04-495) [hereinafter Wilkinson Brief].  In the appellate court,
Ohio had argued that inmates had no liberty interest in detention in the supermax, but in
the Supreme Court it “conceded that the inmates have a liberty interest in avoiding
assignment” to the supermax. Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 221.  The United States, however,
argued that “inmates have no liberty interest” in avoiding that restrictive confinement.  Id.;
see also Wilkinson Brief, supra, at 10.
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in a common eating area.  Opportunities for visitation are rare
and in all events are conducted through glass walls.  It is fair to
say [supermax] inmates are deprived of almost any environmen-
tal or sensory stimuli and of almost all human contact.
Aside from the severity of the conditions, placement at [the
supermax] is for an indefinite period of time, limited only by an
inmate’s sentence.  For an inmate serving a life sentence, there
is no indication how long he may be incarcerated . . . once as-
signed there.263
One might think that such a description would lead to a prohibi-
tion—that individuals could not be subjected to isolation, sensory depri-
vation, and observance indefinitely.264  Indeed, in 1890, the Supreme
Court had objected to the solitary confinement of an individual convicted
of murder; the Court  described that, “after even a short confinement,”
such detention put a prisoner “into a semi-fatuous condition,” making
him unable to “recover sufficient mental activity to be of any subsequent
service to the community.”265   About a century later, in the 1970s, the
Court approved district court findings that Arkansas’s use of indefinite
punitive isolation (in that instance, an “average of 4 . . . prisoners were
crowded into windowless 8’x10’ cells containing no furniture other than
a source of water and a toilet that could only be flushed from outside the
cell”) violated the Eighth Amendment.266  Thus, in lower court decisions
addressing prison conditions in various parts of the United States, judges
limited the duration of isolation and regulated the process for
placement.267
Moreover, prisoners evidencing mental instability were seen as espe-
cially susceptible to deterioration.  In the 1990s, a federal district court
judge concluded that confinement of mentally ill inmates in a supermax
263. Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 214–15.
264. See generally Jules Lobel, Prolonged Solitary Confinement and the Constitution,
11 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 115 (2008).
265. In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 168 (1890).  The decision was written by Justice
Samuel Miller, who registered “serious objections” to solitary confinement.  Id.
266. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 682 (1978).
267. See, e.g., Finney v. Ark. Bd. of Corr., 505 F.2d 194, 207–08 (8th Cir. 1974)
(concluding conditions of solitary confinement in Arkansas were unconstitutional and
ordering that prisoners receive basic necessities of light, heat, ventilation, clothing, and
proper nutrition); Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1305 (5th Cir. 1974) (finding
Mississippi’s use of “dark hole” for solitary confinement a violation of prisoner’s Eighth
Amendment rights); Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265, 1364–67 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (finding
Texas’s administrative segregation policies unconstitutional and ordering additional
procedural protections).
The decisions in some of these cases provide painful detail.  For example, in
Parchman, a prison in Mississippi, prisoners were “placed in the dark hole, naked, without
any hygienic material, without any bedding, and often without adequate food.” Gates, 501
F.2d at 1305.  While holding that such placement of “naked persons” for more than twenty-
four hours in such settings violated the Eighth Amendment, the court did not enjoin the
practice but imposed limits on it—that placement could not be for more than twenty-four
hours, and that clothing, food, and clean surroundings had to be provided.  Id.
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facility in California violated their Eighth Amendment rights.268  Further,
in 2003, the trial judge in Wilkinson sought to impose a substantive con-
straint on supermax—overturned on appeal—by limiting the grounds
that could be a predicate for such confinement.269
In 2005, in Wilkinson, none of the Justices focused on the harms of
long-term isolation, nor mentioned the various studies presented by
health care professionals in an amicus brief documenting the disabling
effects of supermax and the limited evidence of its utility.270  The Court’s
failure to raise concerns could have been based on the case’s legal pos-
268. See Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1267 (N.D. Cal. 1995).  Chief
Judge Thelton E. Henderson held that, while the extreme isolation of supermax units did
not violate the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment for all, it
did for “two categories of inmates:  those who are already mentally ill and those who, as
identified above, are at an unreasonably high risk of suffering serious mental illness” if
confined in such conditions.  Id.  Prohibited was assignment to the “Security Housing
Unit” or “SHU” which, as Chief Judge Henderson wrote, had
gained a well-deserved reputation as a place which, by design, imposes conditions
far harsher than those anywhere else in the California prison system.  The
roughly 1,000–1,500 inmates confined in the SHU remain isolated in windowless
cells for 22 and 1/2 hours each day, and are denied access to prison work
programs and group exercise yards.  Assignment to the SHU is not based on the
inmate’s underlying offense; rather, SHU cells are reserved for those inmates in
the California prison system who become affiliated with a prison gang or commit
serious disciplinary infractions once in prison.  They represent, according to a
phrase coined by defendants, “the worst of the worst.”
Id. at 1155.
269. Specifically, the district court had held that placement had to be based on a
stated quantity of contraband, and for drugs, a threshold amount that reflected “a level
that would subject an inmate to incarceration for at least a third degree felony” or based
on multiple infractions.  Austin v. Wilkinson, 204 F. Supp. 2d 1024, 1028 (N.D. Ohio 2002).
Further, to establish that an inmate posed a threat based on being part of a group, prison
officials had to demonstrate a certain degree of involvement.  Finally, retention decisions
had to be keyed to a time frame, so that only prior behavior within two to five years
(depending on the issue) would be considered.  Id.  Those rulings, imposing “substantive
modifications” of Ohio’s policies, were overturned as beyond the district court’s remedial
power.  Austin v. Wilkinson, 372 F.3d 346, 356 (6th Cir. 2004); see also infra note 270.
Those issues were not before the Supreme Court.
The judge in Wilkinson was not the first to have imposed such restrictions.  Decisions
in prison cases during the 1970s and 1980s had put parallel restrictions into place.  For
example, in Hardwick v. Ault, 447 F. Supp. 116 (M.D. Ga. 1978), the district court held that
the offenses committed (such as advocating “work stops”) were “not sufficiently serious to
warrant several months of confinement in near-solitary.”  Id. at 125; see also Adams v.
Carlson, 368 F. Supp. 1050, 1053 (E.D. Ill. 1973) (putting inmates into segregation for
sixteen months for advocating work stoppages violated the Eighth Amendment).
270. See Brief of Professors and Practitioners of Psychology and Psychiatry as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Respondent, Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209 (2005) (No. 04-495).
According to the brief, all studies of “the effects of solitary or supermax-like confinement
that lasted longer than 60 days” had found evidence of “negative psychological effects.”  Id.
at 4; see also id. at 14–27.  Another overview focused on published studies of “solitary or
supermax-like confinement in which nonvoluntary confinement last[ed] for longer than
10 days.”  Haney, supra note 247, at 130–32.  Where “participants were unable to terminate
their isolation at will . . . negative psychological effects” resulted.  Id. at 132.
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ture; the Eighth Amendment issue was not directly before the Court be-
cause some claims relating to the constitutionality of conditions had been
dealt with by way of settlement.271
But the decision was not silent on the question of supermax; rather
the opinion appeared to bolster its legitimacy, perhaps to ward off sub-
stantive Eighth Amendment challenges, on or offshore.  Justice
Kennedy’s opinion detailed the fearsomeness of inmates and the fragility
of prison security; the Court described the institution as “imperiled by the
brutal reality of prison gangs, . . . [c]landestine, organized, fueled by race-
based hostility, and committed to fear and violence.”272  The Wilkinson
Court further advised that  the “harsh conditions [of supermax] may well
be necessary and appropriate in light of the danger that high-risk inmates
pose both to prison officials and to other prisoners.”273  Thus,
“[p]rolonged confinement in Supermax may be the State’s only option
for the control of some inmates.”274
The Court’s gruesome details (“almost all human contact is prohib-
ited, even to the point that conversation is not permitted from cell to
cell”) served only to explain that inmates so confined had a “liberty inter-
est” that was extinguished when they were put in supermax.275  Therefore
a modicum of process was required under the Fourteenth Amendment.
That proposition ought to have been obvious, but other Supreme Court
decisions stood in the way.  In the 1970s, the Court affirmed that the
Constitution did not stop at the prison door, and the Court obliged cor-
rectional officials to provide procedural safeguards when disciplining
prisoners by taking away good-time or by placing persons in administra-
tive or punitive segregation.276
But from the vantage point of some federal judges, too many cases
would result if inmates were able to contest not only the loss of good-time
but also their transfers to higher security institutions and their placement
in “the hole.”  Rather than install a system of court-based oversight of
either the substantive grounds for solitary confinement or the procedural
protections required for placements exceeding a certain number of days,
the Court has repeatedly concluded that conviction and incarceration ex-
271. According to the Court, the inmates had argued that “certain conditions”
violated their Eighth Amendment rights but that claim was “settled in the District Court”
although the “extent to which the settlement resolved the practices that were the subject of
the inmates’ Eighth Amendment claim [was] unclear.” Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 218.  The
Sixth Circuit reported that the settlement dealt with Eighth Amendment claims “related
primarily to medical care and the provision of outdoor recreation.” Austin, 372 F.3d at
349.
272. Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 227.  The commentary came in the context of explaining
why the process due ought not to include the right to have witnesses appear.
273. Id. at 224.
274. Id. at 229.
275. Id. at 223–24.
276. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563 (1974).
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tinguished most liberty interests of prisoners.277  Under its framework,
the Court circumscribed judicial review of various decisions of prison offi-
cials, such as restrictions or prohibitions on visitors,278 prisoner transfers
from one facility to another,279 and placement in segregation after al-
leged disciplinary infractions.280  The Court’s jurisprudence has blocked
challenges to various aspects of prisons because, absent a showing of an
“atypical and significant hardship,”281 no federal judicial intervention is
permissible.
The Court’s detailed description of the isolating conditions at the
Ohio Supermax, however, sufficed to constitute a “dramatic departure
from the basic conditions of [the inmate’s] sentence.”282  Because Ohio’s
supermax imposed an “atypical and significant hardship,”283 prisoners
had a “protected liberty interest in avoiding assignment” to the Ohio
Supermax Prison.284  Nonetheless, the Court overturned the lower
courts’ imposition of more procedural requirements (such as a right of
review of the supermax placement285) and reinstated Ohio’s minimal
process.  All that was required was notice of “a brief summary of the fac-
tual basis for the classification,” and “a rebuttal opportunity” at the two
277. See, e.g., Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223 (2001); Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472
(1995).  As the Shaw Court put it, because constitutional rights are limited by
incarceration, courts “generally . . . defer[ ] to the judgments of prison officials” in
challenges to regulations that allegedly infringe these rights. Shaw, 532 U.S. at 228–29.
278. See, e.g., Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126 (2003).  The decision upheld a
restriction that cut off visits (except lawyers and clergy) for a period of two years for
prisoners found to have twice violated substance abuse rules.  The Court concluded that
the rule bore a rational relationship to penological goals of deterring abuse.  Id. at 134.
Reinstatement of the privilege was at the warden’s discretion, and other limits (such as on
the number of adults other than family permitted to visit) were also upheld.
279. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976).  The Court concluded that the transfer
of a prisoner from one institution to a higher security prison did not trigger due process
liberty interests requiring a hearing.
280. See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 472.  Criticism of the conditions at issue there—“near-
solitary confinement for two months”—can be found in Michael B. Mushlin & Naomi
Roslyn Galtz, Getting Real about Race and Prisoner Rights, 36 Fordham Urb. L.J. 27, 29, 34
(2009).
281. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484.
282. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 223 (2005) (alteration in original) (quoting
Sandin, 515 U.S. at 485).
283. The contrast was to the “ordinary incidents of prison life.”  Id. at 223 (quoting
Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484).
284. Id. at 220.
285. The appellate court had affirmed the district court’s holding that prior to
confinement, more process was due.  At the classification hearing, the inmate was to have a
right to reasons for placement and “a summary of the evidence to be presented,” a right to
present evidence and witnesses, and a right to a record of the proceedings.  Austin v.
Wilkinson, 372 F.3d 346, 358 (6th Cir. 2004).  The court also affirmed the prisoners’ right
to the warden’s “independent review” of the classification recommendation, to protections
from the use of confidential statements, to a detailed written “justification” for supermax
placement, and to subsequent review by a panel that included none of those who had
made the decision originally.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  Those requirements
were overturned by the Supreme Court.  See Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 224–30.
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levels of internal review.286  Detained prisoners could not present adverse
witnesses; the Court concluded that any right to confront adverse wit-
nesses was outweighed by the state’s interests in order and control.287
The obligation for a short statement of reasons for confinement was, ac-
cording to the Court, enough to buffer against “arbitrary
decisionmaking.”288
The Court’s decision came in 2005, when some information was
available about treatment of 9/11 detainees, many of whom were also
held in isolation.289  As applied in the lower courts, the Wilkinson ruling
has limited oversight of inmate treatment.  Since the ruling, a few forms
of solitary confinement have been found actionable, such as “28 to 35
year confinements” in lockdown in the Louisiana State Penitentiary in
Angola.290  But courts also have rejected a variety of claims, including the
286. Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 226.
287. Id. at 228–29.
288. Id. at 226.  The Court concluded that officials had “to provide a brief summary of
the factual basis for the classification review,” as well as “to allow the inmate a rebuttal
opportunity to safeguard against the inmate’s being mistaken for another or singled out
for insufficient reason.”  Id.  The ability of an inmate to “submit objections prior to the
final level of review . . . further reduce[d] the possibility of an erroneous deprivation.”  Id.
Thereafter, Ohio modified its processes.  In one case, the lower court found that the state
had failed to provide sufficient process to comport with the Supreme Court’s mandates on
the process due.  See Austin v. Wilkinson, 502 F. Supp. 2d 675, 679–82 (N.D. Ohio 2006).
In that case, an inmate, Frederick Tate, had been involved in a fight that resulted in
another inmate’s death; Tate was placed in supermax.  The district court concluded that
“[a]ll physical evidence and both inmates’ behavioral records support Tate’s claims that
[the other inmate] instigated the fight and that Tate acted largely in self-defense.”  Id. at
677.  Therefore, the prison’s system had not complied with the procedures; “[i]ssuing a
decision without any explanation does not constitute a ‘reasoned decision.’”  Id. at 681; see
also Austin v. Wilkinson, No. 4:01-CV-71, 2007 WL 2840352, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 27,
2007) (granting in part plaintiffs’ motion for modification of procedures related to
supermax placements).  That ruling required correctional officials to “communicate in
sufficient detail their consideration of an inmate’s positive behavior at the [Ohio State
Penitentiary] to the inmate” during the “annual security review.”  Id. at *6.  In addition,
the court ordered the prison’s Classification Committee to provide prisoners with a
“reasoned decision” that informed them how to alter their classification status.  Id. at *7.
289. Between 2002 and 2007, detailed information was not forthcoming from the
government on the number detained and the conditions of confinement at Guantánamo.
Data instead came from critics reporting, for example, that as of April 2007, eighty percent
of the then-385 or so detainees were isolated.  See Amnesty Int’l, United States of America:
Cruel and Inhuman:  Conditions of Isolation for Detainees at Guantánamo Bay 1 (Apr. 5,
2007), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AMR51/051/2007 (on file
with the Columbia Law Review).  As of early 2009, a majority of the 240 men held at
Guantánamo were kept in isolation cells.  See Ctr. for Constitutional Rights, Current
Conditions of Confinement at Guantanamo:  Still in Violation of the Law 3 (2009),
available at http://ccrjustice.org/files/CCR_Report_Conditions_At_Guantanamo.pdf (on
file with the Columbia Law Review).
290. Wilkerson v. Stalder, No. 00-304-C, 2007 WL 2693852, at *1 (M.D. La. Sept. 11,
2007); see also Scarver v. Litscher, 434 F.3d 972, 974 (7th Cir. 2006); Bailey v. Fansler, No.
04- 1175-PHX-MHM, 2009 WL 151204, at *1 (D. Ariz. Jan. 21, 2009); Farmer v. Kavanagh,
494 F. Supp. 2d 345, 347 (D. Md. 2007).  Further, in Westefer v. Snyder, 422 F.3d 570 (7th
Cir. 2005), the court noted that placement in supermax resulted in the almost complete
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isolation of a prisoner for an aggregate of thirty months, the transfer of
an individual for six weeks to isolation pending the investigation into his
culpability for a prison murder, and a three-year stint in segregation.291
Furthermore, and in line with Iqbal, even when conditions of confine-
ment constitute a “dramatic” departure warranting procedural protec-
tions, prison officials’ qualified immunity from suit generally shields
them from liability for damages.292
On the other hand, a few lower court judges have registered objec-
tions, and in one case, a judge invoked the parallel between conditions in
“the United States, . . . now” and those of totalitarian countries.  Judge
Terence Evans of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit began one
opinion reinstating a case that the lower court had dismissed by
commenting:
Stripped naked in a small prison cell with nothing except a toi-
let; forced to sleep on a concrete floor or slab; denied any
human contact; fed nothing but “nutri-loaf”; and given just a
modicum of toilet paper—four squares—only a few times.  Al-
though this might sound like a stay at a Soviet gulag in the
1930s, it is, according to the claims in this case, Wisconsin in
2002.293
C. Regular Prisoners, Abuse, and the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995
Turn from the small set of 9/11 detainees and the larger but still
discrete set of prisoners (80,000 by some estimates) in supermax and in
“ordinary” isolation294 to regular prisoners, who number more than two
million.295  Beginning in the 1970s, prisoners challenged conditions in
deprivation of “human contact,” attorneys included.  Id. at 589.  Given that at least some
prisoners confined to the facility were not given the reasons for their placement, the case
survived a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 590.
291. See, e.g., Estate of DiMarco v. Wyo. Dep’t of Corr., 473 F.3d 1334, 1336 (10th Cir.
2007); al-Amin v. Donald, 165 F. App’x 733, 738 (11th Cir. 2006); Skinner v. Cunningham,
430 F.3d 483, 485 (1st Cir. 2005).
292. Occasional exceptions should be noted.  For example, the Supreme Court
rejected that defense when prison guards had, allegedly, chained an individual to a
hitching post for hours on end.  The Court held that such an action was a violation of the
Eighth Amendment, as the infliction of wanton and gratuitous harm, and was a clearly
established constitutional right of which a reasonable person should have been aware.  See
Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 738 (2002), discussed infra note 398.  Justice Thomas
dissented.  Id. at 748 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
293. Gillis v. Litscher, 468 F.3d 488, 489 (7th Cir. 2006).  The district court had
granted summary judgment for the defendant.  The plaintiff, Nathan Gillis, had been sent
to a “Behavioral Modification Program” within a Wisconsin supermax, allegedly for having
slept with his head toward the front of the cell and away from the toilet.  Id.
294. Confronting Confinement, supra note 248, at 56.  That number included R
individuals in administrative, protective, and disciplinary segregation as of 2000.
295. See Mass Incarceration in the United States:  At What Cost?: Hearing Before the
J. Economic Comm., 110th Cong. 1 (2007) [hereinafter Senate 2007 Prison Population
Hearing]  (statement of Sen. Jim Webb, Member, J. Economic Comm.).  By 2008, the
figure generally cited was 2.3 million.  See Pew, One in 100, supra note 163, at 5; see also R
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facilities in various states, including Arkansas (notorious for serving
“grue” in lieu of food to prisoners in isolation and for administering elec-
tric shocks in response to perceived misbehavior296), Alabama, New York,
Texas, and elsewhere.  Federal judges responded with insistence on a role
for federal law—and specifically the Constitution—behind bars.
Lengthy trials and extensive factfinding resulted in a set of decisions
that imposed structural injunctions.  Judges found violations of the
Eighth Amendment’s protection against cruel and unusual punishment
based on a lack of medical care, unsafe conditions, sexual violence, over-
crowding, and, as noted above, isolation in disabling conditions or for
undue amounts of time.297  Moreover, correctional officials—often work-
ing with state officials as well as the American Bar Association and the
American Medical Association—developed manuals and standards to
specify the kind of care and superintendence needed, so as to profession-
alize correctional work and protect officials’ authority.298
In the 1980s, Congress joined in supporting reform of facilities hold-
ing prisoners and the mentally ill.  Through the Civil Rights of
Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA), Congress authorized the Depart-
Senate 2007 Prison Population Hearing, supra, at 19 (statement of Michael P. Jacobson,
Director, Vera Institute of Justice).  Within that population, “Black Americans and
Hispanics, together, account for about one-quarter” of those detained, and “two-thirds of
State and Federal prison populations.”  Id. at 12 (statement of Glenn C. Loury, Professor of
Economics and Social Sciences, Brown University).
296. The four-inch squares of a mashed food paste provided “fewer than 1,000
calories a day.”  Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 683 (1978).  The device used to administer
shocks, dubbed a “Tucker telephone,” was a hand-cranked machine that prison employees
applied to “various sensitive parts of an inmate’s body.”  Id. at 682 n.5 (citing Jackson v.
Bishop, 268 F. Supp. 804, 812 (E.D. Ark. 1967)).  The prison also had rules providing for
corporal punishment, not to “exceed Ten lashes with the strap.” Jackson, 268 F. Supp. at
808 (citing prison regulations).  The district court concluded that corporal punishment
was not itself cruel and unusual but that use of “the strap” without “proper and adequate
safeguards” was impermissible.  Id. at 815.  Further, the “use of any such devices as the
crank telephone . . . or [t]he application of any whipping to the bare skin of prisoners” was
enjoined.  Id. at 816; see supra note 36.
297. See Malcolm Feeley & Edward Rubin, Judicial Policy Making and the Modern
State:  How the Courts Reformed America’s Prisons 39–42 (1998); Larry W. Yackle, Reform
and Regret:  The Story of Federal Judicial Involvement in the Alabama Prison System
11–14 (1989) [hereinafter Yackle, Reform and Regret]; see also William Wayne Justice,
The Origins of Ruiz v. Estelle, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 4–5 (1990) (providing account, by Judge
Justice, who presided, over Texas prison litigation).  See generally Theodore Eisenberg &
Stephen C. Yeazell, The Ordinary and Extraordinary in Institutional Litigation, 93 Harv. L.
Rev. 465 (1980).
298. See, e.g., Am. Corr. Ass’n, Agency Manual of Accreditation Policy and Procedure
(rev. ed. 2007), available at http://www.aca.org/standards/pdfs/AccreditationPolicy
Procedure.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).  The problems of health care while
confined, and the specific problems of particular populations, are longstanding.  See
Judith Resnik & Nancy Shaw, Prisoners of Their Sex:  Health Problems of Incarcerated
Women, in 2 Prisoners’ Rights Source Book:  Theory, Litigation, Practice 319, 332–39 (Ira
P. Robbins ed., 1980).  As noted supra note 249, in 2010, the ABA is to consider approval
of revised standards for prisoners.
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ment of Justice to investigate institutions and, upon notice to state and
local officials, to bring lawsuits on behalf of inmates.299  In some respects,
CRIPA parallels the DTA, for both address mistreatment of those con-
fined.  But unlike the DTA, which sought to cut off access to courts, the
1980 enactment both authorized the Department of Justice to negotiate
with states to improve conditions and helped institutionalized persons get
into courts if they were unable to obtain redress through administrative
routes.
The impact of these various routes to courts was, for a time, signifi-
cant.300  But even as federal judges became involved in oversight, the
Supreme Court began to curb their authority.  In a variety of cases, the
Supreme Court insisted on deference to prison officials, thereby cutting
back the role federal courts could play in shaping substantive standards
299. Pub. L. No. 96-247, §§ 3–4, 94 Stat. 349, 350–51 (1980) (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 1997a–b (2006)).  Congress both authorized federal action and imposed
requirements that the Justice Department first provide notice to permit the state or local
officials opportunities to ameliorate conditions, and for remedial responses through
negotiation in lieu of litigation.  Id. § 4, 94 Stat. at 351.  The Act permitted the federal
government to respond to problems in mental health facilities or other institutionalized
settings, and not only in prisons.  Id. § 2, 94 Stat. at 349.
The use of CRIPA has varied with different presidential administrations.  See Karen E.
Holt, When Officials Clash:  Implementation of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized
Persons Act (1998).  Holt’s study traced the impact of the Reagan Administration, which
sought to reduce “intrusion on the states,” on CRIPA implementation.  Id. at 31–32.  She
reported that in the eight months before Reagan’s inauguration, the Justice Department
had begun nine investigations, whereas five were launched during the first year of the
Reagan Administration.  Id. at 33.  All told, that administration launched eighty-two
investigations, filed sixteen “non-contested lawsuits,” and began eight contested cases.  Id.
at 34.  Holt questioned the implementation efforts of the Executive and faulted Congress
for enacting language, born from compromise, that was laden with vague injunctions and
detailed procedural requirements.  Id. at 107–08.
From January 2001 through September 2008, the Department “opened 94 CRIPA
investigations, issued 71 findings letters, filed 32 cases, and obtained 69 substantial
agreements.”  Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Department of Justice Activities
Under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act Fiscal Year 2008, at 2 (2008),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/split_cripa08.pdf (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).  Within a few months of the beginning of the Obama
Administration, the Department of Justice relied on CRIPA to seek changes in jails and
juvenile facilities in New York.  See infra notes 318–319 and accompanying text. R
In 1994, Congress amended CRIPA to encourage prisoners who were bringing
individual claims, as contrasted with Department of Justice initiated litigation, to seek
redress primarily in administrative, rather than court, venues.  See Violent Crime Control
and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 20416, 108 Stat. 1796, 1833–34
(amending section 7 of CRIPA, exhaustion of administrative remedies).  Those changes
were subsequently modified as part of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, discussed infra
note 312 and accompanying text.  See Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 803, 110 Stat. 1321, 1321–70
(1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2006)).  Unlike other litigants bringing § 1983
claims, prisoners are required to show exhaustion of administrative remedies.  See 42
U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
300. See Feeley and Rubin, supra note 297, at 45–46; Yackle, Reform and Regret, R
supra note 297, at 256–60. R
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governing conditions.301  Further, the Court insulated individual correc-
tional officers from liability, absent proof that they acted “maliciously and
sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.”302  Under the develop-
ing doctrine, harsh conditions and injuries did not result in judgments
against defendant officials, absent showings that they had acted with de-
liberate indifference in denying prisoners “the minimal civilized measure
of life’s necessities.”303
In some facilities, prisoners remained subject to violence at the
hands of the state.  In California, at a prison known as Pelican Bay, a
federal judge found that inmates had been put in “fetal restraints”
(“handcuffing an inmate’s hands at the front of his body, placing him in
leg irons, and then drawing a chain between the handcuffs and legs until
only a few inches separate the bound wrists and ankles”)—a technique
that could “pose a serious health risk to inmates with respiratory ail-
ments” as well as impose “significant pain and yet not fully secure the
inmate.”304  Some were caged nude,305 and many subjected to both lethal
and nonlethal force followed by inadequate medical treatment.306
The rising number of incarcerated prisoners exacerbated the
problems.  In 2009, a three-judge court found conditions so overcrowded
in California prisons (places of “‘extreme peril to the safety of persons’
they house”) that population reductions (a “remedy of last resort”) were
required as a matter of federal right.307  The court’s opinion, running
301. See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 85 (1987) (invoking “separation of powers
concerns” as counseling “a policy of judicial restraint” with respect to state prison
administration); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979) (“Prison administrators therefore
should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and
practices . . . .”); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974) (advising that “courts should
ordinarily defer to [prison officials’] expert judgment” on rehabilitation considerations
such as limiting visitors).
302. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994) (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503
U.S. 1, 6 (1992)).
303. Id. at 834 (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)).
304. Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1168 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
305. See id. at 1171–72.
306. Id. at 1176–92, 1200–14.
307. Coleman v. Schwarzenegger (Coleman II), Nos. CIV S-90-0520 & C01-1351, 2009
WL 2430820, at *1, *2, *29, *63 (E.D. Cal. & N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2009) (citing Governor
Schwarzenegger’s Oct. 4, 2006 Prison Overcrowding State of Emergency Declaration and
H.R. Rep. 104-21, at 25 (1995), as well as 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3) (2006)).  The underlying
litigation—two conjoined cases—had run for eight and nineteen years respectively.  See,
e.g., Plata v. Schwarzenegger, No. C01-1351, 2005 WL 2932253, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3,
2005).  A preliminary ruling in the combined cases on population caps was issued in
February 2009.  Coleman v. Schwarzenegger (Coleman I), Nos. CIV S-90-0520 & C01-1351,
2009 WL 330960 (E.D. Cal. & N.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2009).  At that time, overcrowding at
reception centers ran to 300%. Coleman II, 2009 WL 2430820, at *35.  On September 1,
Governor Schwarzenegger announced his plans to seek Supreme Court review of the
decision, which under the PLRA would review the three-judge court ruling when the
judgment gains sufficient finality.  The state also sought a stay, which was denied at both
the trial and Supreme Court levels.  See Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, Nos. CIV S-90-0520 &
C01-1351, 2009 WL 2851846 (E.D. Cal & N.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2009); Schwarzenegger v.
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more than 180 pages in its “slip” form, detailed the harms of a system
operating at 190% of its capacity.308  Decades of denial of a “minimal
level of medical and mental health care” left some in “horrific condi-
tions” and resulted in a “significant number” of prisoner deaths.309
But by the time that the 2009 opinion about the California prison
system was issued, Congress had also joined the Court in limiting the role
of federal judges vis-à-vis prisoners, just as it would later try to cut off
access for 9/11 detainees.  In 1996, Congress enacted what is officially
called the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), which imposed
various constraints on prison litigation, including legislating end-dates for
structural injunctions absent new findings by federal judges of ongoing
constitutional violations.310  As courts later explained, the “PLRA estab-
lished ‘a comprehensive set of [statutory] standards to govern prospective
relief in prison condition cases.’”311  To be plain, those “comprehensive
standards” aimed to restrict the role of federal courts.312  Moreover,
Congress limited the authority of single-judge district court decisions to
provide reduction in population as a remedy313—thereby requiring
three-judge courts, such as the panel issuing the decision on overcrowd-
ing in the California prison system.314
Coleman, No. 09A234, 2009 WL 2915066 (U.S. Sept. 11, 2009) (denying stay); Michael
Rothfeld & Patrick McGreevy, Prison Plan Delay Sought, L.A. Times, Sept. 2, 2009, at A3.
308. Coleman II, 2009 WL 2430820, at *31.
309. Id. at *1.
310. Congress instructed courts that they could continue prospective relief beyond
two years (in duration) only if the Court found that such relief “remains necessary to
correct a current and ongoing violation of the Federal right . . . .”  18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(3).
The PLRA imposed various other constraints on prisoner filings.  For example, indigent
prisoners were treated differently than other indigent plaintiffs; the law imposed filing fee
obligations—prorated over time—in a complex formula.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)–(b)
(2006).  Further, judges were empowered to screen filings before defendants had to
answer.  See Id. § 1915(e).  Remedies in addition to injunctions were also limited, for
example, by precluding money damages for mental or emotional harm without physical
injury.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (2006).
311. Coleman II, 2009 WL 2430820, at *28 (quoting Gilmore v. California, 220 F.3d
987, 998 (9th Cir. 2000)).
312. The statute speaks of the requirements of relief being “narrowly drawn,” and as
least “intrusive” as possible, coupled with mandatory ending points.  18 U.S.C.
§ 3626(a)(1)(A), (b)(1).  As noted supra note 299, the PLRA also imposed exhaustion
requirements on prisoners bringing individual claims.  In addition, the PLRA amended
CRIPA to require the Attorney General to sign personally the complaint initiating action.
See PLRA of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 803, 110 Stat. 1321, 1321–73 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1997a(c)). See generally Margo Schlanger & Giovanna Shay, Preserving the Rule
of Law in America’s Jails and Prisons:  The Case for Amending the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, 11 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 139, 141 (2008).
313. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3)(B), (E) (“In any civil action in Federal court with
respect to prison conditions, a prisoner release order shall be entered only by a three-
judge court . . . . [I]f the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that (i)crowding is
the primary cause of the violation of the Federal right; and (ii) no other relief will remedy
the violation of the Federal right.”).
314. See Coleman II, 2009 WL 2430820, at *24 n.38.
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Several lower court judges thought that aspects of the congressional
intervention in the PLRA violated separation of powers by dictating re-
sults and interfering with final judgments of the courts.315  The Supreme
Court, however, upheld the challenge it heard on the PLRA.316  As a re-
sult, even in cases such as Wilkinson v. Austin, in which the trial court had
repeatedly issued orders to enforce the minimal protections ordered by
the Supreme Court, the statute required the judge to cede jurisdiction,
absent findings made every two years of “current and ongoing”
violations.317
Parallels between 9/11 detainees and regular prisoners can be con-
tinually drawn.  During the week of August 24, 2009, newspapers carried
headlines of revelations of CIA “guidelines” that had instructed interro-
gators on the procedures to be used for waterboarding and otherwise
physically abusing individuals.  At the very same time, the national press
reported that New York State officials had badly mistreated juveniles in its
prison system.318  According to a thirty-two page report sent in August
2009 by the U.S. Department of Justice to the governor of New York, in
four “residential centers” for juveniles:
Anything from sneaking an extra cookie to initiating a fistfight
may result in a full prone restraint with handcuffs.  This . . .
approach has not surprisingly led to an alarming number of seri-
ous injuries to youth, including concussions, broken or
knocked-out teeth, and . . . fractures.319
315. Two such decisions were French v. Duckworth, 178 F.3d 437, 445–46 (7th Cir.
1999), and Benjamin v. Jacobson, 124 F.3d 162, 169–74 (2d Cir. 1997).
316. Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 342 (2000), rev’g French, 178 F.3d 437.
317. See Austin v. Wilkinson, No. 4:01-CV-00071, 2008 WL 697679, at *2 (N.D. Ohio
Mar. 12, 2008).
318. See, e.g., Nicholas Confessore, 4 Youth Prisons in New York Used Excessive
Force, N.Y. Times, Aug. 25, 2009, at A1; see also Susan Dominus, Girls in Trouble,
Humiliated and Injured at the Hands of the State, N.Y. Times, Aug. 29, 2009, at A15.
The press coverage made the parallels literally manifest.  The story about the youth
facilities bordered a picture of Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr., who had—as the
caption of that photo explained—the day before “named a federal prosecutor to
investigate abuse of prisoners held by the Central Intelligence Agency.”  The right hand
column story described the plan to investigate CIA abuses.  Mazzetti & Shane, Investigation
into C.I.A. Abuse, supra note 141.
319. Letter from Loretta King, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., to the Honorable David A.
Paterson, Governor of N.Y., at 5 (Aug. 14, 2009), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/
split/documents/NY_juvenile_facilities_findlet_08-14-2009.pdf (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (footnote omitted) (detailing Department of Justice’s investigation of Lansing
Resident Center, Louise Gossett, Jr. Residential Center, Tryon Residential Center, and
Tryon Girls Center).  The letter was sent pursuant to CRIPA, see supra note 299, and
provided notice that, absent changes by the state, the Department was prepared to file suit.
The Justice Department has also investigated abuses in Erie County Jails, which receive
around 23,000 people annually.  The Department filed a fifty page report that described
violations of the obligation to protect prisoners from harm, inadequate suicide prevention,
inadequate provision of medical services, and other, similar evidence of inadequate care.
See Matthew Spina, U.S. Probe Finds Abuses at Erie Country Jails, Buffalo News, July 29,
2009, at A1; Letter from Loretta King, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., to the Honorable Chris
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That same week, Hawaii announced the need to withdraw “168 female
inmates at a privately run Kentucky prison . . . because of charges of sex-
ual abuse by guards.”320  Yet—and akin to the claims of popular support
for the torturous treatment of 9/11 detainees321—in Arizona, one sheriff
was celebrated as a folk hero for his flagrantly inhumane treatment of
jailed inmates and his hostility towards immigrants.322
D. Detention, Migration, and Adjudication
One other set of detainees, technically falling on the civil side of the
docket, requires consideration—those individuals alleged to have en-
tered the United States unlawfully or otherwise subject to deportation.  In
2008, more than 378,000 persons “from 221 countries” had been placed
in custody or were otherwise being supervised by the U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement system.323  On any given day, some 31,000 per-
sons were detained in one of more than 300 facilities and some persons,
including small children, were held for extended periods of time.324
In 1996, through the Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA),325 Congress both imposed obligatory deten-
tion for certain categories of individuals facing removal and sought to
limit federal courts’ ability to oversee deportation decisions.326  These ac-
tions paralleled congressional approaches to prisoners in AEDPA and in
the PLRA, and foreshadowed the efforts to limit federal court jurisdiction
in the DTA of 2005 and the MCA of 2006.  Moreover, because IIRIRA did
not detail a length of time for detention of those falling within its param-
Collins, County Executive, Erie County (July 15, 2009), available at www.usdoj.gov/crt/
split/documents/Erie_findlet_redact_07-15-09.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
320. Ian Urbina, Hawaii to Remove Inmates Over Sex Abuse Charges, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 26, 2009, at A12.  The transfer to Kentucky had been prompted by cost savings;
instead of the eighty-six dollars per day it cost to keep the inmates in Hawaii, the private
facility charged about fifty-eight dollars per day.  Id.
321. See, e.g., Donald Lambro, An Incomplete 100 Days:  Coming Up Short of All the
Media Hoopla, Wash. Times, Apr. 30, 2009, at A21 (reporting Pew Research Center poll’s
findings that “nearly half of Americans”, including “[a] 54 percent majority of
independents”, believe that “torturing terrorists is often or sometimes justified”).
322. See William Finnegan, Sheriff Joe, New Yorker, July 20, 2009, at 42, 45; Editorial,
Pulling Back the Immigration Posses, N.Y. Times, Apr. 30, 2009, at A18.  In response to his
critics, Sheriff Joe Arpaio has defended his harsh treatment of inmates.  See generally Joe
Arpaio & Len Sherman, America’s Toughest Sheriff:  How to Win the War Against Crime
(1996).
323. Schriro, Immigration Detention, supra note 165, at 2.  The number detained is a R
small percentage of the more than eleven million people estimated to be in the United
States without legal status.  Id. at 11.
324. Id.
325. Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009–546 (1996).  In 2005, Congress
provided different methods for transferring cases that challenge final orders of removal,
deportation, or exclusion from federal district courts to courts of appeal under section
309(c)(4)(D) of the IIRIA.  See Real ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, div. B, 119 Stat.
231, 302 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 and 49 U.S.C).
326. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), (e) (2006).
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eters,327 it raised the specter of indefinite preventive detention, just as
9/11 detention did in the following decade.
In 2001, the Supreme Court issued a decision that in some respects
forecast Hamdi.  The majority refused the paradigm of unrestrained exec-
utive authority to detain without any court oversight.  Instead, the Court
concluded it had authority to review decisions under particular provi-
sions; further, when immigration authorities had determined a migrant
was to be removed but that person had not been deported, the Court
inferred a statutory presumption of a maximum stay of six months in de-
tention.328  Yet the Court subsequently authorized a good deal of defer-
ence to administrative authorities by concluding, for example, that indi-
vidualized hearings were not required for detentions authorized through
a different provision so long as aliens were confined for less than the six
months.329  According to immigrant advocates, the possibility of pro-
longed detention serves in some cases to induce unrepresented detainees
to waive their rights to hearings (Miranda has no purchase in this con-
text) and proceed directly to deportation by what are known as “stipu-
lated removal orders.”330
327. Id. § 1226(c)–(d); see also Muneer I. Ahmad, Guantánamo Is Here:  The
Military Commissions Act and Noncitizen Vulnerability 13 (2007), at http://www.acslaw.
org/files/ACS%20Issue%20Brief%20-%20Guantanamo%20-%20Final.pdf (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
328. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001).  To avoid the Fifth Amendment due
process questions that would arise if the statute was read to permit indefinite detention,
the Court interpreted the act as imposing a reasonable period of time—presumptively six
months absent some unusual circumstances—for detention after a decision on
removability had been made.  The Zadvydas rule applies in limited circumstances, when a
person has a “final order of removal” but cannot be “removed” for some reason, such as a
country of origin is in disarray.  Id. at 682; see also Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 386
(2005) (extending the Zadvydas presumption of six months detention to cover
“inadmissible” aliens).  Questions about the permissibility of prolonged detention based
on other facets of immigration law remain.  See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Hayes, 578 F.3d 1032
(9th Cir. 2009).
329. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 513, 527–30 (2003).  The Court concluded
that procedural protections such as individualized bond hearings are not required during
the “reasonable” time period, explained as a “brief” and “limited period.”  Id. at 513, 531.
Various lower court opinions document the length of time in which certain categories of
migrants have been held, without trial.  In Ly v. Hansen, for example, an individual had
been confined for “one and one-half years as part of a civil, nonpunitive proceeding when
there was no chance of actual, final removal.”  351 F.3d 263, 271 (6th Cir. 2003).  The
court concluded that in general a reasonableness requirement was implicit in the statutory
scheme and that, in this case the period was “unreasonable”—making habeas relief
appropriate.  Id. at 273.  In Tijani v. Willis, Monsuru Tijani had been “imprisoned by the
federal government for almost two and one-half years[,]” not because of “a criminal
conviction” nor because he “face[d] imminent removal” through deportation.  430 F.3d
1241, 1243 (9th Cir. 2005) (Tashima, J., concurring).  Rather, the government had yet to
prove that he was subject to removal.  Id.
330. See Problems with ICE Interrogation, Detention, and Removal Procedures:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Sec. & Int’l
Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 43–44 (2008) (statement of Kara
Hartzler, Esq., Attorney, Florence Immigrant & Refugee Rights Project), available at http:/
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The fact of confinement is one problem, and the conditions of con-
finement another.  ICE operates immigration detention facilities in ac-
cordance with “correctional detention standards designed for pre-trial
felons,” which is to say that many immigrant detainees are in jails or pris-
ons imposing more restrictions than are needed.331  In addition, a 2009
report commissioned by the federal Department of Homeland Security
concluded that provisions for classification, health care, family needs, visi-
tors, lawyers, recreation, and religious observances were inadequate.332
Documentation of these concerns is ample.  Between 2004 and 2007, an
estimated sixty-nine persons died while in facilities run by ICE,333 with
new revelations in the summer of 2009 of previously unidentified individ-
uals who had also lost their lives.334  A series of lawsuits and congressional
hearings have detailed problems of inadequate access to health care and
deliberate indifference to known medical needs.335  Materials produced
through litigation were also compiled in a report, A Broken System—a
“first-ever system-wide” overview of the government’s “failures” to comply
with its own standards for safekeeping of immigration detainees.336
In its 2009 report, the governing authority—the Department of
Homeland Security—described how it ran “the largest detention system
/judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/110th/40742.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).  Language barriers were a contributing factor.  See Nat’l Immigrant Justice Ctr.,
Language Barriers May Lead Immigrants to Waive Right to Hearing Before Deportation,
June 3, 2008, at http://www.immigrantjustice.org/news/detention/
preleasestiporderdata20080603.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
331. Schriro, Immigration Detention, supra note 165, at 16. R
332. Id. at 17–28.
333. See Cackley, Health Care for Immigration Detainees, supra note 165, at 1; see R
also Castaneda v. United States, 546 F.3d 682, 684–87 (9th Cir. 2008); Richard M. Stana,
U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, Alien Detention Standards:  Observations on the
Adherence to ICE’s Medical Standards in Detention Facilities 2 (2008), available at http://
www.gao.gov/new.items/d08869t.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
These problems have been acknowledged by ICE.  As Schriro reported, as of the fall of
2009, there was “no medical classification system other than a limited use coding of healthy
and unhealthy” and no mental health classification system.  Schriro, Immigration
Detention, supra note 165, at 25. R
334. Cam Simpson, More Immigration Detainee Deaths Disclosed, Wall St. J., Aug. 18,
2009, at A3.
335. See Detention and Removal:  Immigration Detainee Medical Care:  Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Sec. & Int’l Law of
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 56–60 (2007) (statement of Tom Jawetz,
American Civil Liberties Union National Prison Project), available at http://
judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/110th/38115.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (discussing the lack of treatment provided to a detainee suffering from penile
cancer); see also Nina Bernstein, New Scrutiny as Immigrants Die in Custody, N.Y. Times,
June 26, 2007, at A1.
336. Karen Tumlin, Linton Joaquin & Ranjana Natarajan, Nat’l Immigration Law Ctr.,
A Broken System:  Confidential Reports Reveal Failures in U.S. Immigrant Detention
Centers, at vi–viii (2009), available at http://www.nilc.org/immlawpolicy/arrestdet/A-
Broken-System-2009-07.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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in the country”337 and that this system relied too heavily for placements
on facilities built as jails and prisons.338  The 2009 recommendations
called for finding new structures for confinement that were less restric-
tive, identifying “community-based alternatives,” improving medical care,
and expanding opportunities for those detained to have access to visitors,
to practice their religions, and to obtain legal materials.339  Further, the
report concluded that certain populations—“women, families, and asy-
lum seekers”—ought to have services targeted to their needs.340  Thus,
the administrative proposals for improvement continued to rely on the
model of detention, albeit with better facilities,341 and the judicial re-
sponses have insisted, despite legislative obstacles, on some procedural
protections for detained aliens.
A window into the process and quality of decisionmaking about de-
portation is provided by an extensive study of adjudicatory decisions that
was undertaken by a group of law professors.  The empirical survey,
Refugee Roulette,342 by Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz, and
Philip G. Schrag, tracked rulings by 928 asylum officers in some 30,000
cases decided between 1999 and 2004; their article also gives data on the
administrative review provided by “immigration judges” and thereafter by
the “Board of Immigration Appeal,” as well as on more than 2,000 federal
appellate rulings in 2004 and a similar number in 2005.343
Their data parallel—at a general level—what the Abraham affidavit
submitted in Boumediene provided on the decisionmaking deficits in
CSRTs.  Both illuminate the arbitrariness of and the difficulties faced by
adjudicators in the two systems.  The asylum researchers reported, for ex-
337. Schriro, Immigration Detention, supra note 165, at 6.  Most of the facilities were R
“approved . . . for detention greater than 72 hours.”  Id. at 9.  ICE sometimes placed
individuals in facilities run by the U.S. Bureau of Prisons and in “shared-use county jails.”
Id. at 9–10.
338. Id. at 2–3.  The “design, construction, staffing plans, and population
management strategies are based largely upon the principles of command and control.”
Id. at 4.
339. Id. at 3.
340. Id.
341. Concerns about the detention model were reported in news coverage of the 2009
report.  As the director of a statewide immigrant advocacy center in Florida put it:  “Even
though it’s a nicer environment than a jail, . . . these are still the people we would hold up
for release, not just nicer detention.”  Nina Bernstein, Ideas for Immigration Detention
Include Converting Hotels and Building Models, N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 2009, at A14 (quoting
Charu al-Sahli, Director, Florida Immigrant Advocacy Center).
342. Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Philip G. Schrag, Refugee
Roulette:  Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 295 (2007) [hereinafter
Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz & Schrag, Refugee Roulette].  Their work, accompanied by
commentary, was published in 2009 by NYU Press in a book of the same name.  See Ramji-
Nogales, Schoenholtz & Schrag, Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, supra note 170; see
also David Ngaruri Kenney & Philip G. Schrag, Asylum Denied:  A Refugee’s Struggle for
Safety in America (2008).
343. Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz & Schrag, Refugee Roulette, supra note 342, at 301
n.10, 303–04, 362 tbl.2.
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ample, that one immigration judge was more than “1820% more likely to
grant an application for important relief than another judge” at the same
location.344  Further, a “Chinese asylum seeker unlucky enough to have
her case heard before the Atlanta Immigration Court had a 7% chance of
success on her asylum claim, as compared to 47% nationwide.”345  The
review provided by the Immigration Board of Appeals was “streamlined”
under Attorney General John Ashcroft to reduce the number of persons
sitting to review decisions.346  The new process turned “panel” reviews
into decisions by a single-member, and those procedures in turn yielded
higher affirmance rates without opinions than had the prior procedure,
requiring rulings by panels.347
Much criticism has been leveled at these lower tier judges, all of
whom are employees of the executive branch (specifically the
Department of Justice), which has the power to fire or reassign them, as
several were under the tenure of Attorney General Ashcroft.348  Wor-
kload is another problem; as of 2008, the 238 immigration judges aver-
aged about 1,200 cases a year, as contrasted with federal district court
judges who are assigned about 380 cases a year.349  Some immigration
344. Id. at 301.  For example, the researchers looked at a set of asylum officers dealing
with at least “100 Chinese cases,” which are governed by specific statutory provisions.  Id. at
317–25; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006).  That provision enables a refugee who has
“been forced to abort a pregnancy or to undergo involuntary sterilization, or who has been
persecuted for failure or refusal to undergo such a procedure or for other resistance to a
coercive population control program” to be “deemed to have been persecuted on account
of political opinion.”  A person with the “well founded fear that he or she will be forced to
undergo such a procedure or subject to persecution for such failure, refusal, or resistance
shall be deemed to have a well founded fear of persecution on account of political
opinion.”  Id.  The statutory directive has not avoided the challenges of interpretation of
facts and discretionary assessments.  For example, one appellate court reversed an
immigration judge’s finding of no coercion because it was based only on “speculation.”
See Ding v. Ashcroft, 387 F.3d 1131, 1138 (9th Cir. 2004).  Further, grant rates varied,
ranging by individuals in different regions from granting less than ten percent to granting
almost ninety percent of the applications they received.  Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz &
Schrag, Refugee Roulette, supra note 342, at 319 fig.9.
345. Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz & Schrag, Refugee Roulette, supra note 342, at 329.
346. See Dorsey and Whitney LLP, Am. Bar Ass’n Comm’n on Immigration Policy,
Board of Immigration Appeals:  Procedural Reforms to Improve Case Management 28–29
(2003), available at http://www.dorsey.com/files/Publication/e649960f-30c0-408f-8965-0d
f604f69523/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/690ec02a-94b9-4115-a1a0-5d14cf0d7a
6d/DorseyStudyABA_8mgPDF.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
347. Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz & Schrag, Refugee Roulette, supra note 342, at
356–58.
348. See David A. Martin, Another Second-Class Citizen:  How the Justice Department
Has Been Debasing Immigration Courts for Years, Legal Times, Aug. 11, 2008, at 43; see
also Dana Marks Keener & Denise Noonan Slavin, Nat’l Ass’n of Immigration Judges, An
Independent Immigration Court:  An Idea Whose Time Has Come 7–11 (2002), available
at http://www.woodrow.org/teachers/esi/2002/CivilLiberties/Projects/PositionPaper
ImmigrationJudges.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
349. See Marcia Coyle, Immigration Judges Seek Article I Status, Nat’l L.J., Aug. 10,
2009, at 13.  According to Schriro, 253 immigration judges are authorized.  Schriro,
Immigration Detention, supra note 165, at 13. R
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judges have themselves joined in the critique.350  Proposals for restructur-
ing have come from various organizations, urging that immigration
judges be moved out of the Justice Department to enable more
independence.351
Several Article III judges, including Richard Posner of the Seventh
Circuit and Robert Katzmann of the Second Circuit, have been in the
forefront of detailing problems, while M. Margaret McKeown on the
Ninth Circuit has led an effort to provide more counsel to immigrants on
the West Coast.352  In published opinions, circuit judges have objected
that immigration judges have been arbitrary or unfair, citing judges una-
ware of relevant facts and making findings unsupported by the record.353
Federal judges have criticized both the Department of Homeland
350. Stuart L. Lustig, Niranjan Karnik, Kevin Delucci, Lakshika Tennakoon, Brent
Kaul, Dana Leigh Marks & Denise Slavin, Inside the Judges’ Chambers:  Narrative
Responses from the National Association of Immigration Judges Stress and Burnout
Survey, 23 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 57 (2008); Coyle, supra note 349.
351. Coyle, supra note 349; see also Executive Office for Immigration Review:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Sec. & Int’l
Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 53–54 (2008) (statement of Mary M.
Schroeder, Judge, United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit), available at http://
judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/110th/44611.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
352. While serving as the Chair of the Standing Committee on Federal Judicial
Improvements, Judge McKeown helped to launch the Immigration Justice Project (IJP) in
San Diego.  Its goal was “to promote due process and access to justice at all levels of the
immigration and appellate court system, through the provision of high-quality pro bono
legal services for those in immigration proceedings in San Diego.”  Am. Bar Ass’n Comm’n
on Immigration, About the ABA Immigration Justice Project, at http://www.abanet.org/
publicserv/immigration/ijp/home.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2009) (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).  The IJP website detailed problems, including how people claiming
to be lawyers or specialists preyed “upon unsuspecting individuals.”  Id.  Another such
effort, under the aegis of Robert Katzmann of the Second Circuit, is underway on the East
Coast.  See Jennifer Colyer, Sarah French Russell, Robert E. Juceum & Lewis Liman, The
Representation and Counseling Needs of the Immigrant Poor, 78 Fordham L. Rev. 461
(2009); Nina Bernstein, In City of Lawyers, Many Immigrants Fighting Deportation Go It
Alone, N.Y. Times, Mar. 13, 2009, at A21.
353. One decision concluded that the immigration judge’s opinion was “literally
incomprehensible” and the BIA explanation of its action “incoherent.”  Recinos de Leon v.
Gonzales, 400 F.3d 1185, 1187 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Bensilimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d
828, 833 (7th Cir. 2005) (chastising immigration judge and BIA for ordering removal of an
alien because he failed to submit a duplicate form of a document that immigration
authorities already possessed and was peripheral to the alien’s claim); Dawoud v. Gonzales,
424 F.3d 608, 610 (7th Cir. 2005) (criticizing immigration judge’s opinion, “riddled with
inappropriate and extraneous comments”); Ssali v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 556, 563 (7th Cir.
2005) (observing that the “very significant mistake suggests that the Board was not aware of
the most basic facts of [the petitioner’s] case”); Sosnovskaia v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 589, 594
(7th Cir. 2005) (concluding that procedure used by immigration judge was “an affront to
[petitioner’s] right to be heard”); Fiadjoe v. Att’y Gen., 411 F.3d 135, 154–55 (3d Cir.
2005) (commenting that immigration judge’s “hostile” and “extraordinarily abusive”
conduct toward petitioner “by itself would require a rejection of his credibility finding”);
Lopez-Umanzor v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 1049, 1054 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding that
immigration judge’s assessment of credibility “was skewed by prejudgment, personal
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Security and the Justice Department for failing to provide systematic gui-
dance about how to deal with witness credibility issues.354  Moreover,
while lawyers are often absent, some who were present made patent er-
rors.  According to a decision of the Second Circuit, a “disturbing pattern
of ineffectiveness” of counsel was evidenced “with alarming frequency,
in . . . immigration cases.”355
Yet radically varying outcomes in similar cases can also be found
within the Article III judiciary as well.  Figure 9, a graph reproduced from
Refugee Roulette,356 captures some of the problems.  The researchers con-
cluded that “one U.S. Court of Appeals is 1148% more likely to rule in
favor of a petitioner than another U.S. Court of Appeals considering simi-
lar cases.”357  In the Fourth Circuit, during 2004 and 2005, fewer than two











10.3% 10.0% 7.7% 1.4% 4.3% 8.7% 33.9% 14.1% 18.3% 8.8% 4.4% 14.4%
14.5% 17.6% 15.5% 2.4% 3.8% 16.5% 37.7% 7.0% 20.9% 9.4% 2.6% 16.4%
2004
2005
Combined 12.8% 17.1% 11.8% 1.9% 4.1% 12.7% 36.1% 11.3% 19.5% 9.1% 3.2% 15.4%
1st 2d 3d 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th 11th Total
Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Philip G. Schrag, Refugee Roulette: Dispari-
ties in Asylum Adjudication, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 295, 363 (2007), reproduced with the permis-
sion of the authors and the Stanford Law Review.
FIGURE 9
speculation, bias, and conjecture”).  See generally Adam Liptak, Courts Criticize Judges’
Handling of Asylum Cases, N.Y. Times, Dec. 26, 2005, at A1.
354. See Djouma v. Gonzales, 429 F.3d 685, 688 (7th Cir. 2005) (“The departments
seem committed to case by case adjudication in circumstances in which a lack of
background knowledge denies the adjudicators the cultural competence required to make
reliable determinations of credibility.”).
355. Aris v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 595, 600 (2d Cir. 2008); see also Katzmann, supra note
170, at 3. R
356. The chart first appeared in Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz & Schrag, Refugee
Roulette, supra note 342, at 362 tbl.2.  Permission to reproduce this chart was provided by
the authors and the Stanford Law Review.
357. Id. at 301.
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percent of the cases were remanded to the Immigration Board of
Appeals, whereas the Seventh Circuit reversed decisions in thirty-six per-
cent of the cases reviewed during that interval.358  Furthermore, Article
III judges report feeling flooded by the immigration caseload and have
done various forms of triage, such as the Second Circuit’s decision to
place immigration appeals on the nonargument calendar unless any of
the three judges, sequentially reviewing the papers, thinks otherwise.359
IV. THE LESSONS OF AN INTEGRATED CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE
OF DETENTION
A. Factual Distinctions, Legal Homogenization
The details of Part III aim to make plain that, despite the rationales
outlined in Part II to box the 9/11 case law into various categories of
exotica, 9/11 jurisprudence mirrors debates about the roles to be played
by independent judges and public proceedings in relationship to various
detained populations.  Repeatedly, arguments are proffered that the
characteristics of a specific set of detainees—that they are alleged ter-
rorists, postconviction prisoners, or migrants entering without permis-
sion—justify detention with little oversight by outsiders.  Similarly, claims
are made that special forms of expertise—of intelligence officers, of
prison administrators, or of immigration officials—ought to be treated
with deep deference.  The distinctions among populations are also cited
to justify a lack of third-party oversight.  Thus, some argue that the
problems of terror raise distinctive normative questions that ought to pro-
duce judicial reticience to intervene, while others suggest that after de-
fendants are convicted, outsiders (be they judges, legislators, and/or the
public) should stand in abeyance, leaving executive actors to their tasks.
Yet once the various sets of detainees, custodians, and the legal re-
gimes that govern are brought together, one can see that—in practice—
courts and legislators have responded similarly, at times imposing over-
sight and in other eras providing detainees with little by way of insulation
from their custodians.  The homogenization in fact and in law is one of
many lessons to be garnered by integrating Supreme Court and congres-
sional decisions on 9/11 detainees with those dealing with “regular”
habeas corpus, prisoners, other detainees, and the puzzles of separation
of powers in general.
358. Id. at 363 fig.46.
359. See 2d Cir. R. § 0.29 (interim), available at http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/Docs/
Rules/LR.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review); Jon O. Newman, The Second
Circuit’s Expedited Adjudication of Asylum Cases:  A Case Study of a Judicial Response to
an Unprecedented Problem of Caseload Management, 74 Brook. L. Rev. 429, 432–34
(2009).
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B. The Challenges of Peace, Security, and Factfinding—Before and After Trial
Another lesson is that attention must be paid to the precarious posi-
tion of the state.  The facts of torture, physical abuse, solitary confine-
ment, and lack of medical care in various detention centers require a
focus on the profound vulnerability of the detained.  But criminal sus-
pects, hardened prisoners in supermax, ordinary prisoners, and migrants,
as well as 9/11 detainees, pose tremendous challenges for governments
charged with maintaining peace and security in the face of acute practical
difficulties.  Gathering information to ward off injuries is essential, as is
identifying individuals posing special threats, some of whom need to be
held for years on end.
Determining the underlying merits of claims—especially when indi-
viduals have crossed the borders of nation-states—is especially challeng-
ing and, in some instances, functionally impossible.  As the asylum study
showed, even statutory presumptions, codified for certain claims by asy-
lum seekers coming from China, have not produced consistent decisions
for applicants across the country.360  More generally, government offi-
cials, often hampered by limited funds, are dependent on the detained
for information and cooperation.  In every setting I have described, the
initial decisions—arrest, detention of noncriminals, interrogations, place-
ment in solitary confinement, and applications for asylum—are made in
one-on-one exchanges between government officials and individuals.
Such decisions are followed by somewhat more formalized proce-
dures to determine ongoing detention.  In all the various systems ana-
lyzed here, the power to decide individuals’ ongoing interrogation or
confinement (in police stations, Ohio’s supermax, segregation within or-
dinary prisons, immigration, and Guantánamo) is located in individuals
working for the administrations that run the detention facilities.  The
person subject to confinement is often left to his or her own resources
when disputing placements within a bureaucratic system. While rights of
counsel attach to individuals held as criminal defendants361 and to 9/11
360. Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz, and Schrag explain in the book version of Refugee
Roulette that, in the late 1990s, Congress changed immigration laws by specifying certain
criteria for asylum involving specific countries.  Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz & Schrag,
Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, supra note 170, at 71–72.  A “person . . . forced to abort R
a pregnancy or undergo involuntary sterilization was deemed to have been persecuted on
account of political opinion,” presumably making asylum claims easier for certain Chinese
applicants to establish.  Id. at 71.  Yet, in a relatively large number of cases “likely to be the
most similar, because they all involve claims of persecution by the same country,” the
researchers found “wide variation in the remand rate from circuit to circuit;” none of
twenty-eight cases in 2002–2005 were remanded in the Fourth Circuit and about twenty
percent or more were remanded in six other circuits.  Id. at 81 & tbl.5.2.
361. See Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 128 S. Ct. 2578 (2008).  That decision
concluded that this Sixth Amendment right attached when a defendant made an initial
appearance before a magistrate.  Id. at 2591–92.
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detainees at Guantánamo,362 neither immigrants, convicted prisoners,
nor 9/11 detainees outside the United States have free lawyers to assist
them.  The absence of equipage is not only a problem for the individuals
but, as illustrated by judicial complaints in the immigration context, for
decisionmakers as well.
Many judgments about detention are made without testimony from
nonparties, friendly or adverse.  Further, in some instances, observers are
barred and, in others, the proceedings are functionally inaccessible.363
And even as one moves from administrative contexts to courts, a good
many decisions about prisoners are made by judges “on the papers,” re-
viewing legal filings of pro se (or self-represented) litigants.  The
Boumediene majority extolled the importance of independent factfinding,
yet evidentiary hearings in federal postconviction habeas cases are a statis-
tical rarity, exemplified by one study recording hearings in fewer than
two percent of the petitions filed.364
The administrative paradigms exemplified by the CSRTs at
Guantánamo and immigration proceedings are part of a more general
outsourcing and devolution of adjudication from regular courts to resolu-
tion mechanisms that render processes invisible to the public.  One can
find numerous affirmations  in constitutions and in case law at the state,
national, and international levels about obligations to provide “open and
public courts” and independent judges,365 obliged to accord adversaries
equal opportunities.  Yet many decisionmaking procedures with deep ef-
362. See MCA of 2006, 10 U.S.C. §§ 949c, 950h (providing detainees trial and
appellate counsel).
363. In terms of the hearings described here, as noted supra notes 86–88 and
accompanying text, the Department of Defense controlled the openness of CSRTs and
Military Commission proceedings.  Prison administrators, in turn, do not generally permit
observers at disciplinary or placement hearings.  Evidentiary asylum hearings, on the other
hand, are formally open to the public unless the alien requests closure.  8 C.F.R.
§ 1240.11(c)(3)(i) (2009).  In other kinds of immigration proceedings, immigration
judges may limit attendees due to space constraints or to protect “witnesses” and “parties”
when certain kinds of protective orders are sought, or, to guard the “public interest” which
could include national security concerns.  See id. § 1003.27(a)–(d).
364. See Charles D. Weisselberg, Evidentiary Hearings in Federal Habeas Corpus
Cases, 1990 BYU L. Rev. 131, 165–68.  According to Weisselberg, “[i]n 1988, only 1.11
percent of the habeas corpus petitioners received evidentiary hearings, compared with 5.03
percent of all other civil cases.”  Id. at 167.
365. See, e.g., U.S. Const. art. III, § 1; Ga. Const. art. 1 (1777); Md. Declaration of
Rights art. 6 (1776); Mass. Const. pt. I, art. XXIX; N.H. Const. pt. I, art. 37 (1783).  The
transnational precept can be found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A.
Res. 217A (III), art. 10, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 183d plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10,
1948).  It provides:  “Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an
independent and impartial tribunal” in determining criminal charges.  See also
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 6, ¶ 1,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (requiring tribunals be “independent and impartial”).  For
more discussion of the public function of courts and of privatization of adjudiatory
procedure, see Judith Resnik, Courts:  In and Out of Sight, Site, and Cite, 53 Vill. L. Rev.
771 (2008).
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fects on individuals’ lives lack these attributes.366  Thus, an integrated ju-
risprudence reveals not only that the challenges of policing against ag-
gression are endemic but that the result has been, repeatedly, to spawn
internal, closed administrative decisionmaking procedures.
C. Litigation’s Utilities:  Jeremy Bentham’s Publicity and
Normative Contestation
How is it known that “C.I.A. officers carried out mock executions
and threatened at least one prisoner with a gun and a power drill”?367
That disclosure came because (a) in 1966, Congress had enacted the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA); (b) the American Civil Liberties
Union, other lawyers, physicians, and veterans filed disclosure requests in
2003;368 (c) in 2005, the Associated Press filed another lawsuit for access
to information about those held at Guantánamo and transcripts of
CSRTs;369 (d) dozens of individuals, represented by volunteer attorneys
from small and large practices, as well as specialized institutional liti-
gators, contested their detention in court; (e) members of Congress,
factfinding agents in nonprofits such as the International Red Cross, and
non-governmental organizations in other countries published the results
of their investigations; (f) an estimated 10,000 lawyer hours were spent
litigating just one of the FOIA cases;370 (g) lower federal courts ordered
disclosures of various information, putting before the public more than
2,800 documents from the Department of Defense, about 1,000 from the
State Department, some 870 from the FBI, another 145 from elsewhere in
the Justice Department, and just under 50 from the CIA;371 (h) the
Justice Department cooperated by complying in part with various court
orders after; (i) the Supreme Court issued a series of six decisions that
366. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(e) (2008) (providing that for Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission proceedings dealing with claims about discrimination in federal
employment:  “Attendance at hearings will be limited to persons determined by the
administrative judge to have direct knowledge relating to the complaint.  Hearings are part
of the investigative process and are thus closed to the public.”); 38 C.F.R. § 20.701 (2008)
(providing that, in veterans’ claims, “[o]nly the appellant and/or his or her authorized
representative may appear and present argument in support of an appeal”).
367. Mazzetti, New Details on C.I.A. Abuse, supra note 138.
368. ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 339 F. Supp. 2d 501, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); see also
supra note 137 and accompanying text. R
369. Associated Press v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 410 F. Supp. 2d 147, 149 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
370. Scott Shane, A.C.L.U. Lawyers Mine Documents for Truth About Detainees and
Interrogations, N.Y. Times, Aug. 30, 2009, at A4.
371. Id.  Some of what has been provided is posted on the website of the Center for
Constitutional Rights.  See Press Release, Ctr. for Constitutional Rights, CCR, Amnesty and
NYU Receive Docs Cheney Wanted Declassified to Justify Torture (Aug. 24, 2009), at http:/
/ccrjustice.org/newsroom/press-releases/ccr%2C-amnesty-and-nyu-receive-docs-cheney-
wanted-declassified-justify-torture (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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protected habeas jurisdiction and imposed a modicum of review even as
Congress tried to block access.372
I have provided this recitation of events and court orders as an ode
to the information-forcing qualities of litigation.  Hence, one can see the
impact of public conflict, enabled by courts’ commitments to openness.
The 9/11 sequence underscores the political frame that both shapes and
is affected by court decisionmaking.  As administrations changed through
majoritarian politics, the government altered some of its positions,373 ac-
ceding to some disclosure requests (such as the names of inmates held in
Iraq and in Afghanistan)374 and launching its own investigation.  Thus
the public came to know about a 2004 report by the Inspector General of
the CIA, as well as other documents including a 2007 Department of
Justice memorandum that “reauthoriz[ed] the C.I.A.’s ‘enhanced’ inter-
rogation techniques” and detailed  conditions at CIA jails.375
Lawsuits are not the only source for obtaining information, but they
have a special utility.  The formal rules of litigation require that plaintiff
and defendant, be they detainee or custodian, treat each other respect-
fully in public.  Lawsuits in democratic regimes oblige even the govern-
ment to disgorge information and hence to be subjected to scrutiny.  In-
deed, the efforts by other branches to block access to courts and to argue
that “state secrets” required dismissal of individual suits are themselves
testimonials to the power of this facet of adjudication.376
372. In addition, a federal district judge authorized some discovery so that a
Guantánamo detainee, Abdul Raheem Ghulam Rabbani, held “as a terrorism suspect for
five years despite claiming that he did only menial work,” could serve limited written
interrogatories on Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, “the self-proclaimed mastermind of Al
Qaeda’s Sept. 11 plot.”  See John H. Cushman, Jr., Detainee to Question 9/11 Suspect,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 23, 2009, at A4; see also Al Odah v. United States, 559 F.3d 539, 541 (D.C.
Cir. 2009) (remanding discovery order for additional findings on what disclosures should
be required).  Federal judges have also relied on habeas jurisdiction to require medical
monitoring.  See Zuhair v. Bush, 592 F. Supp. 2d 16, 16–17 (D.D.C. 2008).
373. For example, the Department of Justice had contested disclosures and, in the
case seeking facts about detention at Guantánamo, advanced the argument (rejected by
the court) that by doing so, it was protecting the privacy interests of detainees there.  See
Associated Press, 410 F. Supp. 2d at 152–55.
374. Eric Schmitt, U.S. Shifts, Giving Detainees’ Names to the Red Cross, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 23, 2009, at A1.  Under the Bush Administration, the CIA ran “secret prisons,” that
the Obama Administration ordered in January of 2009 to be closed.  Id.  In addition,
foreign prisoners have also been held at “Special Operation camps” (also called
“temporary screening sites”) in Balad, Iraq, and in Bagram, Afganistan.  Those detentions
are supposed to be temporary, as individuals are sent thereafter to long-term detention in
Iraq or Afghanistan.  The Red Cross has been given access to those prisons.  Id.  “The New
York Times reported in 2006 that some soldiers [at such sites] beat prisoners with rifle
butts, yelled and spit in their faces, and used detainees for target practice in a game of
jailer paintball.”  Id.
375. Mazzetti, New Details on C.I.A. Abuse, supra note 138.
376. See, e.g., Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 563 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2009),
reh’g en banc granted, 586 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2009); El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d
296 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 373 (2007); see also supra note 171.
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In Boumediene, Justice Kennedy wrote of the historic role of the writ
of habeas corpus.  I would term its function proto-democratic:  For hun-
dreds of years, habeas corpus has authorized an individual to require an
accounting by the government in public.  The narrow category of rights
protected through habeas has broadened as, over the course of the last
three centuries, constitutions (both domestic and transnational) have
guaranteed that trials be public, judges be impartial, and all courts be
“open.”377  Through developments in the twentieth century, individuals
of every color, gender, and status (prisoners included) gained rights of
access to courts, thereby changing adjudication by imbuing it with demo-
cratic principles of equality.  Adjudication itself entails democratic prac-
tices of reciprocal respect, as courts oblige judges to protect disputants’
rights (including equipping the indigent with counsel in certain in-
stances) and require litigants to treat their opponents as equals.378
A key distinction between CSRTs, military commissions, asylum hear-
ings, and supermax confinement proceedings on the one hand, and adju-
dication in courts on the other, is the public nature of the proceedings.
9/11 decisionmaking is but one of many instances of an increasingly per-
vasive reliance on administrative modes that, in diverse settings, under-
mine the norm of “open” adjudication.379  Indeed when the “Appointing
377. See, e.g., Mass. Const. pt. I, art. XXIX; see also U.S. Const. amend. VI (“In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial . . . to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him . . . .”); Mass. Const. pt. II, chap. VI, art. VII (“The privilege and benefit of the
writ of habeas corpus shall be enjoyed in this commonwealth, in the most free, easy, cheap,
expeditious, and ample manner, and shall not be suspended by the legislature . . . .”);
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), art. 14, U.N.
Doc. 1/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) (“[E]veryone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by
a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law.”); Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 365, art. 6 at 228 (“In
the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him,
everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an
independent and impartial tribunal established by law.  Judgment shall be pronounced
publicly . . . .”).
378. My focus is on the constitutional commitments to open egalitarian adjudicatory
procedures.  Alice Ristroph has argued that the Constitution requires “respectful
punishment,” which entails appreciation of the dignitary interests of convicted prisoners.
She links that thesis to Fifth Amendment rights of silence that could be understood as
based in recognition of self-preservation rights.  Alice Ristroph, Respect and Resistance in
Punishment Theory, 97 Cal. L. Rev. 601, 627–30 (2009).
379. The September 21, 2001 decision to close many “special interest” deportation
hearings in immigration courts prompted litigation, in which the Sixth Circuit found the
blanket closures unconstitutional under the First Amendment, while the Third Circuit
concluded that presumptions of openness in courts did not apply to immigration
administrative hearings, and deferred to the Attorney General’s determination of the need
for closure.  Compare Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002), with N.
Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S.
1056 (2003).  The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISA) also operates under
closed procedures.  See Theodore W. Ruger, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s Appointments to
the FISA Court:  An Empirical Perspective, 101 Nw. U. L. Rev. 239, 244 (2007).
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Authority” at Guantánamo first banned public access to its classification
hearings, it styled them “administrative” to explain their closure.380
An understanding of some of what is lost by using private processes
in lieu of open courts comes in part from Jeremy Bentham.  Writing in
the early part of the nineteenth century, Bentham argued that “publicity”
was “the soul of justice.”381  Bentham advocated public processes for a
host of settings including, infamously, the “panopticon” prison to put in-
mates under constant surveillance, a situation that supermax facilities
have brought to horrific realization.  But Bentham did not advocate the
indefinite isolation of supermax and moreover, he was equally committed
to bringing legislators into plain view—with new designs for buildings
that would let the public watch their officials at work.
As for judges, Bentham offered a detailed account of the utilities of
public courts, which he saw as educating the populace, enhancing the
accuracy of decisionmaking, and enabling oversight of, as well as provid-
ing legitimacy for, the judiciary.  Bentham was deeply skeptical about
both the common law and judges (whom he grouped with lawyers and
referred to as “Judge & Co.”); he thought that they promoted their own
interests through procedural complexities and obfuscating jargon.382
Bentham advocated publicity as a mechanism to police the exercise of
discretion by common law judges; as he put it, while presiding at trial, the
judge was himself “on trial.”383  In today’s terms, Bentham could be un-
derstood both as a procedural reformer (focused on the interstices of
legal rules) and a political theorist, shaping a role for many institutions
(courts included) to contribute to what has come to be called “the public
sphere”384 or more aptly public spheres, as multiple arenas exist in which
members of a polity develop views about governing norms and
practices.385
The conflicts over Guantánamo demonstrate the extent to which
courts can encourage norm contestation.  But unlike Bentham, who
thought that such information exchanges would result in maximizing the
greater good for the greater number, I do not presume that the public
380. See Military Commission Order No. 1, supra note 88, at 14. R
381. See Bentham, Rationale, supra note 32, in 6 Bowring, Works, supra note 32, at R
355.  The materials related to publicity were written around 1812.
382. See, e.g., Jeremy Bentham, Scotch Reform, in 3 Bowring, Works, supra note 32, R
at 511; see also Philip Schofield, Utility and Democracy:  The Political Thought of Jeremy
Bentham 307 (2006); William Twining, Theories of Evidence:  Bentham and Wigmore 28,
41–42, 76–79 (1985).  Twining explained Bentham’s claim as not predicated on
corruption but on a “single class or corporation” forged by judges and lawyers shaping a
regime that served their own interests.  Id. at 76.
383. Bentham, Rationale, supra note 32, in 6 Bowring, Works, at 355.
384. See generally Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms:  Contributions to a
Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (William Rehg trans., 1996).
385. See Nancy Fraser, Rethinking the Public Sphere:  A Contribution to the Critique
of Actually Existing Democracy, in Habermas and the Public Sphere 109 (Craig Calhoun
ed., 1992).
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debate generated through open dispute resolution will necessarily illumi-
nate what the greater good is (if that is one’s metric) or how to produce
deeply just results.  What public courts do achieve is acknowledgment of
the existence of conflicts and, through repeated reiterations, opportuni-
ties to gain a better understanding of the diversity of fact patterns and
arguments, and hence opportunities to develop or revisit governing
precepts.
By imposing processes that dignify individuals and treat them as
equals before the law, litigation makes good on one of democracy’s
promises, even as it may also reveal its failures.  Moreover, rights of audi-
ence divest the litigants and the government of exclusive control over
conflicts and their resolution.  Empowered, participatory audiences can
therefore see and then debate what legal parameters ought to govern.
Free and ready access permits us all to be observers, equipped through
the free flow of information to be competent debaters about norms.386
The constitutional writ of habeas corpus sought to mediate the au-
thority exercised in custodial detention that is otherwise far from public
view.  While 9/11 has demonstrated that habeas corpus remains a route,
the enactment in 1980 of legislation empowering the Department of
Justice to file suits to protect the “civil rights of institutionalized persons”
serves as a reminder that detainee initiation ought not be the only trigger
for outside inquiry, nor are courts the only public institution that could
be charged with oversight.   Another mechanism can be found in provi-
sions of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia;
there detainees have a right of address to courts—every 120 days—when
they are brought physically before a judicial panel in open court to ex-
plain whatever problems they may have.387
Thus, through focusing on the continuities among the war crime
tribunals, the military commissions, detainee review procedures, and ad-
ministrative decisions in prisons and for immigrants, one can see the lim-
ited but creative possibilities for courts (and outsiders more generally)
come into play.  Third-party scrutiny illuminates the treatment of sus-
pects, detainees, prisoners, and immigrants, all reliant on government for
their well-being.  Procedures that offer access thus provide a demonstra-
tion that the government understands detainees to be persons who must
be treated with respect, even while confined and punished.
The next question is to consider the impact this analysis could have
on American constitutional law. Article III could be read to require that
devolution of “judicial power”—in this context, to make decisions sanc-
tioned by law resulting in months and years of detention—be accompa-
386. Robert Post, Democracy and Knowledge:  Opinion and the First Amendment 38
(forthcoming 2010), available at http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/
Intellectual_Life/Post_RosenthalLectures830.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
387. R. Proc. & Evid. (ICTY) 65 bis (as amended Dec. 13, 2001 and reenacted 22 July
2009), available at http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Rules_procedure_
evidence/IT032_Rev43_en.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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nied by obligations that those quasi-judges receiving such authority adopt
the attribute of openness that has come to be definitional of adjudica-
tion.  The Sixth Amendment offers, for example, a model of process for
criminal defendants that gives rise to rights of address, confrontation,
and public scrutiny (“a speedy and public trial”).  The due process clauses
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, coupled with First
Amendment rights to petition for redress, support public access to civil
proceedings, including materials filed with courts.  While the Court has
required adminstrative decisions to comport with due process, it has not
yet inscribed a role for the public.  Just as a convicted defendant has a
right of allocution—to speak, in person and in public—at sentencing,
and just as third parties have rights to attend civil hearings, law could
require that some members of the public (subject to appropriate security
screening) be permitted to observe decisions resulting in the long-term
detention of persons, whether alleged to be terrorists, illicit migrants, or
misbehaving prisoners.  One can conceive of detention-placement and
duration decisions as a form of sentencing or of “resentencing” (for those
convicted), framed as a kind of adjudication requiring acknowledgment
of its significance through a structure of both procedural and substantive
obligations.
The broader point is that the robust critique that has developed chal-
lenging the closed proceedings for classification at Guantánamo should
be the predicate for leveling parallel complaints against decisionmaking
for asylum seekers, for prolonged confinement in isolation within pris-
ons, and for other forms of detention.  Based on the interaction among
provisions of the United States Constitution, augmented by statutes as
well as through rules made by all three branches, law ought to oblige
open decisionmaking when confinement is at stake.  Permitting observa-
tion of various government decisionmaking hearings would serve an im-
portant disciplinary function for, as both Bentham and Michel Foucault
understood, surveillance is power—deployed in this context against
(rather than by) the government as a constraint on its custodians.388
D. Engagement and Anxiety:  Substantive Proportionality and
Jurisdictional Insularity
In May 2009, a federal trial judge asked the question:  “[W]hat is the
scope of the government’s authority to detain” individuals at
Guantánamo?389  As he pointed out, since the mention of the “‘permissi-
ble bounds’ of the government’s detention authority” in Hamdi in 2004,
neither the Supreme Court nor appellate courts had revisited that is-
sue.390  In response, the judge imposed a substantive constraint by con-
388. Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish:  The Birth of the Prison 77 (Alan
Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 1979) (1977).
389. Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 66 (D.D.C. 2009).
390. Id. at 66–67 (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 522 n.1 (2004) (plurality
opinion)).
\\server05\productn\C\COL\110-2\COL208.txt unknown Seq: 94 17-MAR-10 7:55
672 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 110:579
cluding that, under the laws of war, the government’s framework for
which persons were eligible for preventive, pretrial detention could not
be accepted in its entirety.  While individuals found to have “committed a
belligerent act” or to be a “part” of Al Qaeda or the Taliban could be
held, those found only to have provided “substantial support” or “directly
supported hostilities” could not.391  Another example of substantive con-
straints on detention that mixes prevention and punishment comes from
the trial court decision in Wilkinson v. Austin.  As discussed above, a dis-
trict judge ruled that an individual could not be sent to supermax  based
on too small a quantity of contraband drugs or too loose an association
with a gang.392
These decisions embrace a kind of proportionality analysis, broached
expressly in the 1980s by the Court in sentencing cases and used more
regularly in other constitutional systems.393  In Solem v. Helm, the
Supreme Court concluded that a life sentence for minor checking-fraud
was “grossly disproportionate” and hence a violation of the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.394  In addi-
tion to regulating the length of confinement, the Supreme Court has im-
posed constitutional constraints on custodial practices.  For example, in
2002, the Court relied on the Eighth Amendment to conclude that hand-
cuffing a prisoner to a hitching post for seven hours in the sun violated
“the dignity of man.”395  In 2005, judicial authority curbed the discretion
of custodians by holding that, if prison officials wanted to segregate in-
mates by race (which the government had argued was necessary to reduce
gang violence in prison), those decisions were to be subjected to “strict
scrutiny” by the judiciary.396  Congress has also provided protection for
prisoners to exercise their religious beliefs.397  And, of course, decades
earlier the Court had, through Miranda v. Arizona, interposed another
391. Id. at 76–78.  In contrast, another district judge had adopted the government’s
definitional predicates.  Id. at 69 (citing Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 62–71
(D.D.C. 2009)).
392. See supra note 269 and accompanying text. R
393. See generally Alec Stone Sweet & Jud Matthews, Proportionality Balancing and
Global Constitutionalism, 47 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 72 (2008); Vicki C. Jackson, Being
Proportional About Proportionality, 21 Const. Comment. 803 (2004) (reviewing David M.
Beatty, The Ultimate Rule of Law (2004)).
394. 463 U.S. 277, 279–81 (1983).
395. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 738 (2002) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,
100 (1958)).  The legal question was whether a correctional employee could be liable for
damages, which in turn required deciding whether he could reasonably be presumed to
have known that such treatment was unconstitutional.  See supra note 292.  Larry Hope
had taken a “nap during the morning bus ride to the chain gang’s worksite” and after
failing to be “prompt in responding to an order to get off the bus,” and an exchange of
“vulgar remarks” that “led to a wrestling match with a guard,” Hope was subdued, required
to take off his shirt, and hitched to the post for seven hours, during which time he was
given no bathroom breaks and water only “once or twice.”  Id. at 734–35.
396. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 499 (2005).
397. See Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000cc (2006).
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substantive constraint on police interrogations by excluding evidence ob-
tained through coercion.398  All of these decisions insisted that certain
constitutional norms override custodial authority, and all have generated
debate about their wisdom and effectiveness.
But such rulings are now rare, offering another lesson—about the
structural influences on judicial willingness to impose substantive limits
on custodial decisionmaking.  I have provided an overview of interactions
over some sixty years among police, immigration, intelligence and prison
officials, legislators, and the courts.  Constitutional protections for detain-
ees developed in the wake of World War II’s revelations of totalizing gov-
ernment oppression and of equality movements seeking legal recognition
of discrimination’s harms.  Federal and state judges responded by inter-
preting American constitutional precepts to impose constraints on custo-
dians, thereby demonstrating the country’s differences from its Cold War
antagonists.  Subsequently, the focus moved onto a host of other threats
to which a “war on crime,” a “war on drugs,” and a “war on terror” (all
accompanied by preventive and punitive confinement regimes) were
seen as appropriate answers.399
As the currents shifted, the courts and Congress have often been co-
venturers, either enabling detainees to pursue rights or building jurisdic-
tional rules walling them off.  From the 1960s through the 1980s, both
the Court and the Congress shaped legal rules equipping prisoners with
resources (such as the infusion provided by the Department of Justice
under CRIPA) to contest aspects of their confinement.  Race was a sub-
text (at times, directly acknowledged) of criminal justice and prison re-
form, just as the Cold War provided the negative example of a “police
state.”
But in 1987, in McCleskey v. Kemp, the Supreme Court refused to en-
tertain statistical analyses that posed a significant challenge to the fairness
of criminal sanctions.400  The defendant claimed that the imposition of
the death penalty was racially discriminatory; he proffered studies show-
ing that, when black defendants were charged with killing white victims,
the defendants were more likely to be given capital sentences.401  When
398. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
399. For a discussion of the social movements that shaped those ideologies, see David
Garland, The Culture of Control:  Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society
(2001); Jonathan Simon, Governing Through Crime:  How the War on Crime
Transformed American Democracy and Created a Culture of Fear (2007); Tracey L.
Meares, Everything Old Is New Again: Fundamental Fairness and the Legitimacy of
Criminal Justice, 3 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 105 (2005); Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive:
Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 191, 202–07 (2008).
400. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
401. Id. at 287.  Warren McCleskey relied on a statistical study that, as described by
Justice Powell’s majority opinion, had reviewed 2,000 murder cases in Georgia in the 1970s
and concluded, “black defendants, such as McCleskey, who kill white victims have the
greatest likelihood of receiving the death penalty.”  Id.  As the dissenters saw the data,
defendants “charged with killing white victims . . . [were] 4.3 times as likely to be sentenced
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rejecting that systemic attack in favor of demonstrable proof of discrimi-
natory bias in an individual case, the majority explained its unwillingness
to think about the broad impacts of sentences on various discrete popula-
tions.  By way of justification, the majority said, “if we accept McCleskey’s
claim . . . we could soon be faced with similar claims as to other types of
penalty . . . [and] to claims based on unexplained discrepancies that cor-
relate to membership in other minority groups, and even to gender.”402
A few decades later, the Court rebuffed inquiries into sentences alleged
to be disproportionately harsh.  In 2003, the Court upheld state “three-
strike laws,” even as such provisions left some individuals with life
sentences after sequential convictions for minor legal infractions such as
the theft of “four videotapes worth $68.84.”403
The political and social gestalt of the various “wars on . . . ” relied on
anxieties and insecurities to justify ever-growing numbers of individuals
confined and higher sentences, just as fear has animated decisions
around 9/11.  As detailed in Part III, by the mid-1990s, Congress cur-
tailed court review for immigrants,404 further circumscribed access for
regular prisoners by means of the PLRA,405 and limited access for habeas
petitioners through the AEDPA.406  Congress was not inventing such re-
to death as defendants charged with killing blacks.”  Id. at 321 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
But the majority held that such data did not suffice, for a defendant had to show that the
“decisionmakers in his case acted with discriminatory purpose.”  Id. at 292 (majority
opinion).
402. Id. at 315–17 (majority opinion) (footnotes omitted).
403. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 66 (2003).  Leondro Andrade had been
arrested previously for minor thefts, and was admittedly addicted to drugs.  Id. at 67.  As a
result of California’s sentencing provisions, he was sentenced to two consecutive twenty-five
year terms.  Id. at 68; see also Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003).  There, as Justice
Breyer’s dissent explained, the sentence amounted “to a real prison term of at least 25
years.  The sentence-triggering criminal conduct consists of the theft of three golf clubs
priced at a total of $1,197.”  Id. at 35 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
404. See, e.g., IIRIA of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 342(a), 110 Stat. 3009, 3546–606
(codified in scattered sections of 8 & 18 U.S.C.) (limiting judicial review of orders of
removal).
405. Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 803, 110 Stat. 1321, 1366–71 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e (2006)); see also supra notes 310–314 and accompanying text. R
406. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 28 U.S.C.); see also supra note 167.  See generally Giovanna Shay & R
Christopher Lasch, Initiating a New Constitutional Dialogue:  The Increased Importance
Under AEDPA of Seeking Certiorari from Judgments of State Courts, 50 Wm. & Mary L.
Rev. 211, 221 (2008).  AEDPA imposed various gatekeeping restrictions that barred
“second or successive habeas corpus application[s].”  28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1) (2006).
These provisions survived a Suspension Clause challenge in Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651,
662–64 (1996).  As for the cases detailed in Figure 7, a few are high profile rulings on
issues such as the lawfulness of race-related preemptory challenges and the obligations of
states to enforce provisions of consular notice under the Vienna Convention.  See Sanchez-
Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 343 (2006) (consular notice); Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S.
231, 234 (2005) (race-based preemptory challenges); Medellı́n v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 664
(2005) (consular notice).  Yet many more are about whether a petitioner has or has not
missed deadlines, failed to raise claims, exhausted remedies properly, and the like.  See,
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strictions from whole cloth but rather patterning its work after judicially-
crafted interpretations also limiting prisoner access.407  Further, the judi-
ciary generally acceded to congressional restrictions on its authority over
prisoners’s claims408 rather than finding that some of the statutory con-
straints violated principles of separation of powers.409  The treatment of
9/11 detainees through the DTA of 2005410 and the MCA of 2006,411
aiming to limit access to courts, is thus consistent with the barriers im-
posed for other detainees.  What was unusual was the Court’s refusal to
defer to the constraints imposed.
Despite Justice Kennedy’s moving comments in Boumediene about the
role habeas plays in “affirming the duty and authority of the Judiciary to
call the jailer to account,”412 the Court has repeatedly limited its own
relationship to detainees,413 both in cases contesting the factual predi-
e.g., Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 329 (2007); Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 201
(2006); Kane v. Garcia Espitia, 546 U.S. 9, 9 (2005); Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 648
(2005); Johnson v. United States, 544 U.S. 295, 298 (2005); Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269,
271–72 (2005).
407. Several of the restrictions on access that the Court had created through case law
were codified in various ways by Congress in the PLRA or AEDPA.  Those limitations
include the rulings in  Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991) and in Teague v.
Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 316 (1989).  See generally Judith Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. Cal. L. Rev. 837,
886–87 (1984).  The impact of the 1990s legislation is addressed in Liebman & Ryan, supra
note 167, at 852–57; Mark Tushnet & Larry Yackle, Symbolic Statutes and Real Laws:  The R
Pathologies of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, 47 Duke L.J. 1, 10–11 (1997).
408. See, e.g., Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 350 (2000).
409. Some provisions could be seen as posing “Klein” problems, after the 1871
decision in which the Court held that Congress could not direct the courts to find that a
presidential pardon was proof of loyalty to the Confederacy.  See United States v. Klein, 80
U.S. 128, 148 (1871), and discussion supra note 140.  Further, some of the PLRA rules
could have been read as undermining the finality of court judgments.  See supra notes
315–317 and accompanying text.  Both the AEDPA and the PLRA could also be viewed as R
undermining courts’ ability to do independent factfinding relevant to constitutional
questions.  See Liebman & Ryan, supra note 167. R
410. Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005(e)(1), 119 Stat. 2680, 2742 (2006) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2000dd-1); see also supra note 118. R
411. Pub. L. 109-366, § 7(a)(1), 120 Stat. 2600, 2635–36 (2006) (codified in scattered
sections of 10 U.S.C. and at 42 U.S.C. § 2000dd-0); see also supra note 118.  The 2006 MCA R
also purported to limit the ability of 9/11 detainees to bring condition claims.  See
§ 7(a)(2), 120 Stat. at 2636.  Following Boumediene’s habeas ruling, the 2009 MCA, in
contrast, omitted this provision.
412. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2247 (2008).
413. Indeed, Justice Kennedy’s decision for the Court in Boumediene repeatedly
trumpeted its own limits, as it underscored the special and unique status of habeas corpus
as a remedy and the differences between 9/11 detainees and prisoners seeking
postconviction habeas.  See, e.g., id. at 2263–66.  “AEDPA applies . . . to federal,
postconviction review after criminal proceedings in state court have taken place.  As of this
point, cases discussing the implementation of that statute give little helpful instruction
(save perhaps by contrast) for the instant cases, where no trial has been held.”  Id. at 2264.
“The two leading cases addressing habeas substitutes, Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372 (1977),
and United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1952), likewise provide little guidance here.
The statutes at issue were attempts to streamline habeas corpus relief, not to cut it back.”
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cates for detention and in those challenging the conditions of confine-
ment.  As a result, Iqbal—rather than Boumediene—provides more insight
into the contemporary Court’s relationship with its sibling branches’ au-
thority over detention; the self-imposed constraints in Iqbal, produced
through a mix of equitable doctrines, statutory construction, and consti-
tutional interpretation, parallel current doctrine governing most
detainees.
Cases in the 2009 term fit the Iqbal paradigm.  Illustrative is the rul-
ing on William Osborne’s request for access to “physical evidence that, if
tested, [would] conclusively establish” whether he committed a heinous
crime.414  The Court ruled, 5-4, that states had no obligation under the
Due Process Clause to provide samples of DNA.  More generally, prison-
ers (and others) seeking structural reform of institutions are faced with
court-created doctrines and legislative injunctions limiting judicial power
to redress violations of federal law.415  And under Iqbal and other opin-
ions, prisoners requesting monetary compensation face doctrines ex-
panding prosecutorial and prison officials’ authority as well as govern-
mental immunities.416
Again, comparisons across decades are in order.  In the 1970s, Henry
Monaghan argued there should be a special role for federal courts in
enforcing federal rights, at times through a willingness to look over the
shoulder of state court judges and to decide, anew, constitutionally rele-
vant facts.417  But by the late 1990s, judicial interpretations of congres-
sional strictures in habeas had insulated state court determinations of
both fact and law from federal habeas oversight.  For example, a federal
judicial determination of a state court error on a defendant’s federal con-
Id.  Thereafter, a panel of the D.C. Circuit read Boumediene as not addressing “the content of
the law” governing detention nor “disturb[ing]” precedents limiting “the extraterritorial
reach of any constitutional provisions, other than the Suspension Clause.”  Rasul v. Myers,
563 F.3d 527, 529 (D.C. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, No. 09-227 (U.S. Dec. 14, 2009) (denying
relief for “four British nationals” alleging mistreatment while detained at Guantánamo and
seeking redress under Alien Tort Statute, Religious Freedom Restoration Act, Geneva
Convention, and through implied causes of action under the Constitution).
414. Dist. Att’ys Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2331
(2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
415. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 126, 132–33 (1995); Rufo v. Inmates of
the Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 393 (1992); see also Horne v. Flores, 129 S. Ct. 2579,
2593–95 (2009).  See generally Judith Resnik, Constricting Remedies:  The Rehnquist
Judiciary, Congress, and Federal Power, 78 Ind. L.J. 223 (2003).
416. See, e.g., Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 129 S. Ct. 855, 858–59 (2009).  That
decision concluded that a district attorney and chief deputy district attorney were entitled
to absolute prosecutorial immunity in a suit alleging various supervisory failings, including
the “failure to establish an information system containing potential impeachment material
about informants.”  Id.; see also Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 816–18 (2009)
(authorizing district judges to reach question of qualified immunity before determining
whether asserted constitutional right was “clearly established”).
417. See Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication:  The Who and When, 82
Yale L.J. 1363, 1364 (1973); see also Monaghan, Hart & Wechsler, supra note 14, at R
894–95; Monaghan, Supreme Court Review, supra note 238, at 1964.
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stitutional rights is not sufficient grounds for habeas relief; federal judges
must find that state courts were unreasonably erroneous.418  Often, the
Court has explained the limited access afforded to federal courts for state
prisoners in terms of the need to protect the finality of state decisions in a
federal system.419  Moreover, in several decisions, the Court has used its
authority to override lower court judges who had mined records and con-
cluded the remedies were needed—vividly etched when a majority of five
ruled that a habeas petitioner, relying on a judge’s permission to file pa-
pers a few days late, was nonetheless time-barred.420
This integrated jurisprudence underscores that Boumediene, along
with some of the immigration decisions at the appellate and Supreme
Court levels, are rare instances in which oversight has been provided for
detainees with little prospect of trial or those facing deportation.421  Yet
even those remedies do not entail structural interventions taking aim at
the violence in detention.  These cases can thus be understood, as Ste-
phen Vladeck has argued, to fit within a small line of decisions in which
the Court protected its own prerogatives against incursions from sibling
branches,422 rather than as an embrace of a distinct obligation to inter-
pret the Constitution as responsive to detainees dependent on the state.
Yet a puzzle emerges about the structural influences shaping the re-
cent procedural preclusions for detainees and the capacious protections
for custodial officials.  The expansion of criminal defendant rights in the
1960s and 1970s was accompanied by concerns about race discrimination
and a felt need to mark the United States as attentive to human dignity.
One could argue that similar conditions prevail today, in that attention is
418. See Waddington v. Sarausad, 129 S. Ct. 823, 831 (2009); Williams v. Taylor, 529
U.S. 362, 398–99 (2000) (interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)–(e) (2000)).  This approach
puts federal judges in an unpleasant relationship with their state court colleagues, who are
subjected to analyses of whether they not only erred, but also made mistakes on federal law
that competent judges ought to have avoided.
419. The Court has repeatedly described aspects of AEDPA as reflecting “principles of
comity, finality, and federalism.”  Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 206 (2003) (quoting
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 436 (2000)); see also Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198,
208–09 (2006).  See generally Larry W. Yackle, A Primer on the New Habeas Corpus
Statute, 44 Buff. L. Rev. 381, 381–82 (1996); Larry W. Yackle, State Convicts and Federal
Courts:  Reopening the Habeas Corpus Debate, 91 Cornell L. Rev. 541, 547 (2006).
420. Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 207–08 (2007).
421. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2241–42 (2008); Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 569–71 (2006); INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 293 (2001).  In the last
few years, the Court has also interpreted procedural requirements to enable various
immigration petitioners to be heard.  See Nken v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1749, 1754 (2009);
Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159, 1162 (2009); see also Dada v. Mukasey, 128 S. Ct. 2307,
2319–20 (2008).  Of course, a few cases related to postconviction challenges have also
resulted in remedial opportunities or relief.  See, e.g., Jimenez v. Quarterman, 129 S. Ct.
681, 686–87 (2009).
422. Stephen I. Vladeck, Boumediene’s Quiet Theory:  Access to Courts and the
Separation of Powers, 84 Notre Dame L. Rev. 2107, 2146 (2009).  Vladeck argued that
access to courts should be grounded on a theory of separations of powers as well as on First
Amendment and Due Process predicates.
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turning to the racialized composition of detention populations (one in
nine black men between the ages of twenty and thirty-four are behind
bars423), the expenses of and excesses of confinement, the frequently in-
adequate lawyering prior to conviction, and the risk of erroneous imposi-
tion of the death penalty.  Indeed, evidence of horrific violence in prisons
prompted Congress to enact the Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003,
calling for efforts to reduce sexual assaults, albeit without authorizing liti-
gation rights.424
Once again, 9/11 responses provide insights into the lack of respon-
siveness to these stark figures.  As discussed at the outset, in January of
2009, President Obama called for the closing of Guantánamo.  Yet some
ten months thereafter, more than 200 people, including several found by
federal judges to be detained without evidence of wrongdoing, remained
in detention on the base.  Stateside, institutions of total confinement—
supermaxes—are plentiful, providing secure facilities, arguably “worse”
than conditions at Guantánamo.425  Yet, as discussed, Congress has en-
acted bills aiming to make it difficult to bring the (relatively) small num-
ber of remaining detaines onshore, even if locked down; the compromise
measure regulates the transfers by imposing notification requirements
and justifications such as bringing detainees to trial in the United
States.426
The popular demonization of the 9/11 detainees helps to explain
the unwillingness of legal actors to open up debate on the substantive
rules that justify both the fact and duration of detention—before trial or
after conviction, under state or federal regimes.427  Jurisdictional barriers
have proven politically palatable.  For example, although in 2001 the
423. Pew, One in 100, supra note 163, at 6.  Those demographics are not unique to R
the United States, albeit they are more acute in the United States.  See Nicola Lacey,
Prisoners’  Dilemma:  Political Economy and Punishment in Contemporary Democracies
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2008) (2006) (the Hamlyn Lecture).
424. See Pub. L. No. 108-79, 117 Stat. 972 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 15601–609
(2006)).
425. See Peter Finn, Detainees Face Severe Conditions if Moved to U.S., Wash. Post,
Oct. 4, 2009, at A6.  That article detailed conditions at the federal supermax,
Administrative Maximum Facility, in Florence, Colorado, where people are “sealed off for
23 hours a day in cells with four-inch-wide windows and concrete furniture,” and if “they
behave,” they are allowed “an hour’s exercise each day in a tiny yard, . . . alone.”  Id.
426. See supra notes 87–91 and accompanying text.  On October 1, 2009, the House
passed a nonbinding resolution to block all transfers into the United States.  155 Cong.
Rec. 10,413 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 2009).  The negotiation between the House and Senate
resulted in the regulated transfers.  See Peter Finn, Key Democrats Would Let
Guantanamo Detainees Be Tried in U.S., Wash. Post, Oct 8, 2009, at A7.  On October 28,
the President signed two laws containing almost identical language barring release into the
United States and imposing conditions on transfer.  Department of Homeland Security
Appropriations Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-83, § 552, 123 Stat. 2142, 2177–79 (2009);
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 1041, 123
Stat. 2190, 2454–55 (2009); see also supra notes 91 & 140. 
427. See Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism:  Habeas
Corpus and the Court, 86 Yale L.J. 1035, 1065–67 (1977).
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Supreme Court declined to reject Miranda outright,428 its reach has been
limited through Supreme Court doctrine and police practices,429 and in
2009, Congress concluded it had no purchase in offshore interrogations
of “enemy belligerents.”430
The sense of vulnerability captured by the various “war” terminolo-
gies is one basis on which to explain the strictures of contemporary de-
tention law.  Another kind of vulnerability is at work that affects the juris-
prudence—a fear of “foreign” influences undermining United States
legal precepts, resulting in jurisprudential insularity.  As detailed above,
in earlier decades, “the foreign” sometimes stood as a negative exemplar
prompting descriptions of “American” democratic precepts that refused
to condone custodial practices identified with despotic regimes.  Occa-
sionally, courts also referred to other nations or transnational precepts as
providing positive guidance or as relevant sources.
Given the transnational nature of the threats themselves (as border-
crossing is itself criminalized and as migrants are conflated with ter-
rorists), and given the overlap in legal regimes aiming to justify deten-
tion, this arena of law would seem to invite transnational judicial ex-
changes.  Not only do many countries grapple with terror, many (like the
United States) have responded by detaining individuals preventively.
Around the world,431 countries authorize incapacitation for “public pro-
tection” based on an array of grounds—illegal migration, sexual preda-
tory behavior, heinous criminal actions, terrorist threats—that under-
mine the presumption that it is conviction and punishment that is
required for incarceration.432  One could marshal elements of legal re-
428. See Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 171 (2001).
429. See, e.g, Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2091 (2009).  That decision
overturned Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1985), and concluded that the fact that a
defendant is represented by counsel does not bar the police from initiating interrogations
and requesting cooperation.  See also Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, supra note 221, at R
1592.  Pending before the Court this term is a case that will require examination of the
reach of Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), which held that once an accused has
invoked a right to counsel for interrogation, that person cannot be subjected to
questioning without counsel present.  See Shatzer v. Maryland, 954 A.2d 1118, 1130–31
(Md. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 1043 (2009).
430. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 prevents the
Miranda rule from applying to individuals detained “outside the United States as an enemy
belligerent and . . . in the custody or under the effective control of the Department of
Defense” unless so ordered by a court.  Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 1040, 123 Stat. 2190, 2454
(2009) (“No Miranda warnings for Al Qaeda Terrorists.”); see also infra notes 445–456.
431. Cole, Preventive Detention, supra note 93, at 694–95.  See generally Stella Burch R
Elias, Rethinking “Preventive Detention” from a Comparative Perspective:  Three
Frameworks for Detaining Terrorist Suspects, 41 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 99 (2009).
432. See, e.g., A. & Others v. United Kingdom, App. No. 3455/55 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb.
19, 2009), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&
documentId=847470&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB8
6142BF01C1166DEA398649 (on file with the Columbia Law Review); Al-Kateb v. Godwin
(2004) 219 C.L.R. 562, ¶ 45 (Austl.), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/
sinodisp/au/cases/cth/HCA/2004/37.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review); CC
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gimes from many countries to support some of the 9/11 responses, in-
cluding a frank embrace of preventive detention.  But the domestic judg-
ments on 9/11 habeas, on asylum detention, on supermax, and on prison
conditions do not entail reflections on how other jurisdictions have dealt
with these problems.
Thus, 9/11 jurisprudence reveals the constitutional gestalt of the era
in which it sits, as it developed when efforts to chill references in United
States constitutional discourse to “foreign law” were ascendant.433  When
writing in 2005 for the majority that held the death penalty for juveniles
violative of the Eighth Amendment, Justice Kennedy mentioned interna-
tional and comparative law.  His comments drew a sharp rebuke from
Justice Scalia,434 committed to damping down such analyses.435  Further,
when nominated for the Supreme Court, each of the three newest jus-
tices—Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Alito, and Justice Sotomayor—were
questioned about their views on “foreign law,” and each explained their
reasons for not resorting to foreign law.  Justice Alito explained: “We have
our own law, we have our own traditions, we have our own precedents,
and we should look to that in interpreting our Constitution.”436  Thus,
the transnational literature addressed to supermax, solitary confinement,
decision no. 2008-562DC, Feb. 21, 2008, ¶ 10, available at http://www.conseil-
constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/root/bank_mm/anglais/a2008562dc.pdf (on
file with the Columbia Law Review) (declaring certain provisions of the Act pertaining to
postsentence preventive detention and diminished criminal responsibility due to mental
deficiency unconstitutional); Sec’y of State for Justice v. James [2009] UKHL 22, 2009 2
W.L.R. 1149 (U.K.); see also Judith Resnik & Brenda Hale, The Law of Detention, in
Global Constitutionalism:  Constitutional Administration I-1, I-1 (Robert Post ed., 2009).
433. See Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Comparisons:  Convergence, Resistance,
Engagement, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 109 (2005) [hereinafter Jackson, Constitutional
Comparisons]; Judith Resnik, Law as Affiliation:  “Foreign” Law, Democratic Federalism,
and the Sovereigntism of the Nation-State, 6 Int’l J. Const. L. 33, 39 (2008).
434. Justice Scalia’s dissent in Roper v. Simmons objected to references made in Justice
Kennedy’s majority opinion to punishment practices outside the United States and to
international conventions.  543 U.S. 551, 622–28 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  See
generally Jackson, Constitutional Comparisons, supra note 433; Jeremy Waldron, R
Comment, Foreign Law and the Modern Ius Gentium, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 129 (2005).
435. See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, “A Decent Respect to the Opinions of
[Human]kind”:  The Value of a Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication,
26 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 187 (2007); A Conversation Between U.S. Supreme Court
Justices:  The Relevance of Foreign Legal Materials in U.S. Constitutional Cases:  A
Conversation Between Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Stephen Breyer, 3 Int’l J. Const.
L. 519 (Norman Dorsen moderator, 2005).  See generally Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional
Engagement in a Transnational Era 194–95 (2009).
436. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to be an
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States:  Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 370, 471 (2006); see also Confirmation Hearing on the
Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the United States:  Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 200–01 (2005); Transcript of the
Sotomayor Confirmation Hearings 88, 89, at http://epic.org/privacy/sotomayor/
sotomoyor_transcript.pdf (last visited Dec. 26, 2010) (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(July 14, 2009 and July 15, 2009, exchanges with Senators Schumer and Coburn).
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and to prison conditions has not been explored in the Supreme Court’s
discussions.
E. “Self-Regulating Official Behavior”:  Tiers of Authority in the Federation
This integration of 9/11 law with federal court jurisprudence on
jails, prisons, and immigrant detention facilities invites reflections on the
silences and lacunae.  Jenny Martinez described “process as avoidance”437
in the context of 9/11 decisions.  Those are not the only cases in which
the Supreme Court has had difficulty in responding directly to the ques-
tion of what rules ought to apply when the state has total control over
human beings.  Even when faced with detailed descriptions of human
subjugation and of evidence that ought to produce uncertainty about the
legitimacy of ongoing detentions, the Court has repeatedly insulated the
federal judiciary from addressing the merits to decide when an individual
is wrongfully convicted or detained in intolerable conditions.
Yet, in the face of legislative approval reflecting popular support
that, in 2005 and 2006, closed off all redress for 9/11 detainees, a major-
ity of jurists have, in fact, insisted at least upon open processes to afford
protection for liberty.438  Just as some jurists refused total executive au-
thority during prior wars, their contemporary counterparts have done so
again.  The 9/11 habeas cases represent, movingly, the utility of provid-
ing structural insulation for judges, protected from many forms of politi-
cal retribution.  What 9/11 litigation has demonstrated is the value of a
central tenet of the federal courts canon—judicial independence.  An
amalgam of executive and legislative decisions produced Guantánamo, as
well as the prisons, jails, and “residential centers” in Ohio, California,
New York, Arizona, and the hundreds of facilities for the detention of
immigrants.439  Those political processes continue to churn out fear and
anger at persons perceived to be threats, exemplified in 2009 by congres-
sional efforts to cut 9/11 detainees off from transfers to mainland pris-
ons, supermaxes included.440
Nonetheless, independent judges have spoken to detainees as rights-
holders.  Such decisions are examples of what Henry Monaghan argued
to be a critical facet of Article III decisionmaking—the “independent”
437. Martinez, supra note 26, at 1017–18. R
438. The idea that law—personified through judicial decisionmaking—must be
“present,” even in times of terrorism and war, is argued by the then President of the Israeli
Supreme Court.  See Aharon Barak, Foreword:  A Judge on Judging:  The Role of a
Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 19, 151–52 (2002).
439. As the Coleman three-judge court noted, the “massive 750% increase in the
California prison population since the mid-1970s is the result of political decisions made
over three decades, including the shift to inflexible determinate sentencing and the
passage of harsh mandatory minimum and three-strikes laws,” as well as the failure to
provide resources to match the incarceration rate.  Coleman v. Schwarzenegger (Coleman
II), Nos. CIV S-90-0520 & C01-1351, 2009 WL 2430820, at *115 (E.D. Cal. & N.D. Cal. Aug.
4, 2009).
440. See supra notes 425–426 and accompanying text. R
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review of constitutional facts.  While defining that arena remains slippery,
Monaghan has repeatedly insisted that the vitality of a role for the
Supreme Court resides within its delineation of “constitutional facts”
about which it (and lower court judges) will not defer in favor of rulings
by administrative agencies or state courts.441
But 9/11 ought to prompt a reconceptualization of the roles that
state officials could play.  The development of constitutional rights for
criminal defendants and prisoners came through litigation against state
officials—the Arizona police holding Ernesto Miranda in the 1960s, and
the prison officers of Arkansas and Ohio whipping William King Jackson
in the 1970s, and sending Charles Austin to supermax in 2005.  The
habeas cases brought by Guantánamo detainees and by individuals held
in immigration detention bring federal custodians into focus and con-
found a narrative that posited that misbehavior was based in the states.
This frame reveals that custodial excesses know no jurisdictional
bounds, inviting both renewed focus on the constitutional rights of de-
tainees and active participation from an array of government actors, rang-
ing from state judges to executive officials.  The last few decades have
brought attention to state courts as a font of constitutional jurisprudence
that can be more rights-protective than federal precepts.442  Further, state
judges have written about the role played by their courts in the applica-
tion of transnational human rights.443  Yet federal court doctrine has ei-
ther continued to presume that national constitutional law is intrusive
(rather than a useful supplement) or overridden state courts that have
extended protections to criminal defendants beyond what the United
States Constitution has been interpreted to require.444
The rise of federal detention and the revelations of its failings offer
the opportunity to rework legal regimes to recognize robust roles for
441. Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 229, 263–76
(1985); Monaghan, Supreme Court Review, supra note 238, at 1925–26 (2003). R
442. See Martha F. Davis, The Spirit of Our Times:  State Constitutions and
International Human Rights, 30 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 359, 361 (2006); Paul W.
Kahn, Interpretation and Authority in State Constitutionalism, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 1147,
1148 (1993).  This commentary has not focused on detainees.  Further, reported state-
based case law on prisoners’ rights often refers to federal interpretations.  See, e.g., Stolte
v. Cummings, 70 P.3d 695 (Kans. App. 2003) (holding lack of personal hygiene products
not violative of Eighth Amendment or state provisions); Cordova v. LeMaster, 96 P.3d 778
(N.M. 2004) (identifying spousal visitation rights, under both Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments and state counterparts).
443. See, e.g., Shirley S. Abrahamson & Michael J. Fischer, All the World’s a
Courtroom:  Judging in the New Millenium, 26 Hofstra L. Rev. 273, 273 (1997); Margaret
H. Marshall, “Wise Parents Do Not Hesitate to Learn from their Children”:  Interpreting
State Constitutions in an Age of Global Jurisprudence, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1633, 1655
(2004); Resnik, Law’s Migration, supra note 244, at 1627–33. R
444. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940–41 (1996); Arizona v. Evans,
514 U.S. 1, 4 (1995); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1051 (1983).  See generally Edward
A. Purcell, Jr., The Story of Michigan v. Long:  Supreme Court Review and the Workings of
American Federalism, in Federal Courts Stories, supra note 11, at 115, 115–39. R
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state courts and legislators to address the substantive law of detention and
custody.  Further, just as Congress in the 1980s invited the Department of
Justice to play an active role in reforming conditions of confinement in
state institutions, Congress could fund the National Center for State
Courts and the State Justice Institute to support interstate initiatives on
custodial reforms.  Moreover, states—lacking the ability to print money
to fund deficits—bear the brunt of pressures resulting from over-incar-
ceration.  The expense and futility have moved some officials to argue for
alternatives to incarceration.
If 9/11 makes plain the importance of the role to be played by
judges of all jurisdictions, another lesson of the integration of the 9/11
jurisprudence with that of criminal and immigration detention is about
the limits of their interventions.  Return to the history resulting in
Miranda.  A decade earlier,  Jerome Hall had examined the problems of
custodial interrogations and warned against judicial rules of evidence be-
cause, he thought, they could “widen[ ] the gap between law and police
practices.”445  Rather than indirect means of dealing with “serious
abuses,” Hall argued for the imposition of liability on harmdoers, cou-
pled with “discipline and better training of the police.”446
Thereafter, the Court in Miranda crafted the kind of rule that Hall
thought would be too indirect.  To protect against coercive interroga-
tions, the police were obliged to inform defendants of their right to re-
main silent; the price for noncompliance was exclusion of the evidence.
Henry Monaghan read that remedy as constitutional common law, “a sub-
structure of substantive, procedural, and remedial rules drawing their in-
spiration and authority from, but not required by, various constitutional
provisions,” and hence “subject to amendment, modification, or even re-
versal by Congress.”447  But in the 1990s, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing
for the Court in Dickerson v. United States, appeared to give the Court’s
formulation constitutional status when refusing to permit a statotury cut-
back that Congress had enacted soon after Miranda to limit it.448  The
Court enshrined its own authority to set the parameters of investigatory
interrogations in the narrow circumstances to which Miranda now ap-
plies, the “use of unwarned statements . . . in the prosecution’s case in
chief.”449
445. Hall, supra note 225, at 176. R
446. Id.
447. See Monaghan, Constitutional Common Law, supra note 42, at 2–3.  He had R
argued that the case had not established “immutable constitutional status” for warnings,
which were a “famous gloss on the privilege against self-incrimination.”  Rather, the Court
had subsequently “stressed its willingness to accept alternatives” as long as they would
achieve the underlying goal.  Id. at 20.
448. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 438–39 (2000).
449. Id. at 443–44.  As noted above, pending before the Court are questions about
when interrogations can occur without counsel.  In 1981, in Edwards v. Arizona, the Court
held that “[W]hen an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during
custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only
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Hall’s warning about the gaps between legal command and practice
have been substantiated in the recent literature about Miranda’s ef-
fects.450  In a 2008 article, Charles Weisselberg examined the post-
Miranda rulings constraining its import and the police manuals devel-
oped in response to the Supreme Court interrogation case law.451  What
Weisselberg found was that police training materials gave instructions on
how to undercut the effects of the warnings.  Further, suspects often had
little education, rendering them unable to understand whatever warnings
were given.452  John Parry has also detailed studies reporting that “most
suspects waive their rights.”453  As the title of Weisselberg’s article—
“Mourning Miranda”—suggests, he regretted his conclusion that the re-
shaping and implementation of the Miranda rule had failed to secure
protection for individuals at risk of coercion, and had failed to enhance
the efficacy of policing efforts.454  Weisselberg concluded that a system of
“ineffective warnings and waivers is worse than no such system at all;”455
he recommended instead that executive branch officials (including the
police) and legislators prohibit certain forms of deceptive questioning.456
that he responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been
advised of his rights.”  451 U.S. 477, 484 (1981). In 2009, the interpretation of that rule is
before the Court.  See Shatzer v. Maryland, 954 A.2d 1118, 1130–31 (Md. 2008), cert.
granted, 129 S. Ct. 1043 (2009); supra note 432.
450. See, e.g., Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, supra note 221, at 1590–92. R
451. Weisselberg reviewed the police training manuals for more than forty
departments in California (with 75,000 sworn police officers, making it the largest of the
states) as well as federal materials.  Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, supra note 221, at R
1523–24.  He also analyzed how the Court has itself eroded Miranda’s protections by
characterizing the purpose of the rule as protecting rights in a criminal trial against self-
incrimination, rather than as rights about non-coercive interrogations.  Moreover, even
then, certain lines of questioning, such as impeachment, are permissible.  Id. at 1523;  see,
e.g., Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2086–88 (2009); Missouri v. Seiberg, 542 U.S.
600, 607–08 (2004); Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 772–79 (2003).  For example, the
“physical fruits of the suspect’s unwarned but voluntary statements” are admissible.  See
United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 634 (2004).  That plurality decision by  Justice
Thomas stated that “a mere failure to give Miranda warnings does not, by itself, violate”
constitutional rights—it was the use at trial that constituted the violation.  Id. at 641.  “It
follows that police do not violate a suspect’s constitutional rights . . . by negligent or even
deliberate failures to provide the suspect with the full panoply of warnings prescribed by
Miranda.”  Id.  This approach has prompted Peter Brooks to characterize the discussion as
“the eviseration of Miranda.”  See Peter Brooks, Speech, Silence, the Body, in Speech and
Silence in American Law 190, 197 (Austin Sarat, ed., forthcoming 2010) (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
452. See Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, supra note 221 at 1565–68.  One study
“found that . . . disabled subjects understood only about 20 of the critical words comprising
the Miranda vocabulary, compared with the non-disabled subjects who understood 83% of
the words.”  Id. at 1570.
453. Parry, supra note 218, at 1019. R
454. Weisselberg argued, reluctantly, that the “forty-year experiment in reforming
police practices” had not been able to solve the problems “endemic in police
interrogation.”  Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, supra note 221, at 1599–600. R
455. Id. at 1596.
456. Id. at 1596–600.
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Those recommendations echo Hall’s 1953 commentary and what 9/11
teaches:  that frontline decisionmakers—those drafting guidelines for in-
vestigations as well those implementing them—play key roles.  The post-
Miranda case law demonstrates the judicial reluctance to engage in a sus-
tained effort to regulate custodial interrogations and that, even when
judges try to intervene, they are deeply reliant on the behavior and
choices of other actors.
In the painful sequence of events encapsulated through the short-
hand of 9/11, those frontline actors have been pivotal.  Civilian govern-
ment lawyers wrote the Torture Memos, and lawyers (often those serving
in the military) protested the failure of fairness at the CSRTs.  Some
judges and Justices have sought to bar any form of redress, and others
have insisted on information and accountings.  Yet the sum of the post-
9/11 cases provides stark evidence about why Article III judges—the ex-
emplars of independent jurists—can never be enough.  This small (and
sometimes weary) band of judges operate on the fringe, even when they
speak up to bemoan the failures of both the process and the substance of
the decisions of other, lower tier actors.  Henry Monaghan made a paral-
lel point in the context of analyzing Miranda—that judges were, in their
traditional function, appropriately “protecting individual rights” by “pro-
viding guidance to primary actors (law enforcement personnel)” in terms
that were “sufficiently specific”457 to generate “self-regulating official
behavior.”458
Courts sit at a distance from individuals denoted “criminal,” “alien,”
or “terrorist.”  Given the aspiration that these individuals be treated as
“persons” protected by law, implementation rests with intelligence offi-
cials, police officers, immigration authorities, lawyers, and deci-
sionmakers operating at the lowest tiers of the systems that apprehend
and confine such persons.  The jurisprudence of 9/11 serves as a re-
minder of the specific attributes that make Article III judges admirable—
their independent decisional authority and their obligations to treat all
disputants equally, both of which are protected and monitored through
public observation.  The argument here is the need to export those quali-
ties to settings where decisionmakers—whether called judge or not—
hold the power to determine the liberty of others.  The aspirations for
decent treatment of individuals subject to the power of the state run deep
inside American law.  Those precepts are invoked as guiding principles by
both lawyers and non-lawyers during eras when efforts are made to re-
form the practices of confinement.  As this review of the constitutional
law of detention makes painfully clear, if American law is to cherish
human dignity, it will be because more than life-tenured judges make it
do so.
457. Monaghan, Constitutional Common Law, supra note 42, at 20, 23, 26. R
458. Id. at 26.
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